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What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for
the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational
activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short,
thinking has to be minimally logical.
An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our
commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of
understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that thinkers have general abilities
to respond to support and tension among their thoughts. And these abilities are
constituted by following logical rules. So thinkers have to follow logical rules.
But there isn’t just one correct logic for thinking. I show that my view is
consistent with logical pluralism: there are a range of correct logics, any one of which
a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to contain certain
minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and perhaps others.
We follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive
first-person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule
compelling without seeing them as instances of a rule. As a result, there are two
limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to tend to find instances of logical
rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in obviously illogical ways. So thinking
has to be logical – but not perfectly so.
ii
When we try to think, but fail, we produce nonsense. But our failures to think
are often subjectively indistinguishable from thinking. To explain how this occurs, I
offer an account of nonsense. To be under the illusion that some nonsense makes
sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. Our use of nonsense
within the pretence relies on the role of logical form in understanding.
Finally, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out of logical consti-
tutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of logical normativity which
has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I argue that thinking is necessary for
human flourishing, and that this is the source of logical normativity.
iii
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. . . and for all her illegalities
an enemy of misrule.
Anne Carson
0.1 Overview
What is the relation of logic to thinking? Why should we think logically, and what
happens if we don’t? Is it even possible to think illogically?
These are the questions this dissertation seeks to answer. They aren’t new
questions, but my answer is different from the ones that contemporary philosophers
tend to accept. In short, my answer is that following logical rules makes it possible
for us to think, with all the conceptual flexibility that thinking involves. One aspect
of this is that logic is the form of thinking: its skeleton, the internal structure that
holds it up. Another aspect is that logic sets limits to thinking, drawing a line
between thinking and non-thinking.
An analogy may help here. Philosophers sometimes talk about logic as ‘the
laws of thought’, and it’s useful to reflect on which laws they have in mind. Often,
they seem to be thinking of the criminal law, which seeks to impose restrictions on
preexisting activities, like stealing or killing. While the analogy isn’t perfect, I think
logic is better compared to the law of contract. Contract law makes it possible for us
to do new things – to make various sorts of binding promises. It is power-conferring
or facilitative.1 Like the law of contract, logic sets conditions that we have to meet
in order to do something; the ‘penalty’ for falling too far from these conditions is
that we failed to do the thing the rules make possible.
Of course, this is all very imprecise. Making it precise will take up the next
four chapters. My limited aim in this Introduction is to characterize my view in an
1The contrast is from Hart (1961, 27): ‘The criminal law is something which we either obey
or disobey and what its rules require is spoken of as a ‘duty’. ... Legal rules defining the ways in
which valid contracts or wills or marriages are made do not require persons to act in certain ways
whether they wish to or not. Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide
individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes...’
1
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intuitive way and locate it in a historical context. In 0.2, I’ll set out the dominant
view of the relation of logic to thinking, make an objection and comment on the
deeper source of the problem. In 0.3, I’ll introduce my own view, highlighting some
ways that it differs from other views and clarifying what I mean by ‘logic’. In 0.4,
I’ll outline the rest of the dissertation.
0.2 Normativism and illogicality
In this section, I’ll set out the dominant view of the relation of logic to thinking. I
call this view normativism, following Nunez (2018).
Normativism Representational activity counts as thinking only if it is evaluable
by logical rules.
To be clear, I have a lot of common ground with normativists. They hold that
thinking is a distinct kind of representational activity – distinct from perceiving,
sensing, or the mere information-processing of a thermostat. Thinking is the activity
composed of acts of judging and inferring, acts whose contents are propositions
or thoughts. They argue that at least part of what makes an activity thinking
is its relation to logic. More precisely, they argue that there’s some relation a
representational activity must bear to logic in order to count as thinking. I agree
with both of these claims; my disagreement with normativists is about what the
relation is between logic and thinking.
Normativism originates in John MacFarlane’s (2000; 2002) interpretation of
Kant’s philosophy of logic. Here is MacFarlane spelling out the view:
What makes [something] a thought is not that it conforms to the laws
of logic, but that the laws of logic are normative for it. To say that the
laws of logic are norms for thought as such, then, is not to say that it
is impossible to think illogically, but only that it is impossible to think
illogically and be thinking correctly. (2000, 54)
And here is Jessica Leech:
There are some normative laws, evaluability in light of which is constitu-
tive of thought. That’s just what thought is: a mental activity which is
subject to rules of a peculiar kind. (2015, 17)
Normativists say that the relation of logic to thinking is that thinking is evaluable
by logical standards; an activity that isn’t up for logical assessment isn’t thinking
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at all. They emphasize, however, that thinking doesn’t have to conform to those
standards. Evaluability exhausts the relation of logic to thinking.
There are different ways of making normativism precise. One set of options is
about which role logic plays. Steinberger (2019c) distinguishes three roles here: logic
might provide ‘directives’ (standards that ought to guide subjects in their thinking),
‘evaluations’ (standards such that a subject’s thinking goes well or poorly depending
on the subject’s conformity to the standards) or ‘appraisals’ (standards that we use
to praise or criticize other subjects’ thinking). Different norms might be appropriate
for different roles.
The second set of options is about exactly what logic requires of thinkers. These
options can be mapped out as a space of different ‘bridge principles’ (MacFarlane
2004; Field 2009; Steinberger 2019a). A bridge principle is a statement of the form
Bridge Principle If Γ entails q, [normative statement about attitudes to Γ and q].
As MacFarlane shows, we can generate different bridge principles by (among other
things) varying the type of deontic operator, the scope of the operator, whether the
obligation applies to accepting the consequence or not accepting its negation, or
whether the obligation is conditional on knowing that the entailment holds. Here
are some examples:
• If Γ entails q, then if you judge Γ, you ought to judge q.
• If Γ entails q, then if you judge Γ, you have reason not to judge not-q.
• If Γ entails q, then you ought to ensure that if you judge Γ, you judge q.
• If you know that Γ entails q, then if you judge Γ, you may judge q.
However, I’m not going to spend any more time on these different options, because
any view on which such a principle exhausts the relation of logic to thinking faces a
problem.
0.2.1 The problem of illogical thinking
The problem is that, if normativism is right, then thinking can be illogical to an
arbitrary degree.
On the normativist view, the fact that some act of thinking violated a logical
rule typically means that it was bad or prohibited. But no number of claims that
certain acts of thinking were bad or prohibited add up to a claim that they were
not acts of thinking at all. So no matter how often or how badly a subject violates
0. Introduction 4
logical rules – even if every content the subject judges is logically false – the subject
is still thinking.
You might think that I’ve left out part of the view. For example, Leech doesn’t
only say that thought counts as right or wrong in light of logical standards, but that
it must count as right or wrong ‘[i]n order to count as thinking at all’ (2015, 15). So
an act will only count as thinking if it is evaluable by logical standards. Logical laws
are, in Leech’s terms, ‘constitutive-normative’ laws, which ‘separate the Fs from the
non-Fs, not in terms of whether or not something conforms to the law, but in terms
of whether something is subject to or evaluable in light of the law’ (2015, 2). Doesn’t
this rule out the worst cases of illogical thinking?
To assess this response, we have to consider what makes an act evaluable by
logical standards. Not everything is, after all. It makes no sense, for example, to ask
whether my cup of coffee is logical or illogical: the cup of coffee is simply not apt for
evaluation by the standards of logic. So some things are apt for logical evaluation
and others are not. And it can’t be a brute fact that certain things and not others
are apt for logical evaluation. There must be some explanation of why they are apt.
Why shouldn’t a normativist say it’s a brute fact which things are apt for logical
evaluation? This is an unattractive claim – for one thing, it seems to leave potential
explanations on the table. Judgments and sentences contain concepts or terms that
express concepts; the coffee cup does not. Judgments and sentences have logical
structure that determines their truth-conditions; the coffee cup does not. These facts
suggest potential explanations for why judgments and sentences are apt for logical
evaluation and the coffee cup is not. So to propose that the difference in evaluability
is a brute fact would be to give up the investigation too early.
Let’s say that an act is apt for logical evaluation if and only if it meets some
condition C. Given that, for the normativist, an act must be apt for logical evaluation
in order to be thinking, it follows that an act that fails to meet C is not thinking.
For present purposes, we don’t need to know what C is: whatever it is, it faces a
dilemma. Either C rules out arbitrarily illogical thinking or it doesn’t, and neither
option is acceptable.
If C rules out arbitrarily illogical thinking, normativism doesn’t exhaust the
relation of logic to thinking. Normativism might still be true, in that case, but it
would leave out the most fundamental point: an act has to be logical, not just be
evaluable by logic, to be an act of thinking. So if C rules out arbitrarily illogical
thinking, normativism doesn’t capture the most basic way that logic relates to
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thinking as it purports to do.
If C doesn’t rule out illogical thinking – if C can be met by activity which violates
logical rules to whatever degree – then thinking can be illogical to whatever degree.2
Since the normativist purports to capture the most basic way that logic relates
to thinking, this is the way they should go: they should accept the possibility of
arbitrarily illogical thinking.
You might say: what’s the problem? We make mistakes sometimes, so why
couldn’t we always make them?
When I imagine someone whose every judgment has the form of a contradiction
– someone who looks out the window and judges that it is and isn’t raining, that
they should and shouldn’t bring an umbrella, that the rain will and won’t end in an
hour – I’m not inclined to describe them as thinking. First, their ‘judgments’ have
no meaningful connection to their evidence. Whether their evidence supports p or
not-p, they will judge p and not-p. Second, their ‘judgments’ have no real expression
in their conduct: we’re never able to say that their actions make sense given what
they believe. Third, their ‘judgments’ are never related to each other. If each of their
judgments is contradictory, then none of their judgments is rationally supported by
any of the others (although they might entail each other by the rule of Explosion).
But without such links to evidence, conduct and other judgments, it’s not clear how
their judgments can have any content.
Still, I don’t have a decisive argument against this possibility. All I will say is
that the notion of such a thinker is counterintuitive, and that we shouldn’t accept it
unless forced to.
0.2.2 Back to Kant, again
Normativists trace their view back to Kant’s notion of form. Kant said that logical
rules are the ‘form of thinking’ (Critique of Pure Reason A54/B78) and ‘the form of
the understanding’, which is the faculty of thinking (A56/B80). MacFarlane argues
that the core of what Kant meant by this is that logical rules are constitutive norms
for thinking, in the sense that an activity is thinking only if it is evaluable by logical
rules.
2Of course, you might hold that illogical activity meets C, but violates some other necessary
condition for thinking. This position would supplement normativism with a requirement that
thinking conform to logic to some minimal degree. I don’t think this position is wrong, but in
substance, it’s not a supplementation of normativism but a version of my own view.
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Above, I argued that this position is philosophically unsatisfactory. But it’s also
unsatisfactory as a reading of Kant.3 Despite the fact that MacFarlane set out to
investigate what it means to say logic is formal, it remains unclear what the idea of
constitutive norms has to do with form or formality. The form of a thing is what
unifies its elements and makes it the thing it is (Korsgaard 1996, 107): say, the way
pieces of wood are put together to make a bookshelf. And what makes something a
bookshelf isn’t being evaluable by the standards for bookshelves, but conforming
to them to some degree; something which utterly fails to conform to the form of a
bookshelf isn’t a bookshelf at all.
These two defects in normativism are connected. If logic is the structure of
thinking, then thinking has to be logical, at least to some degree, not just be
evaluable by logic. The reason why normativism leaves room for arbitrarily illogical
thinking is that it doesn’t take logic to be the structure of thinking. This connection
is drawn by Hilary Putnam in a suggestive passage:
Logic is not a description of what holds true in “metaphysically possible
worlds”, to use Kripke’s phrase. It is a doctrine of the form of coherent
thought. Even if I think of what turns out to be a “metaphysically
impossible world”, my thought would not be a thought at all unless it
conforms to logic. ... For to say that thought, in the normative sense of
judgment which is capable of truth, necessarily conforms to logic is not to
say something which a metaphysics has to explain. To explain anything
presupposes logic; for Kant, logic is simply prior to all rational activity.
(1994, 247)
Of course, this passage raises a lot of questions. One point is clear, though: if logic
is the form of thinking, then illogical thought is not thought at all.
If this diagnosis is right, then it offers a clue for a way beyond normativism. A
better philosophy of logic should try to develop the Kantian insight that the basic
way logic relates to thinking is by providing its constituting structure.
0.3 Logic as constitutive of thinking
While this Kantian insight is – to my mind – a compelling one, it has been neglected
in contemporary philosophy of logic. One reason for this, I think, is that the insight
3I’m not pretending to do responsible Kant scholarship here; I’m taking Kant’s ideas as a clue for
contemporary philosophy of logic. For further discussion of Kant’s views, see Tolley (2006), Stang
(2014), Merritt (2015), Lu-Adler (2017) and Boyle (2020).
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has been articulated into an account whose central theses are mostly false. Rejecting
these theses has led philosophers to neglect the insight that they purport to capture.
In this dissertation, I show that the insight is better articulated – with the
help of some more recent philosophical material – into an account that looks very
different. In this section, I’ll spell out the contrast between what the Kantian insight
is commonly taken to mean and what I take it to mean. Following this, I’ll explain
my usage of ‘logic’.
Any account of logic as the form of thinking needs to answer a series of difficult
questions. Why does thinking need logic? Is there one specific logic that it needs?
If logic is the form of thinking, does that mean it’s impossible to think illogically?
Where, exactly, is the line between thinking and non-thinking? What happens when
you fail to think? What is wrong with failing to think?
At a high level of abstraction, contemporary philosophers who seek to develop
the Kantian insight into a more determinate theory have answered these questions
as follows. (I don’t claim that each of the authors cited would accept all six theses,
but each would accept most of them, and together they form a coherent picture.)
(T1) The basic relation of logic to thought is that logic makes it possible to represent
reality in a way that is either true or false. Without logic, your representations
might have correctness-conditions, but not truth-conditions (Rödl 2006, 353).
(T2) There’s one universally correct logic. Someone who followed a different logic
would be a logical alien, which makes no sense (Conant 1992).
(T3) Illogical thinking is impossible. While subjects can make logical errors, the acts
in which they make those errors are not acts of thinking (Tolley 2006, 385).
(T4) There’s a sharp line between thinking and non-thinking. At any given moment,
a subject is either thinking or they aren’t; there are no in-between cases.
Thinking is a distinctively self-conscious representational activity (Kimhi 2018,
53), and you either have this self-consciousness or you don’t.
(T5) When you fail to think, nothing at all happens at the level of thought, even if
you’re under the impression that you are thinking. You aren’t exercising your
logical or conceptual capacities in such cases (Moore 2000, 198).
(T6) Logic is normative purely in virtue of being constitutive of thinking. Illogical
thinking is bad just because it isn’t thinking at all (Merritt 2015, 483).
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By contrast, despite fully expressing the Kantian insight that logic is the structure
of thinking, the account I develop in this dissertation rejects each of these theses.4
Let me elaborate on my account a little before stating my alternatives to T1–T6.
The core claim in my account is
Logical Constitutivism A subject’s representational activity counts as thinking
only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules.
In arguing for this claim, I start from the theory of understanding – the theory of
how we understand concepts and thoughts (Peacocke 2008). In my view, the right
theory of understanding has to allow for the flexibility of our grasp of thoughts; I
show that this flexibility requires that thinkers be sensitive to, or follow, logical rules.
So thinking requires following logical rules.
Now, being sensitive to logical rules doesn’t mean explicitly knowing logical
propositions, and nor does it mean always conforming to them. Rather, it means
that we tend to find instances of those rules compelling. For example, the inference
from p and if p, then q to q is tempting, and judging p and not-p seems unacceptable.
Putting this account of rule-following together with the requirement that thinkers
follow logical rules generates two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to
tend to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers can’t think in
obviously illogical ways. As a result, in my account, thinking has to be logical – but
not perfectly so.
I develop two important consequences of this view. First, anyone who thinks
that there’s a limit on illogical thinking must hold that sometimes we fail to think
by virtue of illogicality. In such cases, we produce nonsense. But theorists who
accept this consequence have an obligation to explain what nonsense is, and how
non-thinking can seem the same (from the inside) as thinking. I show that, when
we fail to think, we can exercise our conceptual capacities in a way that makes our
activity seem like thinking.
Second, while an account of the normativity of logic doesn’t fall directly out
of logical constitutivism, I explain how to build such an account with logical con-
stitutivism as an integral part. By giving this account, I recapture the intuition
4This way of presenting my view is inspired by Paoli’s (2007) discussion of relevant logic. Tyke
Nunez has also developed a modified Kantian account, but it remains committed to T1 (Nunez
2018, 1175), T2 (2018, 1176), T3 and T4 (2018, 1164), though not T5. Nunez aims to distance
himself from T6 (2018, 1162), but, as I’ll argue in Chapter 6, he doesn’t go far enough.
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that logic is normative without ceding ground to the normativist error that logic is
fundamentally evaluative of thinking rather than constitutive of it.
As you might suspect, my answers to the questions I raised earlier are very
different from T1 to T6.
(T1’) The basic relation of logic to thought is that logic makes possible the conceptual
freedom that thinking involves – the freedom to question, modify or even reject
seemingly obvious conceptual connections without loss of understanding.
(T2’) There isn’t just one correct logic for thinking, but a range of correct logics, any
one of which a thinker might follow. A logic for thinking does, however, have to
contain certain minimal principles: Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction, and
possibly others. So there’s room for different individuals, different communities
or different species of thinkers to follow different rules, but within limits.
(T3’) Illogical thinking is possible. A thinker might accidentally judge a contradiction,
or reject a direct consequence of their beliefs, because they were inattentive,
because the thoughts involved were too complicated to understand, or simply
because their logical capacities misfired on that occasion. However, thinking
can’t be illogical to an arbitrary degree.
(T4’) The line between between thinking and non-thinking is vague, because it is
vague how often your capacities can misfire before you fail to count as being
sensitive to logical rules at all. As a result, there might be borderline cases
between thinking and non-thinking.
(T5’) When you fail to think, you can exercise your logical and conceptual capacities
within the scope of a pretence that you’re thinking. This allows you to reason
with nonsense and embed it within that-clauses.
(T6’) Being constitutive alone is not enough for normativity: many activities have
internal standards without those standards being normative. Logic is normative
because thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
These claims are defended in Chapters 1 to 6, respectively.
0.3.1 What I mean by ‘logic’
You might have noticed that I haven’t said what I mean by ‘logic’. In this section,
I’ll rectify that omission and clarify the order of conceptual priority in my discussion.
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Before this, a brief note on symbolism. Except where otherwise stated, lower-case
italic letters like p and q range over thoughts; upper-case italic letters like P and Q
range over sentences in artificial object-languages; and capital Greek letters like Γ
and ∆ range over sets of either thoughts or sentences, depending on context. Instead
of using corner quotes, logical symbols like → are used as names of the identical
object-language symbols; concatenation in the metalanguage (i.e. in the language
I’m using now) stands for concatenation of the object-language symbols (Church
1956, §8).
In this dissertation, I’ll use ‘logical concepts’ to mean a set of concepts which
express topic-neutral rational relations among thoughts, and which are constituted
by rules of inference, or ‘logical rules’. I’ll use ‘logic’ more loosely to refer either to
logical concepts or logical rules. Logic is topic-neutral in the following sense: if an
inference from some premises Γ to a conclusion q is logically valid, it is so regardless
of the subject-matter of the thoughts in Γ and q. Here’s an example of a logical rule
that we’ll return to in later chapters.
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
It’s natural to write down logical rules as imperatives, but this notational choice isn’t
meant to beg any philosophical questions: in particular, it isn’t meant to suggest
that the rule on its own has normative force.5 For present purposes, all we need is a
way of specifying the class of transitions that the rule licenses.
Of course, this isn’t the only thing one might mean by ‘logic’. For example, it’s
far removed from a conception of logic as a science continuous with other sciences
(Williamson 2013). But the idea that logic is a set of concepts which express topic-
neutral rational relations among thoughts, constituted by rules which all thinkers
must follow, is in line with a long tradition. It goes back at least as far as Kant,
who wrote that ‘the universal and necessary rules of thought in general can concern
merely its form’ (Jäsche Logic 528), and Hegel, who wrote that logic’s content ‘is
nothing but our own thinking and its ordinary determinations’ (Encyclopedia Logic
45).
This conception was taken up and reworked by early analytic philosophers like
Frege, who wrote that logic’s task is ‘saying what holds with the utmost generality for
all thinking, whatever its subject-matter’ (‘Logic’ 128), and Wittgenstein, who wrote
that ‘the sole logical constant [is] what all propositions, by their nature, [have] in
5For this point, see Harman (1986, 5).
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common with one another’ (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.47), and that thinking
illogically is impossible (5.4731). I think these philosophers were on to something,
and what I’m doing is continuous with their work – although I differ from them on
many points of detail, just as they differed from each other.
So much about my conception of logic. But I want to be clear about the role
this conception plays in my discussion. I’m not assuming that thinkers must possess
concepts which express topic-neutral rational relations among thoughts. Nor am I
assuming that the concepts which play this role are ones which we would ordinarily
think of as logical – concepts like negation or the conditional. Rather, both of these
are claims that I will argue for in the course of the discussion. So you don’t have to
agree with these claims at the outset: this is just a preview of where we’re headed.
At this point, you might worry that this order of priorities brings me dangerously
close to psychologism – the view that logical rules are either generalizations about
how we in fact think, or natural laws of thinking (Husserl, Logical Investigations
§21-24). The short answer is that it doesn’t: my claim is that logic is constitutive
of thinking, not descriptive of it. The longer answer is that this worry rests on
conflating the order of knowledge with the order of being. My argument starts
from the activity of thinking, and shows that a certain relation to certain rules is a
condition of the possibility of that activity. (Roughly speaking, it’s a transcendental
argument.) Then, I follow Kant et. al. in calling rules that play this role ‘logical’.
So in the order of knowledge, I begin from thinking and end with logic.
But it doesn’t follow from this that logic is grounded in thinking. Just the
opposite: logic is part of what makes thinking possible. In the order of being,
thinking is grounded in logic. If q is a logical truth, it is true regardless of its relation
to thinking, and if there were no thinkers around, q would still be true. So I wholly
agree with Frege that you can only explain why a logical truth is true by reducing it
to another logical truth (Basic Laws xvii), and not by appealing to any facts about
thinking. As Woleński (2003, 186) nicely puts it, if q is a logical truth and ∆ is a
set of psychological truths, you only have ∆ ` q if you have ` q; the psychological
truths are never needed as premises.
Getting these priorities straight matters because it bears on the connection
between my account and the deductive systems produced by mathematical logicians –
that is, theories about consequence relations that hold among sentences of artificial
languages. My conception of logic didn’t make any reference to deductive systems. In
fact, there’s no upfront guarantee that logic and deductive systems have anything to
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do with each other. This means that my account is upstream of several contemporary
debates: I don’t presuppose a criterion for demarcating logical from non-logical
constants (Tarski 1966; Etchemendy 1990) or a theory of logical necessity (McFetridge
1990). Nor do I have to start with any assumptions about whether there’s one correct
logic (understood as a deductive system) or many (Beall & Restall 2005).
This isn’t to say that my account has no bearing on these debates – only that its
bearing will depend on what the connection is between logic and deductive systems,
and this connection needs to be argued for, not assumed. Moreover, any connection
that does exist between logic and deductive systems is likely to be weaker than
identity, so not everything that’s true of one has to be true of the other. If logic is
constitutive of thinking, it doesn’t follow that the Hilbert-style axiomatization of
classical logic you teach your students is constitutive of thinking.
Of course, it is an interesting question what the connection is between logic in
my sense and the theories produced by logicians: are the rules we think with the
same as the rules in some formulation of, say, classical or intuitionistic logic? Is
there just one set of correct rules, or are there many different ones? I investigate
these questions in Chapter 2. It would also be interesting to explore whether my
account generates a demarcation criterion, or an explanation of logical necessity, but
I haven’t done that here.
0.4 Dissertation outline
The next four chapters comprise Part I of the dissertation. These chapters develop
logical constitutivism.
In Chapter 1, I argue that thinkers have to follow logical rules. The argument
begins with a holistic account of understanding, which recognizes that thinkers are
free to question, modify or even reject seemingly obvious conceptual connections
without loss of understanding. Much recent work in the theory of understanding has
emphasized this kind of freedom and its importance in the development of thought. I
show that, on this holistic account, thinkers have to have general abilities to respond
to the rational relations among their thoughts. These abilities are constituted by
possessing logical concepts. So thinkers have to possess logical concepts, and follow
the rules that govern those concepts.
In Chapter 2, I explore the interactions between logical constitutivism, dis-
agreement about which logic is correct and logical pluralism. I argue that my view
0. Introduction 13
doesn’t rule out the possibility of rational disagreement about which logic is correct
and that it allows for two kinds of logical pluralism: different logics might be correct
in different domains, and thinkers might also use different logics to think about the
same domain. In this sense, there are a range of correct logics, any one of which a
thinker might follow. I briefly comment on which logics meet the requirements.
In Chapter 3, I consider what it is to follow logical rules. I argue that we
follow logical rules by exercising logical capacities, which display a distinctive first-
person/third-person asymmetry: a subject can find the instances of a rule compelling
without seeing them as instances of a rule. Recognizing this asymmetry helps to
resolve certain puzzles about the sense in which reasoning involves following rules.
On the resulting view, we can have and exercise logical capacities without always
conforming to the rules.
In Chapter 4, I argue for two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to
tend to be sensitive to logical rules. In response to an objection, I observe that this
limit is vague, and show how different treatments of vagueness can be brought to
bear on the problem. Second, I argue, thinkers can’t think in an obviously illogical
way. I clarify the sense in which it’s impossible to judge a contradiction and show
that this is consistent with reductio proofs.
That concludes my development of logical constitutivism. The chapters in Part
II, which were written as standalone papers, spell out two important consequences
of the account.
My view entails that sometimes, because of illogicality, we fail to think. In such
cases we produce nonsense. Anyone who accepts this consequence has an obligation
to explain what nonsense is, and how failing to think can seem the same (from the
inside) as thinking. So in Chapter 5, I give an account of nonsense. The account I
give doesn’t depend on the views defended elsewhere in the dissertation, and applies
to a broader class of failures to think than those due to illogicality alone: for example,
if category mistakes are nonsense, then my account applies to them too. I argue that
an adequate account of nonsense has to meet two constraints: it has to explain how
our engagement with nonsense is like our engagement with sense, but it has to avoid
assimilating nonsense to sense. I show that some existing accounts fail to meet one
constraint or the other, and propose an account that meets both. On my proposed
account, our engagement with nonsense is an exercise of imagination that draws on
the role of logical form in understanding.
You might wonder whether logic is normative on my account. Chapter 6
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addresses this question. I show that, while the normativity of logic doesn’t fall
directly out of logical constitutivism, it’s possible to build an attractive account of
logical normativity which has logical constitutivism as an integral part. I start by
trying to develop an account of logical normativity on analogy with constitutivism
in metaethics, and show that this attempt fails: even if logic divides thinking from
non-thinking, this doesn’t show that we have any reason to think. However, logical
normativity does follow if we supplement my account with a claim about the value of
thinking. In particular, I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing, and
that this is the source of the normativity of logic. The resulting account also deals





1 Why thinking needs logic
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I argue for a precise version of the thesis that logic is necessary
for thinking. The idea that there is something essentially logical about thinking,
that thinking cannot take place outside of a logical framework, is an old one in
analytic philosophy. It can be found in early works of mathematical logic, like
Boole’s The Laws of Thought, which takes logical laws to govern the basic operations
of the mind, such that mathematical logic is a clue to the ‘Constitution of the
Intellect’, and Frege’s Begriffsschrift, which presents its symbolism as a ‘Formula
Language for Pure Thought’. The same idea shows up in a strong form in the
early Wittgenstein’s insistence that thought ‘can never be of anything illogical’
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 3.03), i.e. that it is ‘impossible to represent in
language anything that “contradicts logic”’ (3.032) and more weakly in Quine’s
dismissal of the possibility of ‘prelogical mentality’ (1960, 58; 1974, 80).
But the idea is not quite so popular these days: it is sometimes explicitly denied,
for example by Brandom (1994, 383), and is certainly not taken for granted. One
reason for this is that the rather rigid theories of understanding that motivated the
idea in early analytic philosophy are themselves less popular than they were.1 This
makes it less obvious, on contemporary views, why thinking would need logic. In
this chapter, I show that even in a contemporary theory of understanding which
emphasizes the flexibility of our grasp of concepts, thinkers must follow logical rules
– indeed, that logic makes this flexibility possible.
1.1.1 Terminology
Before sketching my argument, let me clarify some terms. I’ve been talking about
‘thinking’. This word is used in various ways. Sometimes it is used as a catch-all for
activity with representational content – as, for example, by Descartes in the Second
Meditation: ‘Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that
1Another likely culprit is that the idea gets conflated with psychologism. Absent this conflation,
the idea is not directly threatened by the deluge of psychological results showing that our beliefs are
sometimes irrational (see Bergamaschi Ganapini (2019, 4) for a summary and references).
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doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.’
I’m using the term in a more discriminating sense. ‘Thinking’ is not a term for
the genus, representational activity, but for a particular species of representational
activity. It is the representational activity composed of acts of judging and inferring,
acts whose contents are propositions or ‘thoughts’. Exactly what distinguishes
thinking from other kinds of representational activity is a difficult question, and I’m
not proposing to answer it here. I am going to presuppose, however, that thinking
some thought p requires understanding p; this link may not hold for other kinds of
representational activity, such as asserting.
A couple more qualifications will help to focus my discussion. First, in a full
account of thinking, we might also want to account for peripheral cases such as
entertaining a thought or reasoning under a supposition. Here I focus on the core
cases. Entertaining and supposing raise different issues, because some of the norms of
judging and inferring seem to be suspended in these cases: we have good reason not
to judge a contradiction, but no reason not to entertain one. Second, I’m assuming
that judging is binary rather than allowing for varying degrees of confidence. If we
instead conceived of judging in terms of degrees, we might hold that the axioms of
probability have a role similar to that which I defend for logic. This suggestion could
find additional support in the claim that the axioms of probability are merely ‘a way
of applying standard logic to beliefs, when beliefs are seen as graded’ (Christensen
2004, 15). But without a detailed consideration of whether logic and probability are
so closely related, I prefer to leave this issue open.
Next, ‘logic’. Many people use ‘logic’ to refer to a theory of the sort produced by
logicians, or the discipline to which those theories belong. Typically, these theories
are about a consequence relation that holds among sentences of a formal language.
That is not what I will mean. I use ‘logical concepts’ to mean a set of concepts which
express topic-neutral rational relations among thoughts, and which are constituted
by rules of inference, or ‘logical rules’. An example of a logical rule is Modus Ponens:
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
My claim is that thinkers have to possess logical concepts, which they do by following
logical rules. But it’s important to be clear on the conceptual order here. I’m not
presupposing that thinkers have such concepts, or that these concepts are ones we
would ordinarily think of as logical. Rather, I’m going to argue that thinkers must
have such concepts, and that they include at least some of the concepts we would
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ordinarily think of as logical – namely, the conditional and negation. The premises of
my argument don’t presuppose anything about logic: in fact, the word ‘logic’ doesn’t
appear at all in sections 1.2 or 1.3.
1.1.2 Thesis and argument
My thesis is that a subject’s representational activity counts as thinking only if it
manifests sensitivity to the rules which constitute the concepts of the conditional
and negation. More concisely, I argue for
Logical Concepts A thinker must possess concepts of the conditional and negation.
It follows from my discussion of these concepts that possessing them involves sensitiv-
ity to logical rules. In this chapter, I’m going to rely on our intuitive sense of what it
is to ‘be sensitive to’ or ‘follow’ a rule; in Chapter 3, I address this question head-on.
For now, the rough idea is that you can follow a rule without always conforming to
it, but you have to tend to conform, and to conform because that is what the rule
says, not just by accident (Wedgwood 2006).
By way of initial motivation for this thesis, observe that there seems to be a limit
on how incoherent someone’s representational activity can be while they still count as
thinking. As Jane Heal puts it, ‘completely unsuccessful and chaotic thought, thought
in which no shred of truth or rational connectedness is discernible, is an incoherent
notion’ – although of course this ‘does not deny the possibility of extremely bizarre
beliefs, great degrees of muddle, contradiction and so forth’ (1989, 89).
My argument for this thesis goes in three main steps. First, in 1.2 I develop
a holistic constraint on understanding a thought. I start with the idea that un-
derstanding any thought requires appreciating its rational relations to some other
thoughts. I use some cases of ‘deviant understanding’ to motivate a holist reading
of this idea as against a more rigid inferentialist reading of it. Second, in 1.3 I give
an explanation of why this holism holds: namely, that thinkers must have general
abilities to respond to relations of support and tension among thoughts. I show that
this explanation fits the phenomenon better than its competitors. Third, in 1.4 I
argue that we have these abilities by possessing logical concepts – in particular, the
conditional and negation. Following this, in 1.5 I show that this view makes sense
given the Quinean roots of holism about understanding and in 1.6 I conclude.
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1.2 The holistic constraint on understanding
You’re doodling on a piece of paper. What does it take for a mark on the paper
to represent an eye?2 A mark on its own isn’t naturally interpreted as an eye or
anything else. One way of getting a mark to represent an eye is by putting it in the
context of a face: for example, a dot can represent an eye if you put another dot
next to it, and draw a circle around them, and maybe a line underneath the dots
to make things extra-clear. Another way is to make the mark look like an eye: in
other words, to put it in the context of other marks which represent parts of an eye
– pupil, iris, eyelashes. And there are other ways.3 While there’s no single context
you need to make a mark represent an eye, you do need some context or other.
In this section I’ll defend a holistic constraint on understanding a thought. It
says that understanding is, in this way, like drawing an eye.
Holism Understanding a thought p requires sensitivity to some of its rational
relations to other thoughts.
I’ll say more about technical terms like ‘sensitivity’ and ‘rational relations’ below;
for now, the rough idea is that understanding p involves relating p to other thoughts.
While there is no single set of relations you need to grasp in order to understand p,
you do need to grasp some set or other. I’m not proposing this as a full account of
understanding, but as a necessary condition for understanding.
Before arguing for holism, I want to distinguish it from two other views with
which it might be confused. First, holism about understanding is different from
holism about meaning (Heal 1994). Holism about meaning says that the meaning
of a sentence s is constituted by the meanings of all the sentences in the language
to which that sentence belongs, such that if there is a change in the meaning of
any other sentence, then the meaning of s changes (Dummett 1975). This has the
unpalatable consequence that, if two speakers have slightly different idiolects, then
they can’t mean the same thing by any sentence. At the level of language, holism
about understanding does entail that understanding s requires understanding some
range of other sentences, but it doesn’t follow that the meaning of s depends on
the meanings of these other sentences. Holism about understanding is more closely
2This example is from Heal (2017, 312).
3They don’t all involve more drawing. You might just declare, ‘this is an eye.’ But then the
utterance provides context for the mark; indeed, the meaning of the mark is parasitic on the meaning
of the utterance.
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related to the metasemantic thesis that conferring a meaning on s requires conferring
a meaning on some range of other sentences. It’s consistent with this that the
meaning of s remains the same while the meaning of some other sentence changes.
Second, holism about understanding is different from holism about confirmation,
Quine’s (1951) view that it doesn’t make sense to speak of confirming or falsifying
a single statement on its own, as only a collection of statements can be confirmed
or falsified. Holism about confirmation might be false while it remained true that
understanding a thought requires placing it among a range of other thoughts. Again,
then, the two theses are distinct.4
I’ll argue for holism as follows. First, I’ll argue for the general claim that
understanding one thing requires understanding others: in short, understanding
requires a setting (Heal 1994, 334). Second, I’ll motivate holism in particular by
reflecting on cases of deviant understanding. These cases were first introduced by
Tyler Burge and taken up by Timothy Williamson as counterexamples to purportedly
analytic truths and analytic inferences, but they are also examples of a distinctive
kind of conceptual freedom which provides support for holism.
1.2.1 Understanding requires a setting
In this section I argue that understanding requires a setting: understanding a thought
p requires sensitivity to its rational relations to a range of other thoughts.
By ‘rational relations’, I mean at least the following two kinds of relations:
relations of rational support, where q is a consequence of p, and relations of rational
tension, where r is incompatible with p. By ‘sensitivity’, I mean that the subject has
to grasp, or recognize, the way that taking up or revising a position on q or r could
give them reason to take up or revise their position on p. This characterization is
intentionally loose, and I’ll return to it below. For now, I’m leaving it open whether
sensitivity involves knowledge, or even beliefs, about these rational relations.
Let me clarify a few points. First, these relations need not be formal ones, like
4Quine suggests that the two theses go together (1974, 38): ‘An observation may refute some
chunk of theory comprising a cluster of sentences, and still leave us free to choose which of the
component sentences to continue to count as true and which to abandon. ... The semantical
relation of observation to the theoretical language is similarly intricate and indirect, since we learn
the language only partly by associating terms or sentences directly with observation, and partly
by linking them to one another. The evidence relation, in all its intricacy, and the semantical
relation, in all its intricacy, are coextensive still.’ But this coextensiveness depends on Quine’s
account of understanding; in principle, you could hold Quinean views about evidence but not about
understanding.
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the tension between p and not-p – indeed, it’s a mistake to hold that all rational
relations are formal (Brandom 1994, 97ff.). Second, in a fuller treatment we would
also have to include cases where p and r together support q, although neither p nor
r support q on their own: where the support-relation is not a V-shape with separate
lines from p and r to q, but a Y-shape (Berker 2015, 330). Similarly, we would have
to include cases where p, q and r are in tension, although no two of them are in
tension. However, these cases are more demanding than the binary case of support
or tension between two thoughts, so I leave them aside. If the binary case already
requires logic, this conclusion won’t be threatened by adding the higher-arity cases.
Third, there might be weak relations of support where p increases the likelihood
of q by some small degree, but not enough to license believing q on the basis of
p (or the converse for tension). Accounting for such cases would require me to
consider degrees of belief and the way the axioms of probability govern credences,
and I’m not going to do that here. Still, I take it that a thinker has to be sensitive to
some rational relations which are strong enough to justify an inference, and indeed
that thinkers do sometimes correctly infer on the basis of such rational relations.
Ichikawa & Jarvis (2013) also develop a view in which understanding a thought
involves sensitivity to its objective rational relations, but they take these relations to
be conclusive – indefeasible except in cases of compromised rationality (2013, 44).
I’m not going to assume that the rational relations I consider are conclusive, but I’ll
comment in 1.4.1 on what difference this further assumption would make.
Finally, while my discussion focuses on relations of support and tension between
thoughts, and while I take sensitivity to such relations between thoughts to be
essential for thinking, it’s important to note that support and tension don’t only
hold between thoughts. There are also the relations that Sellars called ‘language-
entry’ and ‘language-exit’ (1974, 423). A thought can be rationally supported by
perceptual evidence, and perhaps by other kinds of evidence, such as testimony; by
the same token, it can stand in tension with evidence. A thought can rationally
support actions, as it does in belief-desire explanation, and by the same token can
stand in tension with them. I think these connections with evidence and action
are necessary for thoughts to have content. This point goes back to Kant’s claim
that ‘[w]ithout sensibility no object would be given to us’ (CPR A51/B75) and
Burge’s (1977) argument that having beliefs de dicto presupposes having beliefs de re.
But entry and exit aren’t sufficient; grasp of relations among thoughts is necessary too.
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The thought that understanding requires a setting is suggested by an observation
that Gareth Evans made in arguing against simple dispositional accounts of belief.
Building on Ryle’s observation that intelligent capacities are ‘not single-track dispo-
sitions, but dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous’ (1949,
44), Evans noted a difference between the ‘beliefs’ we attribute to animals and those
of human beings (1982, 336-7).
The rat manifests the ‘belief’ [that something is poisonous] in only one
way – by not eating – whereas there is no limit to the ways in which the
ordinary belief that something is poisonous might be manifested. The
subject might manifest it by, for example, preventing someone else from
eating the food, or by giving it to a hated enemy, or by committing
suicide with it. ... One who possesses a belief will typically be sensitive
to a wide variety of ways in which it can be established (what it can be
inferred from), and a wide variety of different ways in which it can be
used (what can be inferred from it).
The rat can only do one thing with its ‘belief’, while the human being can do an
open-ended range of things with it, including being able to support the belief in
various ways and derive various consequences from it. This suggests that sensitivity
to some of the rational relations of a belief is essential to having the belief in the
first place. (This is not to say the rat has no representational content at all – just
that it doesn’t have beliefs.)
Consider what would follow if we denied that understanding requires a setting.
It follows, first of all, that someone could think p while being wholly insensitive to
the rational relations between p and other thoughts. But then it would seem that
any other thoughts the thinker understood would be making no contribution to the
thinker’s understanding of p. So it would seem possible that someone could think a
single thought p as the entirety of their mental life.5 Now, I don’t have much of an
argument against this possibility, and it has occasionally been accepted, for instance
by Jerry Fodor (1987, 89). But to me it seems absurd. I can’t imagine a case where
we would have reason to attribute one thought to a creature without having reason
to attribute any others.
Of course, without accepting interpretivism – that to have a thought is to be
interpretable as having it – it doesn’t follow that there could be no such creature. But
5Kwong (2007) denies that possessing a concept requires possessing others, but maintains that
acquiring a concept requires possessing others. But on Kwong’s view the one-thought mind is still
metaphysically possible – its concepts just have to be innate rather than acquired.
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the fact that we are pressed to acknowledge a possibility which we could never have
reason to take to be actual still seems problematic. What would make it the case that
the creature is thinking p rather than some other nearby thought p’, if the creature
isn’t able to recognize any of the grounds or consequences that distinguish p and
p’? Note that, while some have argued that our thoughts are perfectly determinate
(Ross 1992; BonJour (ms.)), I’m not taking such a strong position here. Quine (1960,
§15) may be right that all our thoughts are indeterminate to some degree. It doesn’t
follow that any degree of indeterminacy is consistent with thinking; it seems more
likely that there’s a limit on how indeterminate a thought can be, and the creature
who can only think p is past that limit.
Suppose, for example, that p is the thought this is square (had while the creature
is looking at a table). What would make it the case that our creature, incapable
of having any other thoughts, is thinking this is square rather than, say, this is
rectangular? In any situation where the former is true, the latter is, too. The ordinary
way of telling these cases apart rests on the fact that this is square requires more
specific grounds than this is rectangular, and that that it has broader consequences –
for instance, it lets you infer all of its sides are the same length. But this sort of
thing is, by hypothesis, unavailable. Nor can we appeal to the fact that the table the
creature is looking at is square: this fact is only there to appeal to in cases where
the creature is thinking truly, but it’s surely possible to think falsely that something
is square (Millikan 1984, 7). In any event, if the table is square, it’s rectangular too,
so this consideration fails to distinguish the two thoughts. Indeed, the table also has
a colour (say, green) which is also visible to the creature, so this consideration fails
even to distinguish this is square from this is green. It seems to me that if we have
grounds to attribute the thought this is square but not this is rectangular or this is
green, then we must also have grounds to attribute some other thoughts.
You might suggest that language-entry and language-exit are sufficient for under-
standing: in other words, although the creature doesn’t recognize any links between
p and other thoughts, it’s sufficient if it recognizes links between p, evidence for
p and action supported by p. But there are two problems with this suggestion.
First, while they are likely essential for contentful thought, links with evidence and
action on their own do not confer determinacy. The rat might be disposed to form a
representation in response to the colour or smell of its food, and it might be disposed
not to eat the food when it has formed this representation, but that isn’t enough to
attribute to it a determinate thought: a thought is ‘conceptually too rich for the
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purpose’ (Dummett 1994, 122). In the case of human beings, links with action and
evidence do seem to justify attributing determinate thoughts, but this is because
they manifest connections with other thoughts as well: if the subject gives the food
to a hated enemy, this might justify attributing the belief that it was poisoned, but
only against a background of other beliefs.
Second, a subject whose representations are tied this closely to evidence and
action violates a requirement on thought which Elizabeth Camp (2009, 288) calls
‘stimulus-independence’:
genuine thought involves a clear distinction between representation and
represented, so that the former can occur even in the latter’s absence.
... Because thoughts are at least partly constituted by their contents,
understanding a thought requires grasping the conditions required for
its satisfaction. But if a thinker really does grasp those conditions of
satisfaction, as opposed to simply being confronted by the conditions
themselves, then its grasp of those conditions should be relatively inde-
pendent of its current circumstances. Otherwise, the world, and not the
thinker, is shouldering the bulk of the representational burden. And if
this is so, then that “thinker” really is just a passive reactor.
Camp’s idea – which, as she notes, has roots in Dummett (1994, 123) and McDowell
(1994, 57) – is that understanding a thought requires an ability to think it indepen-
dently of being confronted by the situation the thought is about. But a creature
which only makes language-entry and language-exit transitions, and not transitions
between thoughts, is unable to think a thought without being confronted by, or taking
itself to be confronted by, evidence for that thought, so it lacks stimulus-independence.
Without discussing the connection between stimulus-independence and understand-
ing, I don’t want to put too much weight on this point. But to the extent that
the connection is plausible, it tells against the suggestion that language-entry and
language-exit are sufficient for understanding.
So there’s strong reason to accept that understanding requires a setting. As
it stands, however, there are different versions of this claim, depending which
sets of rational relations are said to be required for understanding. One version
is inferentialism – the view that understanding a thought requires recognizing a
particular set of rational relations involving that thought (Peacocke 1992). But
it’s possible to maintain that understanding requires a setting while refusing the
inferentialist gloss, which involves drawing a distinction between ‘canonical’ and ‘non-
canonical’ rational relations – a rational relation being canonical for p iff recognizing
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that relation is necessary for understanding p. Holism accepts that understanding
requires a setting without commitment to this distinction.6 In the next section, I
introduce cases of deviant understanding, which support holism specifically.
1.2.2 Deviant understanding
In this section I’ll discuss cases of deviant understanding – that is, cases where a
subject understands a thought p in a deviant way, rejecting obvious truths containing
p or obviously valid inferences involving p. I’m not going to define deviance or
obviousness, as my argument doesn’t require any precise distinction between deviant
and non-deviant understanding. The cases I’ll discuss were introduced by Burge,
and taken up by Williamson, as counterexamples to purportedly analytic truths or
inferences, but my interest here is in the distinctive freedom that subjects in these
cases display. I’ll argue that making room for this phenomenon requires holism.
Consider the thought this is a sofa. Most people consider it obvious that this is
a sofa entails this is for sitting on; it might seem that anyone who fails to accept this
consequence fails to understand this is a sofa. But Burge (1986) shows that, with a
bit of imagination, we can tell a story in which a speaker understands this is a sofa
but rejects the link in question. Suppose we meet somebody who is able to identify
sofas and uses the word in a syntactically appropriate way, but who staunchly denies
that they are for sitting on. When we ask why not, we get the following response:
“Sofas are, in fact, items of religious worship. That’s why we traditionally
keep them in the most central part of the house, and why so much
attention is lavished on their design and materials. Of course, most
people don’t realize this; they think that a sofa is just a regular piece
of household furniture. What people don’t know is that, in the early
years of the 20th century, there was an extensive – and highly successful
– propaganda campaign to eradicate the sofa cult. And what better way
to degrade a religious item than to convince people everywhere to sit on
it? As I say, the campaign was so successful that, today, hardly anybody
knows about it: but none of this changes the fact that sofas are really
not for sitting on...”
And so on in this rather tiresome vein. What should we say about this? Burge’s
view – which I think is the right one – is that this person understands the thought
6There are strong arguments that in some cases some rational relations are canonical (Balcerak
Jackson 2009; Boghossian 2012), but I doubt this holds in every case.
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this is a sofa, even though they reject the obvious entailment. They understand the
thought in a deviant way.
Note that understanding the thought this is a sofa, and in particular, under-
standing the concept sofa, amount to more than just referring to sofas. Merely being
able to pick out the same class of objects that we pick out using the concept sofa,
and having a term for objects in that class, is enough to count as referring to sofas;
no overlap with our own conceptual connections is required. Burge isn’t making
the weak claim that his character’s use of the word ‘sofa’ refers to the same things
that we refer to; he’s making the strong claim that the character’s use of the word
‘sofa’ expresses the same concept that we express, such that he can reject the same
thought that we accept.
Williamson (2006; 2007, ch. 4) has developed a range of similar cases, focusing
on purportedly analytic statements – that is, truths the acceptance of which is a
necessary condition on understanding them. Consider Williamson’s counterexample
to the purportedly analytic statement ‘Every vixen is a vixen’. Williamson’s character
‘Peter’ thinks that universal generalizations presuppose the existence of an instance,
so ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ presupposes that there are vixens. Peter also believes
that there have never been any vixens (2006, 9-10):
For he spends far too much time surfing the Internet, and once came
across a site devoted to propagating the view that there are no foxes, and
therefore no vixens, and never have been: all the apparent evidence to the
contrary has been planted by a secret international agency; for sinister
purposes best known to itself, it produces elaborate fox-hallucinations.
Being a sucker for conspiracy theories, Peter accepted this one.
As a result, Peter thinks ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ is false. But we’re still inclined to
say he understands it.
The subjects in these deviant cases display, to an extreme degree, a freedom
which, in less extreme forms, is a familiar part of our cognitive lives. It’s possible
to suspend commitment to, or even reject, seemingly obvious beliefs or inferences
without loss of understanding; in particular, it’s possible to use a concept in a way
that belies some apparently definitional link to other concepts while still counting as
using that concept. We have the conceptual freedom to question or modify some of
the rules that constitute our inherited representational system.
This phenomenon goes beyond the rather fruitless eccentricities described in the
cases above. It doesn’t merely make possible counterexamples to analyticity, but also
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plays a role in the development of thought in general (Williamson 2007, 126; Rattan
& Wikforss 2017, 283). Here are two examples. First, scientific progress sometimes
involves rejecting connections that at one time would have seemed definitional, or at
least impossible to doubt. For example, in Newtonian mechanics it would have seemed
impossible to doubt that the mass of an object is the same in all reference frames,
but this assumption is given up in relativity theory (subject to some complications
about the reference of ‘mass’ in the two theories (Field 1973, 467)). Second, certain
sorts of social and political change are also bound up with exercises of conceptual
freedom – for instance, in rejecting the idea that a marriage has to be between a
man and a woman, or in changing understandings of the latter concepts (Haslanger
2000; Jenkins 2016).
The role of conceptual freedom in the development of thought in general makes
it harder to dismiss than it otherwise would be. As Davidson writes in a related
context, ‘A theory that could not explain irrationality would be one that also could
not explain our salutary efforts, and occasional successes, at self-criticism and self-
improvement’ (2004, 187). An account of understanding that had no room for deviant
understanding would also have no room for the use of conceptual freedom to criticize
and improve our system of thoughts. So we should make room for this phenomenon
in our account of understanding.
This gives us reason to accept holism. In fact, two reasons. Negatively, it’s clear
that the inferentialist version of the claim that understanding requires a setting
would be inconsistent with conceptual freedom: if inferentialists were right, it would
be impossible to reject a canonical rational relation without loss of understanding.
So we should accept the holist version of the claim instead.
But I think conceptual freedom also provides more positive support for holism.
We can see this by further reflection on the sofa case. The intelligibility of the subject
who denies that sofas are for sitting on depends on their other beliefs (cf. Reimer
2012, 255). Some of these are orthodox beliefs about sofas themselves, e.g. that
sofas are human-made artefacts rather than, say, vegetables; that they generally stay
where they are, rather than moving about on their own. If the subject believed not
only that sofas aren’t for sitting on, but also that a sofa is a sort of pumpkin which
travels about on its own, in pursuit of its own purposes, we might be less inclined to
agree that they still understood this is a sofa. Intuitively, the thought this is a sofa
is held in place by a network of links to other thoughts. While the subject has cut
an important link – the connection to this is for sitting on – enough of the other
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links are still intact to keep the thought in place.
Others among the subject’s beliefs play a different role. They rationalize the
subject’s rejection of the ‘canonical’ entailment. These are the beliefs about the
propaganda campaign and the religious nature of sofas. While these beliefs are
unorthodox, we can see how someone with such beliefs would deny that sofas are for
sitting on; without these beliefs, the subject’s denial would be much less intelligible.
Both sets of beliefs are essential to deviant understanding. This suggests that,
‘unless a plausible background story emerges such that the “unorthodoxy is com-
pensated for by orthodoxies at other points”, the fact that [the subject denies the
analytic statement] does entail failure of understanding’ (Wikforss 2009, 12). In
other words, a subject counts as understanding p only if there is some ‘plausible
background story’ – some set of links to other thoughts – which underwrites the
subject’s understanding of p.7 But as the cases show, there’s no single background
story that is required, but many background stories each of which would be sufficient
for understanding. Requiring a single background story for understanding p would
leave no room for conceptual freedom involving p. And the claim that understanding
p requires a background story, but no particular background story, is equivalent to
holism. So cases of deviant understanding support holism.
1.3 General rational abilities
In the previous section, I began by motivating the thesis that understanding requires
a setting. I then introduced cases of deviant understanding, which, I argued, show
that we should accept holism as a particular version of the thesis. In this section,
I ask what explains the truth of holism, and argue that it reflects the thinker’s
sensitivity to rational relations among their thoughts. In particular, I will suggest
that the best explanation for why thinkers in deviant cases count as understanding
is that the thinkers manifest general abilities to recognize and respond to relations
of support and tension among their thoughts (cf. Boyle 2009, 150-151). These are
7Williamson implies that the role of the background story is merely practical (2006, 36): ‘Although
disagreement is naturally easier to negotiate and usually more fruitful against a background of
extensive agreement, it does not follow that any particular agreement is needed for disagreement
to be expressed in given words. A practical constraint on useful communication should not be
confused with a necessary condition for literal understanding.’ But without the background beliefs,
why accept that the deviant speaker still understands the thought? Moreover, in denying that ‘any
particular agreement is needed’, Williamson rules out only the inferentialist construal of the point,
leaving room for the holist position that some agreement or other is, in fact, needed.
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deep waters, and I don’t have a proof that such abilities are the right explanation.
But I will suggest that this is the feature of the cases which drives our conclusion
that the deviant thinkers understand what they are saying. I’ll begin by ruling out
the two most plausible competitors, before spelling out the explanation I prefer.
1.3.1 Two unsuccessful explanations of holism
Why is it possible to understand p while rejecting some obvious inference involving
p? I’m going to consider two explanations in this section and argue that neither
of them succeeds. While we’re looking for an explanation of the truth of holism
generally, I’ll focus on cases of deviant understanding, as these are where holism
comes apart most clearly from other theories.
The first possibility is that holism is underwritten by social externalism. According
to social externalism, a subject counts as understanding p if, in their use of p, they
intend to defer to the way p is used in their community, or to the way p is used by
relevant experts (Putnam 1975; Burge 1979). For example, I count as understanding
the concept chrysanthemum even though I’m unable to recognize chrysanthemums,
and even though the inferential role I associate with the concept is indistinguishable
from the role I associate with other concepts of flowering plants, like rhododendron,
because when I use chrysanthemum I intend to defer to whatever ‘chrysanthemum’
is taken to mean by gardeners or botanists. In the present context, the idea would
be that the deviant user can still intend to defer to whatever the community means
by ‘sofa’, and so still count as understanding it.
I should note that this probably isn’t the right reading of either Burge or
Williamson. Burge is clear that his arguments about sofa take a different route
from his arguments on social externalism; he distinguishes the notion of cognitive
value, which he takes to be at play in the sofa case, from the notion of conventional
linguistic meaning (1977, s. IV; 2007, s. V). In particular, Burge holds that since
‘communally accepted characterizations as well as expert opinion can be doubted’,
the standards of correctness for using a cognitive value, like sofa, aren’t determined
by the usage ‘of any person or social group’ (1986, 720). Since cognitive value isn’t
determined by social patterns of usage, our grasp of cognitive value cannot consist
in deference to such patterns.
Williamson is less clear about what drives his cases, and he does refer to Putnam’s
hypothesis of the division of linguistic labour and ‘the way in which individual speakers
defer to the linguistic community as a whole’ (2006, 36). He also notes that Peter
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intends for his words ‘to be understood as words of our common language, with their
standard English senses’ (2006, 12). However, the structure of Williamson’s cases
precludes any straightforward explanation in terms of social externalism, for the
simple reason that the deviant speakers Williamson describes are experts (Boghossian
2012; Murzi & Steinberger 2017). Peter is said to ‘have published widely read articles
on the [semantic] issues in leading refereed journals of philosophy, in English’. For a
social externalist, experts are the people non-experts defer to; experts themselves
don’t defer. Peter’s understanding of ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ can’t consist in his
deference to other speakers or to the speech community as a whole.
Of course, we can ask whether social externalism is the right explanation for the
cases regardless. But there’s good reason not to invoke it here. It fails to explain the
importance of rationality in the cases – the feature that Wikforss calls a ‘plausible
background story’. The sofa-worshipper’s denial of an obvious truth is rationalized
by his other beliefs about sofas – the story about the propaganda campaign and
religious worship. If social externalism were driving the case, the background story
would be beside the point. It would be sufficient to say: one day somebody believed
that sofas are not for sitting on, while intending to defer to their speech community’s
use of ‘sofa’, and still understanding sofa in virtue of this deference. The fact that
this bare case is wholly unconvincing suggests that the rationalizing background story
plays more than a rhetorical role in the deviant cases (cf. Heal 1999, 78; Boghossian
2011).8
Social externalism, then, is not the right explanation of holism. A second
possibility is that deviant understanding is explained by a causal theory of meaning
(Fodor 1987). On such a theory, for my use of some term t to mean some concept c
is for my use of t to stand in the appropriate kind of causal relations with certain
bits of the world: for example, my use of ‘sofa’ means sofa because it is causally
connected in the right way with sofas. To explain the deviant cases, we have to say
in addition that, if I use any term t that means some concept c, then I count as
understanding c: for example, if my use of ‘sofa’ means sofa, then I understand sofa.
So it’s possible to understand sofa while denying that sofas are for sitting on, as
long as you have the right causal relations to sofas.
Moving to a causal theory of meaning would be a drastic reaction to the puzzle
8This is not to say that such bare cases are never possible – one such is Burge’s (1979, 77)
example of someone who believes they have arthritis in their thigh. But here the overlap with
orthodoxy is much greater than in the cases I’m considering.
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posed by deviant understanding. For it would amount to abandoning not only
inferentialism but also holism, and even the broad claim that understanding requires
a setting. On the causal theory, it ought to be possible for a subject to have a single
thought p as the entirety of their mental life, as long as the right causal relations hold.
p might even be a necessary falsehood: there might be a subject whose entire mental
life consisted of judging that green is red. This suggests that adopting the causal
theory would be an overreaction. Nothing in the cases of deviant understanding puts
pressure on the claim that understanding requires a setting. We should seek a more
conservative explanation of these cases that doesn’t require us to abandon what was
plausible in our starting point.
The causal account also faces the same problem as the externalist one: it fails
to explain the role of rationality in the cases. If causal relations were driving the
cases, the background story would be beside the point. It would be sufficient to
say: one day somebody believed that sofas are not for sitting on, while standing
in the appropriate causal relation to sofas, and still understanding sofa in virtue
of this relation. But, as before, this bare case is wholly unconvincing. So causal
relations are not the right explanation either. Of course, this doesn’t mean that
causal relations have no role in understanding. It only means that, if they do have
a role (as I believe they do), this role is not sufficient to explain the possibility of
deviant understanding.
1.3.2 A better explanation
Both of the accounts I’ve considered stumbled on a distinctive feature of deviant
understanding: the cases present a subject as being rational even in their irrational-
ity. Why not make this feature central to our explanation? What underwrites
understanding in these cases is precisely that the subject manifests rationality in the
position that they take up. The background story rationalizes their mistaken belief
by showing that it is supported by their other beliefs. This is why, in rejecting an
obvious inference, they remain intelligible.9
The thinker who denies that sofas are for sitting on is intelligible because they
9As Schroeter & Schroeter write, ‘anyone with whom we can profitably participate in critical
debate involving an evaluative term – whatever his initial substantive assumptions are – shares
the same meaning’ (2009, 21). In more Fregean terms, a central theoretical role for thoughts is in
tracing patterns of rational agreement and disagreement. As long as the deviant speaker shows
sensitivity to rational relations, we should count ourselves as in rational disagreement with them,
and this requires taking them to reject the very thought that we accept.
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take this thought to be incompatible with a series of further thoughts which they
accept: that sofas are religious objects, and that religious objects are not for sitting
on. In other words, they reject a thought p because they accept some other thoughts
q and r, which they rightly take to be in tension with p. We could analyze the rest
of the background story in the same way. So the thinker’s rejection of p manifests
their ability to respond to the rational relations among their thoughts.
Exactly what ability does the thinker need? You might think that they only
need to recognize particular rational relations – namely, those which form part of
the ‘plausible background story’. In our example, they would only need to recognize
the relations betweeen p, q, and r – perhaps by having an aversion to believing p, q
and r together. In fact, however, this suggestion reflects a residual inferentialism
and fails to appreciate the depth of the holist challenge.
Positing an aversion to believing p, q and r together would account for the
particular case I presented earlier, but it wouldn’t account for the indefinitely many
other cases we could imagine. In supposing that the deviant thinker understands
sofa in virtue of the plausible background story, we suppose that they are sensitive
to various further connections involving sofa: for example, if they rejected some
crucial element of the background story about the propaganda campaign, they would
come to accept that sofas are for sitting on – unless they replaced the propaganda
campaign with a new background story – unless some crucial element of this new
story proved incompatible with their other beliefs – and so on. There’s an indefinite
list of further connections to which a thinker who understands p is sensitive, an
indefinite list of abilities to make further revisions in their beliefs as their other
beliefs changed. In taking the subject to understand this is a sofa, we take them to
have an open-ended sensitivity to the way other thoughts might bear on this one.10
Earlier, I treated the difference between inferentialism and holism as one of scope:
the inferentialist holds that there is a set of rational relations involving p which you
must accept to understand p, while the holist holds that to understand p, there must
be a set of rational relations involving p which you accept. Now we can see that this
understates the difference. There would be no deep challenge to inferentialism in
allowing that there are, say, two sets of canonical inferences involving p, such that
understanding p requires accepting at least one of these sets. (For example, there
might be two sets of equivalent inference-rules for a connective.) The holist position
10Horvath (2020, 522) argues, relatedly, that understanding is not constituted by any particular
first-order disposition but by a second-order disposition to have various first-order dispositions.
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is, rather, that understanding p is an open-ended exercise requiring sensitivity to
whichever other thoughts might prove to be rationally relevant.
The open-ended sensitivity involved in thinking means that no finite set of abilities
to respond to particular rational relations will suffice for understanding. An ability
to believe p if you believe q, for example, is entirely inert when it comes to other
rational relations that may bear on p. What a thinker needs, instead, is a general
ability to recognize and respond to rational relations involving p, such that their
pattern of attitudes as a whole comes out as overall rational. To put it in a thesis:
General Rational Abilities A thinker must have general abilities to recognize
and respond to relations of support and tension among thoughts.
To be clear, the requirement isn’t only that thinkers have concepts applicable to cases
of support or tension, nor even that they be able to recognize such cases reliably.
They must also have some tendency to be moved by such relations to change their
beliefs. If you recognize that p supports q, you must have some tendency to infer
from p to q; if you recognize that p is in tension with q, you must have some tendency
not to judge p and q together.
1.4 The expressive role of logic
In the previous section, I suggested that thinking involves general abilities to recognize
and respond to relations of tension and support among thoughts. Several philosophers
have inferred from this that thinking requires metarepresentation, or second-order
thinking about thinking. For example, Burge (1996, 100) argues that ‘critical
reasoning requires thinking about one’s thoughts’. Spelling out Burge’s argument,
Rattan (2002, 150) writes:
I change my thoughts immediately when there is a tension in my thoughts,
when the perspective of thinking about thoughts and the first-order thoughts
themselves are part of the same perspective. So, it is because I normally
know what my thoughts are, and that they are my thoughts, that reflection
can allow us to take rational control of our thoughts. So special second-
order knowledgeable thought seems to be essential to the very idea that
we can exert rational control over our thoughts.
Ichikawa & Jarvis also argue that understanding involves topic-neutral inferential
abilities to systematize our first-order inferential abilities; they take the systematizing
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abilities to be second-order (2013, 90ff.).11
It’s not hard to see why one might take metarepresentation to be required. If
we ask what the ability to recognize tension among thoughts consists in, a natural
suggestion is that it consists in having the concept tension, and being able to use it
in thoughts such as p is in tension with q. But to think p is in tension with q, you
have to refer to – that is, metarepresent – the thoughts p and q. The same goes for
support. So if the natural suggestion is right, then recognizing tension and support
requires the expressive resources for metarepresentation – for second-order thinking
about thoughts.
The problem is that this seems far too intellectualist. It seems like the ability
to use that-clauses, quotation, or other devices of semantic ascent is much more
sophisticated than the ability to think purely first-order thoughts (Price 1990, 231;
Camp 2009, 286).
This creates a puzzle. On the one hand, thinking requires a general ability
to revise one’s position in response to rational relations among thoughts. On the
other hand, thinking can’t require a general ability to represent one’s own thoughts.
So there has to be a way of recognizing and responding appropriately to rational
relations without metarepresentation. In 1.4.1, I’ll argue that logical concepts – in
particular, negation and the conditional – play this role. Following this, in 1.4.2 I
sum up the argument and comment on where I diverge from Brandom’s views.
1.4.1 The conditional and negation
In this section, I argue that having logical concepts – specifically, the conditional
and negation – provides a way of being responsive to the rational relations among
thoughts without needing to metarepresent them.
Expressive Role of Logic The conditional and negation allow their possessors to
have general rational abilities without metarepresentation.
The basic idea is simple. Instead of having a meta-level concept like support, which
forms a thought from two names of thoughts, you have an operator ? which forms a
thought from two thoughts, where p?q is true if p supports q. Given this fact, being
able to think p?q is a way of being able to think about the support-relation between
11Although in other places their description of systematization sounds less metarepresentational
(2013, 228). For discussion of this tension, see the review by Rattan (2014).
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p and q without metarepresentation. Of course, ? just is the conditional. A similar
story goes for tension and negation.
This basic idea isn’t new. It can be found in the Grammatical Propaedeutic
to Anderson & Belnap (1975), which argues for a systematic equivalence between
operators within a language and metalinguistic predicates which express facts about
the language. Formal presentations of logical connectives as reflecting metalinguistic
properties in the object-language can be found in Došen (1989) and Sambin, Battilotti
& Faggian (2000). Perhaps the most detailed philosophical development of the idea is
by Brandom (1994), who also singles out negation and the conditional as exemplifying
this role.
This idea about the expressive role of logic doesn’t dictate exactly which logic
is correct. For purposes of clearer exposition, however, I’m going to assume that
there’s a single set of correct rules, and will ignore the existence of controversy about
which rules those are. I won’t attempt to fully specify which rules those are, but
for each concept I will suggest a minimal rule that the concept must satisfy. In the
next chapter, I consider how my account would have to change to accommodate
controversy about which rules are correct and the pluralist view that multiple logics
are correct.
I’ll discuss the conditional first and then negation.
The conditional. Possessing the conditional constitutes our general ability to
recognize and respond to relations of support among thoughts. If the oven is too hot
supports the pie will burn, then we can express this relation by thinking, if the oven
is too hot, the pie will burn. The latter is an object-level thought; thinking it doesn’t
require the ability to metarepresent either of its constituents. More generally, if p
supports q, we should have if p, then q.
In positing such a close link between the conditional and the consequence-relation,
I’m following Došen (1989, 366) and Priest (2006, 83). But the consequence-relation
and the conditional are not the same in every respect. They’re of different logical
types – the former is a metalanguage predicate, the latter an object-language operator
– which gives them different uses. Given this difference, Shapiro (2011) argues that
the consequence-predicate can be used to formulate generalizations that are not
expressible in the object-language, in much the same way the truth-predicate can be
used for formulating generalizations that are not expressible in the object-language.
For present purposes, the more important difference is that the conditional can be
used by a subject who lacks the resources for metarepresenting their thoughts.
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A defining feature of relations of support (or at least the strong relations I’ve
focused on) is that if p supports q, then from p, you can infer q. If a conditional
serves to express these relations, then it works as an ‘inference-ticket’ licensing its
possessor to move from p to q (Ryle 1949, 117). In other words, the conditional has
to satisfy something like Modus Ponens:
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
Priest (2006, 83) even writes that Modus Ponens is ‘analytically part of what
implication is’.
I say ‘something like’ Modus Ponens because McGee (1985) has proposed coun-
terexamples to Modus Ponens; I want to allow for the possibility that only a restricted
version of the rule is required. But even the reasoning which McGee uses to make
his case involves instances of Modus Ponens: for example, that if Modus Ponens has
a counterexample, it should be modified, and Modus Ponens does have a counterex-
ample, so— I don’t take this to show that McGee’s argument is incoherent. Rather,
I take it to show how unavoidable Modus Ponens, or something like it, is in making
a case for anything at all (Russell 1912, ch. VII; Evnine 2001, 348-9; Hale 2002).
Although I’ve stated Modus Ponens as an imperative, it doesn’t mean that if
you judge some p which supports q, judging q is all things considered the best thing
to do. You might also believe some t which is in tension with q and more credible
than p. This doesn’t undermine the claim that support-relations are expressed by a
conditional which satisfies Modus Ponens. As I’ll explain in more detail in Chapter
3, following a rule doesn’t mean always conforming to it; it means tending to find
the conclusions of instances of the rule compelling on the basis of instances of the
premises. Following the rule in this sense is consistent with judging p and not judging
q in some cases.
Note, too, that not every conditional has to play this expressive role. It may
be that many conditional constructions in natural languages play other roles (see
Briggs (2019) for general discussion of conditionals). Moreover, there’s no guarantee
that the conditional which does play this expressive role is a material conditional,
definable as not (p and not-q). Rather, the logical properties of the conditional will
reflect the logical properties of the support-relation. So, for example, if Brandom
(2018, 78) is right that support is not monotonic – if p might support q even though p
and r does not – then the conditional might not allow strengthening the antecedent:
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we could have if p, then q but not if p and r, then q.12 If, by contrast, support
is conclusive and therefore monotonic, strengthening the antecedent should hold
(Ichikawa & Jenkins 2013, 25).
Negation. Possessing a concept of negation constitutes our ability to recognize
and respond to tensions between thoughts. The role of negation is brought out
vividly in a dialogue imagined by Huw Price. He imagines a community of Ideolog-
ical Positivists, ‘fanatical disciples of Norman Vincent Peale’, who ‘have tried to
reconstruct their language so as to make negative thinking impossible’ (1990, 223).
The Ideological Positivists have, in particular, purged any term for negation from
their language. Now Price imagines two Positivists discussing where to find their
friend Fred:
Me: ‘Fred is in the kitchen.’ (Sets off for kitchen.)
You: ‘Wait! Fred is in the garden.’
Me: ‘I see. But he is in the kitchen, so I’ll go there.’ (Sets off.)
You: ‘You lack understanding. The kitchen is Fred-free.’
Me: ‘Is it really? But Fred’s in it, and that’s the important thing.’
(Leaves for kitchen.)
The point of the dialogue, I take it, is that the characters – or at least ‘Me’ – lack
even an implicit understanding of tension between claims.13 ‘Me’ seems to accept
that Fred is in the garden, and is unable to appreciate that this is in tension with
Fred’s being in the kitchen. As Price comments (1990, 224):
Your problem is to get me to appreciate that your claims are incompatible
with mine. Even in such a trivial case, we can see that it would be
useful to have a device whose function was precisely to indicate that an
incompatible claim was being made: precisely to deny an assertion or
suggestion by somebody else. It seems that this is what negation gives
us.
If the characters in the dialogue understood negation, they could say things like
12Brandom makes the stronger claim that, since the conditional serves to express a prelogical
relation of material support, it should be conservative over the prelogical support-relation. So if
prelogical support is non-monotonic, the conditional has to be non-monotonic. In my own account,
the link between the conditional and support is different. The conditional helps to usher in a new
kind of representational activity; there’s no reason in principle why it should be conservative over a
prelogical support-relation rather than modifying it (see also 3.5.2). But its role is still to express
support. So if the postlogical support-relation is non-monotonic, then the conditional should be too.
13It might be argued that ‘You’ displays such an implicit grasp in the use of language such as
‘lack’ and ‘Fred-free’. This is fine with me: thinkers need to understand negation, but this doesn’t
require that they have a single word that plays the same role as ‘not’ in English.
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‘Fred is not in the kitchen’; this claim is such that, if you understand it, then you
take it to be in tension with ‘Fred is in the kitchen’.
How exactly does negation express tension between thoughts? The essential
feature is that not-p and p are in tension, or mutually exclusive (Evnine 2001, 354).
But of course many propositions are in tension with p. More precisely, then, the
essential feature is that not-p is the weakest claim in tension with p: if q is in tension
with p then q entails not-p (Peacocke 1987, 163; Brandom 1994, 115).14
Now, the defining feature of tension between thoughts is that if p and q are in
tension, you shouldn’t judge p and q. So if not-p is the weakest claim in tension
with p, then, as a minimum requirement, it must satisfy something like the Law of
Non-Contradiction in the following form:
Law of Non-Contradiction Do not judge p and not-p.
As Hale suggests, ‘acceptance of the principle of non-contradiction may be integral
to operation with the idea that recalcitrance obliges us to make some revision in our
overall corpus of accepted statements’ (1999, 51 n. 24).
It’s true that dialetheists have argued against Non-Contradiction (Priest 2005;
2006), generally on the basis that rejecting Non-Contradiction makes room for a more
satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. But the very idea that the paradoxes
could motivate such a rejection presupposes a notion of rational tensions among
our commitments which demand resolution (Armour-Garb 2004). For example, the
reasoning might be that if the semantic paradoxes give us reason to accept p and
not-p, and the Law of Non-Contradiction tells us not to accept p and not-p, then
we ought to give up one or the other of these commitments. This is an instance
of something like the Law of Non-Contradiction, even if we only want to allow
a restricted version of the rule. Again, this doesn’t show that these arguments
for dialetheism are incoherent, but it does show how unavoidable something like
Non-Contradiction is in arguing that there is a tension among our beliefs which
requires us to make a revision.
14This doesn’t dictate precisely which logic of negation to adopt. For an analogue of this idea in
relevant logic see Restall (1999, 61). Peacocke (1993, 177) argues that if not-p is the weakest claim
in tension with p, then negation is classical. But Wright (1993) shows that Peacocke’s argument
presupposes either Double Negation Elimination or a classical conception of the domain of thoughts.
For further discussion, see Humberstone (2011, 1170-1171).
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1.4.2 Response to Brandom
That concludes my argument for Logical Concepts. There were a lot of moving
parts, so it might be helpful to recap before we move on. Here’s how the argument
went:
1. (Holism) Understanding a thought p requires sensitivity to some of its rational
relations to other thoughts.
2. The best explanation for Holism is that thinkers must have general abilities to
respond to support and tension among their thoughts. So
3. (General Rational Abilities) A thinker must have general abilities to re-
spond to support and tension among their thoughts.
4. But thinkers don’t need metarepresentation.
5. (Expressive Role of Logic) The conditional and negation allow their pos-
sessors to have general rational abilities without metarepresentation.
6. There’s no way other than possessing the conditional and negation to have
general rational abilities without metarepresentation. So
7. (Logical Concepts) A thinker must possess concepts of the conditional and
negation.
Since, as I’ve argued, the conditional and negation have certain minimal rules, I take
it to follow from Logical Concepts that thinkers have to be sensitive to logical rules.
I discuss the kind of sensitivity involved in Chapter 3.
The only premise I haven’t defended is 6. I can’t think of a clear counterexample
to it. Of course, a thinker might be able to use other concepts from which negation
and the conditional can be defined: if they were using classical logic, they might
possess (say) conjunction and negation, or a Sheffer stroke. 6 should be read to allow
for such cases.15 But it’s important to notice that which equivalences are available
will depend on which logic is correct: for example, in the Logic of Paradox (2.4;
Priest 2006), if we define if p, then q as not (p and not-q), Modus Ponens fails. So
in this logic, conjunction and negation don’t provide an alternative to the conditional.
I’m now in a position to respond to Brandom’s claim that there is ‘nothing
incoherent about a language or stage in the development of a language in which the
15Not every functionally complete set is allowed. Consider Leśniewski’s Protothetic, which uses
only the biconditional and propositional quantification (Tarski 1923). Protothetic is functionally
complete, but following its rules requires understanding propositional quantification. I’m inclined to
think this requires metarepresentation, so it’s not an alternative to the conditional and negation.
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only vocabulary in play is nonlogical’ (1994, 383). In terms of the above argument,
Brandom accepts 1, 4, 5 and, I think, 6. Because he rejects 7, he must reject 2 and
3. He concedes that logic ‘make[s] it possible to criticize, control, and improve our
concepts’ (1994, 384), but he denies that this is required for thinking. His idea is that
a prelogical thinker can be sensitive to rational relations between particular contents,
but not to rational relations in general. Such a ‘thinker’ would lack conceptual
freedom.
To illustrate this point, let’s consider the affirmativist – someone whose language
lacks negation, but contains for each primitive predicate F a primitive predicate F̄ for
its complement (Kripke 2015). For each F and F̄ , the affirmativist follows a rule not
to predicate both of a single object. Let’s also suppose (modifying Kripke’s example)
that the affirmativist lacks other logical connectives, such as the conditional, but that
they follow rules specifying containment between primitive predicates: if F contains
G, then if you predicate F of an object you must also predicate G of that object.
The affirmativist is sensitive to support and tension between particular thoughts,
but they have no topic-neutral way of expressing these rational relations.
Every rational relation we recognize can be hardwired in to the affirmativist’s
language, so the set of relations they recognize can be the same as ours. But they
have no way of proposing to add or drop a rational relation. Supposing there isn’t
already a rule that being F supports being H, the affirmativist cannot propose If
Fa, then Ha. Supposing there’s a rule that being F is in tension with being I, the
affirmativist cannot propose Not: If Fa, then not Ia. But proposing to add or drop
rational relations is precisely what we do in exercising conceptual freedom; this is
just what the deviant speakers discussed earlier were doing. So the affirmativist
lacks conceptual freedom. Since Brandom is committed to treating the affirmativist
as a thinker, he has to deny that conceptual freedom is required for thinking.
In a response to Brandom, John McDowell writes that ‘self-consciousness requires
the capacity to make the goodness of materially good inferences explicit, and hence
command of logical vocabulary; and it is unintelligible that something without
(semantic) self-consciousness could explicitly undertake commitments’ (1997b, 162).
In later comments, McDowell elaborates, pointing to the idea that grasp of meaning
requires ‘being responsive to reasons’ (2005, 135):
Surely the responsiveness to reasons that figures in this connection should
be responsiveness to reasons as such. Can that really be in place in the
absence of the capacity to raise questions about whether what one finds
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oneself inclined to be swayed by, in forming a belief or deciding to act,
really constitutes a reason for the belief or action one is contemplating?
McDowell is right to take issue with Brandom’s claim, but the way he does so is too
intellectualist. He seems to be suggesting that thinking needs logic because it needs
metarepresentation, and metarepresentation uses logic. While I agree that thinking
needs logic, my reason is nearly the opposite of McDowell’s: thinking needs logic
because it doesn’t need metarepresentation.
The fact that thinking needs logic doesn’t mean that every time a thinker judges
q on the basis of p, they use the conditional if p, then q, or that any time a thinker
avoids judging p and r because they are incompatible, they first infer not-p from
r. I agree with Brandom that material inferences, which don’t use logic, need not
be enthymematic. But it doesn’t follow from the fact that material inferences don’t
use logic that logic makes no difference to their nature (McDowell 2005, 134). The
assumption that it makes no difference reflects what Koreň (2018, 201) calls a
‘layer-cake’ picture of language, in which logic is added on top of an existing practice
without transforming it in any way.16
But logic does make a difference. The conceptual practice of a subject without
logic would involve sensitivity to particular links between thoughts. But nothing in
their practice would allow them to reject such a link while maintaining understanding.
Nor, therefore, would they be able to understand someone else who rejected the link.
As a result, they would relate to the rules that they followed as a rigid structure
imposed externally, not as a set of apparently rational connections which can be
modified as rationality requires. We need not deny that such a speaker would be
able to say intelligible things. But the rigidity of their practice means that they
would not manifest the rationality that (if my line of thought is correct) is essential
to thinking.
1.5 Quinean reprise
At this point, I think it might be useful to take a different approach to the material
we’ve just covered. The holism about understanding which we find in Burge and
Williamson is a philosophical descendant of Quine’s holism about confirmation. I’ll
16Boyle (2016) develops a related critique of ‘additive’ theories of rationality, although his focus is
on the way rationality transforms perception and desire.
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show that the role of logical rules, which I’ve been trying to excavate, is much more
visible in the Quinean picture.
While there’s a lot of disagreement about how to understand Quine’s arguments
in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, we can set that aside to focus on the positive
proposal near the end of the paper: a holistic epistemology in which no statement is
immune from revision. Quine writes (1951, s. VI):
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic
physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric
which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the
figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions
are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions
readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to beredis-
tributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some statements
entails re-evaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections –
the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the
system, certain further elements of the field. Having re-evaluated one
statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be statements
logically connected with the first or whether they be the statements of
logical connections themselves. ...
Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close
to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience
by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind
called logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is
immune to revision.
Supposing that an analytic statement must be immune to revision, it follows from
Quine’s picture that there are no analytic statements. Some statements, like those
of logic, are central while others are at the periphery; in principle, however, any
statement can be revised or held fixed in the face of any experience.
This picture is the ancestor of that of Burge and Williamson. A statement like
‘Sofas are not for sitting on’ can be held true, or a statement like ‘Every vixen is a
vixen’ can be rejected, in the face of a great deal of recalcitrant experience ‘if we
make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system’. Indeed, Williamson’s
examples nicely show how revising a belief deep within the web – e.g. about the
semantics of ‘every’ – can ramify into apparently unrelated domains. Quine, Burge
and Williamson all allow us a freedom in our use of concepts that results from the
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‘intricacy’ (Quine 1974, 38) of the web of belief. Given this connection, if logic turns
out to have an essential role in Quine’s account of the web of belief, we have some
reason to suspect that it will turn out to be similarly essential in contemporary
holism about understanding.
The role of logic in Quine’s web is more subtle than is often appreciated. Logic
appears in two guises: first as ‘logical interconnections’ among beliefs, such that
revising one belief can mandate revising others, and second as ‘statements of logical
connections’ (‘if the oven is too hot, the pie will burn’) and ‘logical laws’ (‘From
p and if p, then q, infer q’). Statements of logical connections and logical laws,
in Quine’s view, are simply further nodes of the web, but logical interconnections
themselves cannot be. This subtlety, however, is often overlooked. Quine is taken
to assign to logic only the second role, to hold that logic occurs in the web only as
nodes, not as connections among nodes. But if logic only occurs as nodes in the
web, then it isn’t a web at all, but merely an array of disconnected points. I’ll begin
my discussion by rehearsing the problem for taking logic to consist only in ‘further
statements of the system’ and then comment on the other role that logic must play.
The claim that logical laws are ‘further statements of the system’ faces an initial
difficulty: ‘logical laws’ is most naturally heard as referring to rules of inference, not
propositions (Dummett 1973, 596; Priest 1979, 291). But a rule of inference, like
Modus Ponens, is not the sort of thing that can be believed or disbelieved; rather,
it is the sort of thing we can follow or fail to follow. So it can’t be a node in the
web of belief. Still, for any rule of inference of the form ‘from Γ, infer q’, we can
write down a closely related statement: the corresponding conditional, ‘if Γ, then q’
(Priest 1979, 292). So we can take the claim to be that the role of logical laws in the
web of belief is exhausted by the occurrence of their corresponding conditionals as
nodes within the web.17 I’ll refer to this as condensing a rule into a truth.
The common reading of Quine holds that logical laws occur in the web only in
condensed form. The problem with this picture is that it makes it impossible for
any belief to support any other. Suppose, for example, that the web contains the
beliefs p, if p then q and q. The first two beliefs should count as supporting the third
– but how does this happen? The only answer available is that the web contains
17Some have argued that all rules of inference are of conditional form (Finn 2019b), but this view
isn’t mandatory. If we also want to allow prohibitory rules, like ‘Do not believe p and not-p’, we
should extend the notion of corresponding conditional to include statements like ‘not p and not-p’.
If we want to allow rules of inference to have multiple conclusions (Restall 2005), we should extend
it to include statements like ‘if p, then q or r ’. See also 2.4.
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a corresponding conditional for Modus Ponens, as an axiom-schema or statement
universally quantifying over thoughts, or for a particular instance of Modus Ponens.
But if p and if p, then q are not enough on their own to support q, then adding such
a conditional – simply a further if-then statement – will not improve the situation.
As Priest and Dummett both observe, the assumption that an added conditional is
what does the supporting leads to the regress in Carroll (1895).
The same is true of tensions between beliefs, whose existence Quine needs in
order to hold that a ‘recalcitrant’ experience forces us to make some adjustment or
other in our beliefs. Suppose that the web contains r and not-r. These two beliefs
should count as being in tension – but how does this happen? The only answer
available is that the web also contains something like not r and not-r. But if r
and not-r are not already in tension, adding this further belief will not improve the
situation. As BonJour writes (1998, 94),
the basis for any supposed incompatibility within any set of sentences
... can apparently only be some further sentence in the system that says
explicitly that the acceptance of such a set is objectionable and hence
that the system of beliefs must be revised. But if we now consider the
set of sentences that includes that one, the same situation repeats itself...
In short, if statements already stand in relations of support and tension, then
corresponding conditionals are not required for underwriting those relations; if they
don’t already stand in such relations, then corresponding conditionals won’t make
a difference, and all we have is a ‘featureless collection of sentences standing in no
special relations’ (Dummett 1973, 597).
It follows that statements must already stand in relations of support and tension.
In other words, corresponding conditionals can’t exhaust the rational role of logical
laws in the web of belief. Logical laws also have to provide the structure of the web.
Let’s consider how this works.
Quine’s claim is not merely that any belief can be held fixed or rejected in the
face of experience, but that any belief can be rationally held fixed or rejected in
the face of experience (Chalmers 2011a, 389). The fact that an analytic truth can
be rejected irrationally would pose no threat to defenders of analyticity. Quine’s
web shows how, given enough compensatory adjustments, any p can be held fixed or
rejected while the subject remains rational – or at least rational enough to count
as understanding p. But this only makes sense if there’s a fact of the matter, to
which the subject is responding, about which combinations of other beliefs should
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be accepted or rejected if p is accepted or rejected (Wright 1986a; Field 1998, 13).
There may be room for debate about whether p is true, and about whether p
is in tension with, or supports, some particular q. But if logical laws themselves
are up for grabs – if it’s up for grabs whether p and if p, then q support q – then
there’s no sense in which the subject ought to accept q if they accept p and if p,
then q and so no sense in which it would be rational to make such an adjustment; it
would be equally rational to accept the premises and reject the purported support
they provide to the conclusion. In this case we might say with Wittgenstein that
‘whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we
can’t talk about “right”’ (Philosophical Investigations §258). The viability of the
web conception, then, requires that there be objective logical rules, which the subject
is able to recognize and respond to appropriately.
You might think that it would be enough for the subject to recognize and respond
to particular rational relations – for example, those between p, q and r – without
following any general rules. But this fails to allow for the open-ended character of
the phenomenon. To say that the subject is rational in accepting p is not merely
to say that they responded appropriately to the relations between p, q and r, but
to say that there is an indefinite list of further changes that they are capable of
making, depending on which other beliefs turn out to be relevant. So the thinker
needs a general ability to respond to relations of support and tension such that their
pattern of attitudes as a whole comes out rational. And this just is an ability to
follow logical rules.
This, in turn, casts doubt on Quine’s claim that logical rules are all up for
rejection. There’s room for debate about exactly which rules are the right ones – for
example, whether not-not-p supports p. But it’s not the case that any set of rules
will do. Any revision, if it is to be rational, has to rely on an intelligible conception
of support and tension among beliefs; if we change our logic so much that we no
longer have a conception of support and tension, then no set of beliefs is rational at
all. There’s no substitute for support and tension, no alternative relations that can
structure a web of belief. Nor, therefore, is there a substitute for the logical rules
which govern support and tension. The fixity of these relations makes possible the
freedom we see elsewhere in the system. As Wittgenstein said (On Certainty §343):
‘If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.’
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1.6 Conclusion
I’ve argued that logic is necessary for thinking in the sense that understanding
any thought requires possessing logical concepts, which means being sensitive to
logical rules. This argument, if successful, establishes not only that a subject
with no sensitivity to logical rules would be unintelligible to us, or that we would
have no reason to attribute thinking to them, but that, objectively speaking, their
representational activity would not be thinking at all. Similarly, it shows not only
that ‘we have no choice but to project our own logic on to the beliefs of another’
(Davidson 2004, 157) but that both we and the other must share the correct logic.
But the strength of this conclusion should not be overstated. It shows that all
thinking is logical, but not that all representational activity is logical: we already know
that there are kinds of representational activity, like sensing and perhaps perceiving,
which are not necessarily logical. The kinds of non-logical representational activity
which we know of might seem to be less objective, or at least less sophisticated,
than thinking, but it’s an open question whether there could be creatures whose
representational activity is as objective or as sophisticated as thinking without
involving logical rules. If such creatures were possible, then the fact that logic is
necessary for thinking would turn out to be more parochial than it sounds.18
18This possibility arises in Kant’s account of thinking. In the CPR, Kant maintains that the
logical categories are the universal structure of thinking; although other thinkers might have different
forms of sensibility (B150), they could not have different (or no) categories. Later on, in the Critique
of the Power of Judgment, Kant observes that the claim that the categories are universal is more
parochial than it sounds: all we can really say is that ‘given the nature of our (human) cognitive
faculty or even the concept that we can form of the capacity of a finite rational being in general, we
cannot and must not conceive otherwise, but without asserting that the basis for such a judgment
lies in the object’ (§76; AK 5:401). Similarly, the argument of this chapter relied on our conception
of thinking for its conclusions about logic; I did not attempt to show that the world itself grounds
these conclusions because it can only be thought about logically. As a result, the possibility of a
similarly sophisticated but non-logical representational activity is left open. As Kant writes, we
can conceive this possibility only ‘negatively, namely merely as not discursive’ (§77; AK 5:406),
observing only that nothing said so far rules it out.
2 Disagreement and pluralism
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I assumed that there’s a single correct set of logical rules – in short,
the One True Logic – and ignored the existence of controversy about which rules
these are. These commitments allowed me to focus the argument, but they are highly
disputable. First, even if there is one true logic, there is longstanding disagreement
about which logic it is: candidates include classical logic, intuitionistic logic, relevant
logics, dialetheic logics, and other three-valued and four-valued logics. Second, logical
pluralists have argued that there is more than one correct logic (Beall & Restall 2005;
Russell 2008; Shapiro 2014).1 In this chapter, I address the ways that my account
needs to be modified if we relax the initial commitments to allow for controversy
about which logic is correct and for logical pluralism.
Let me briefly restate the results of Chapter 1. I argued that thinkers must possess
concepts of the conditional and negation. More fully, a subject’s representational
activity counts as thinking only if that activity manifests sensitivity to the rules
that govern the conditional and negation. The upshot, which I’ll discuss in detail
in Chapter 4, is that there are limits on illogical thinking: if you don’t manifest
sensitivity to the logical rules, you fail to think at all. What survives of these claims
if we relax our commitment to a single and uncontroversial set of logical rules?
To pin down the issues, we have to draw a connection between a deductive system
such as classical or intuitionistic logic and the rules that a thinker must follow. You
might think that these have, at best, a distant relation to each other: deductive
systems are precise, while the rules we think with are vague. Indeed, I emphasized
1In some ways, everybody should be a pluralist: everybody should accept that there are different
abstract structures with associated model or proof theories – what Priest calls ‘pure logics’ (2005,
195). Moreover, everybody should accept that different pure logics might be best for different
applications: one for computer programming, another for constructing mathematical proofs. These
tame pluralisms pose no threat to anyone. For a pluralism in which logic can vary with the kind
of truth-bearer, see Russell (2008), and for some other varieties see Shapiro (2014, ch. 2). The
challenging pluralism at issue here holds that, vis-a-vis some important role a logic could play, more
than one logic is correct for that role. For example, Beall & Restall (2005) argue that more than
one logic specifies an ‘admissible’ consequence relation – where a consequence relation is admissible
iff it is necessary, formal, normative and instantiates the Generalized Tarski Thesis (‘An argument is
validx if and only if in every casex in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion’). My focus
here is on the role of constituting thinking. The pluralism I’m considering is pluralism about that.
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in 0.3.1 that there was no upfront guarantee that logic, in my sense, has anything
to do with deductive systems. I didn’t want to assume, for example, that the rules
we think with are identical to those of classical logic. But I now want to suggest a
connection between deductive systems and the rules we think with (cf. Blake-Turner
& Russell 2018, s. 3). To make this connection, I’ll need to say a bit more about
deductive systems and about how thinkers follow logical rules.
I take a deductive system to be composed of three things:
• An artificial object-language;
• A set of entailments of the form Γ ` Q, which say that some (possibly empty)
set of object-language sentences Γ entails some sentence Q; and
• A superstructure which generates the entailments – typically, a model theory
or proof theory (for further discussion, see Russell (2019, 552)).
Of course, in practice we don’t always specify a superstructure, and I won’t always
do so here; in principle, however, the choice of superstructure can make a difference
where there are failures of soundness or completeness. I will say that Γ ` Q is
valid in a deductive system if and only if it belongs to its set of entailments. To
be clear, this means I’m using the single turnstile in a broader way than is usual:
it expresses entailment, whether generated by model-theory or proof-theory. On a
model-theoretic approach, an entailment holds iff Q is true (or: has a designated
value) on condition that Γ are true (or: have designated values). On a proof-theoretic
approach, an entailment holds iff there is a proof of Q from Γ, either in a single step
or in a series of steps.
We follow logical rules by having logical capacities – capacities to make certain
transitions between thoughts. As I’ll explain in detail in Chapter 3, someone who
possesses a logical capacity finds transitions which obviously fall within the relevant
rule ‘primitively compelling’. For example, someone who has the capacity to draw
Modus Ponens inferences will find it primitively compelling to go from p and if p,
then q to q. Let us say that a form of inference is ‘licensed’ by a thinker’s logical
capacities if the form of inference is either primitively compelling or ‘derivatively’
compelling – that is, it can be built up out of primitively compelling steps.
To approach the connection between deductive systems and the rules thinkers
follow, let’s consider the following form of inference:
From not-not-p, infer p.
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It seems like an open question whether this form of inference is licensed by the
logical capacities which thinkers must possess. It seems doubtful that it is primi-
tively compelling. For it seems possible that someone could judge not-not-p, fully
understanding it, and yet not take themselves to have a reason to judge p even when
the question is raised. It does, however, seem like a live possibility that the rule is
derivatively compelling.
Now, notice that while classical and intuitionistic logic both specify rules for
negation, these rules differ: the following is a valid form of argument in classical
logic and not in intuitionistic logic.
Double Negation Elimination ¬¬P ` P
The fact that DNE is a valid form of argument in classical logic and not valid in
intuitionistic logic points to the connection between deductive systems and the rules
we think with. If thinkers are licensed to infer from not-not-p to p, then, to this
extent, classical logic is correct and intuitionistic logic is incorrect. More generally,
then, a deductive system is correct if and only if the entailments in the system specify
the inferences licensed by thinkers’ logical capacities.2
Let me enter a few caveats. First, I’m not claiming that this is what mathematical
logicians have in mind or that this is the only right way to see deductive systems.3
Second, the claim is that the class of transitions licensed by (say) classical logic
corresponds to the class of transitions licensed by thinkers’ capacities – not that
each rule in a particular presentation of classical logic corresponds to a particular
capacity. So the correctness of a deductive system doesn’t require that the rules
in the deductive system have psychological reality. Third, then, deductive systems
that validate the same entailments will stand or fall together. If classical logic is
correct, then a system with only the Sheffer stroke is as correct as a system with the
conditional and negation.
We’ve now established a connection between deductive systems and the rules
we think with. With this connection in place, we don’t need to be fussy about the
distinction between logics and deductive systems. Going forward, I’ll talk about
2Of course, in classical logic negation and the conditional are an expressively complete set
(Enderton 1972, §1.5), so accepting classical rules for those connectives amounts to accepting
classical logic. This is not so in, for example, intuitionistic logic. So in principle someone might
advocate accepting the rules that some system contains for negation and the conditional without
those for, say, disjunction. For readability, however, I’m going to assume that the candidates for the
correct logic are relatively familiar deductive systems and not fragments of them.
3On other cognitive attitudes one might have to a deductive system, see Soysal (2018).
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whether there’s a single correct ‘logic’ or many, or about someone advocating or
using a ‘logic’: all of these locutions can be cashed out in terms of deductive systems
which are said to capture the rules we think with.
Having clarified this point, we can restate the commitments we started with: first,
the metaphysical assumption of a single correct logic for thinking, and second, the
epistemic assumption that this logic is universally accepted as correct by thinkers.
Monism There is only one correct logic for thinking.
Agreement The correct logic is universally accepted as correct.
Relaxing these assumptions allows for the following:
Pluralism There is more than one correct logic for thinking.
Disagreement The (or a) correct logic is not universally accepted as correct.
For now, I’m going to ignore the possibility that no deductive system correctly
specifies the logical rules that thinkers have to follow. This possibility would obtain
if there were no such rules – a variety of ‘logical nihilism’ (Russell 2018a) – but it
would also obtain if, while there were such rules, no deductive system was adequate
to specify them (Cotnoir 2018). Perhaps, as Strawson said, ordinary language ‘has no
exact logic’ (1950, 344). I’m ignoring this view because the more difficult problems
for my view involve Pluralism and Disagreement.
We can organize the space of options in stages, as follows:
1. Monism and Agreement
2. Monism and Disagreement
3. Pluralism and Disagreement
Possibility 1 is what I’ve been working with so far in the dissertation. In this chapter
I’ll discuss what changes I need to make to accommodate Possibilities 2 and 3.
There’s also the theoretical possibility that many systems are correct, but only one
is universally accepted. In this case, the pluralism would be possible but not actual.
I don’t think any new issues arise in this case.
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2.2 Monism and Disagreement
At this stage we retain the assumption that there is a single correct logic for thinking,
but we drop the assumption that this logic is universally accepted as correct. Rather,
there is disagreement about which logic is the right one. This combination of views
appears most prominently in the work of defenders of non-classical logics who argue
on principled grounds that their logic is the right one. Dummett, for example, argued
in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (1991) that general constraints on the theory
of meaning show that intuitionistic logic is correct. Similarly, Priest has argued
that a dialetheist logic is correct on the basis that it allows a coherent treatment
of various paradoxes; he denies (2005, ch. 12) that it is merely one of many correct
logics. Defenses of classical logic against such challenges (Rumfitt 2015) also make
the monistic assumption.
A similar position sometimes – but not always – underlies discussions of whether
logic is rationally revisable. Haack (1996, 26) distinguishes between ‘absolutist’ and
‘pragmatist’ approaches to revision: the absolutist assumes that there is a unique
correct logic, but argues that we have been wrong about which logic it is, while the
pragmatist holds that we should choose the logic which displays the best combination
of theoretical virtues. A Haackian absolutist is a monist who allows for disagreement
about which logic is correct.4
On a view where logic has the same status as other sciences (Hjortland 2017),
disagreement about the right logic can be as intelligible and rational as any other
scientific disagreement. By contrast, you might worry that, if there is a single correct
logic which is constitutive of thinking, then anyone who disagrees with that logic
must be failing to think. You might also worry that, even if someone who disagrees
with the right logic is still thinking, the rationality of that disagreement is cast into
doubt.
In response, I want to begin by distinguishing two kinds of logical disagreement.
Type A disagreement consists in having conflicting beliefs about which logic is correct.
Type B disagreement consists in actually using conflicting logics. The distinction
here is between what Peirce called logica docens – beliefs about logic – and logica
utens – logic in use (Pietarinen 2005). We will see that on the constitutive view,
advocating an incorrect logic does not lead to failure to think, nor to automatic
4A Haackian pragmatist could hold a similar position, if they thought that theoretical virtues
were a reliable guide to the correct logic, or they could be a pluralist.
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irrationality. In this sense, constitutivism is consistent with disagreement about logic.
Actually using an incorrect logic may lead to failure to think, but I’ll suggest that our
discomfort with this conclusion is better targeted at monism than at constitutivism.
2.2.1 Type A disagreement: conflicting beliefs about logic
Type A disagreement occurs when the two parties have conflicting beliefs about
which logic is correct: for example, R asserts that classical logic is correct and D
asserts that intuitionistic logic is correct. There are two worries you might have
about how this kind of disagreement interacts with my view.
The first worry is that someone who advocates intuitionistic logic must be failing
to think. This worry can, I think, be assuaged fairly quickly. It’s possible to advocate
intuitionistic logic while following the rules of classical logic (or, conversely, to
advocate classical logic using only intuitionistically valid reasoning). Indeed, this
fact underlies the argumentative strategy of Rumfitt (2015), who argues for classical
logic against intuitionism by providing a semantic theory that validates classical
logic regardless of whether the metalogic is classical or intuitionistic.5 So the fact
that someone is advocating an incorrect logic doesn’t mean that they’re failing to
think. (If they’re using an incorrect logic, that is a different matter, which I consider
in the next section.)
The second worry is that someone who advocates an incorrect logic must be
irrational. Field (2009, 251) suggests a similar objection, arguing that the claim that
logical laws are laws of thought
seems problematic, if rational change of logic is possible: can it really
be that in a debate over logic, the party who advocates the incorrect
logic is automatically irrational, however compelling her case may be and
however poor the currently available arguments on the other side?
But Field’s argument is not entirely clear. It’s trivially true that someone who
advocates an incorrect logic is wrong – but why would they be ‘automatically
irrational’? One possibility is that Field assumes the advocate of the incorrect logic
must be using the incorrect logic, and so reasoning incorrectly; but as I pointed out
above, there’s no reason why someone who advocates a logic has to use that logic in
their advocacy.
5Rumfitt is following the strategy of Dummett (1991), who argues for intuitionism. Williamson
(2017) argues instead that the metalogic should be the same as the logic, but my disagreement with
Williamson is upstream of this particular issue.
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Another possibility is that Field thinks logics are immodest in roughly the sense
of Lewis (1971): good classical reasoning will inevitably favour classical logic, good
intuitionistic reasoning will inevitably favour intuitionistic logic, and so on. The
argument would then be that since (say) classical logic is constitutive of thinking, the
advocate of intuitionistic logic must be following classical logic; but good classical
reasoning favours classical logic; so the advocate of intuitionistic logic must be
reasoning badly. This is an interesting argument, but – aside from doubts, suggested
by the earlier examples of Dummett and Rumfitt, about whether logics are immodest
in this sense – I don’t think it is what Field has in mind. Field’s imagined advocate
is not reasoning badly, but well; they are making a compelling case against a
not-so-compelling one.
Rather, I think Field’s argument is something like this. If there is a set of logical
rules which all thinkers follow, then a thinker who is wrong about what those rules
are is misapprehending the very rules that they are following. Supposing that the
right logic is classical, for example, Priest, Dummett and other non-classical logicians
are wrong about the very rules which they, as thinkers, follow. And being wrong
about the very rules that you are following is different from being wrong about some
external matter. For, given that you’re actually following the correct rules, you have
access to very direct evidence about which rules those are. A thinker who is wrong
about what rules they are following is wrong in the face of direct evidence, and this
is irrational.
As Field says, though, this is a very problematic conclusion. Priest, Dummett,
Rumfitt and other defenders of particular logics have spent decades making detailed
arguments in favour of their proposed rules; this kind of activity seems like a paradigm
of rationality. So if my view entails that all of them (perhaps excepting those who
picked the right logic) are ‘automatically irrational’, then that is a problem for my
view.
In fact, I don’t think my view entails this. In particular, it’s not true that following
logical rules gives you direct evidence about which rules you are following. It’s a
familiar phenomenon that human beings can know how to do some rule-governed
activity without being able to state the rule that they are following. This is often
called ‘tacit knowledge’; although merely labelling the phenomenon doesn’t explain it,
I think the familiarity of the phenomenon is enough to show that it is possible. The
most prominent example of tacit knowledge is our knowledge of language (discussed
below in 3.5.1). A competent English speaker can follow the kinds of rules that
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are specified in a formal grammar of the language, but they need not be able to
make those rules explicit. There is nothing puzzling in the example of a competent
English speaker who has false beliefs about the rules of English grammar. This is
the position of the vast majority of English speakers. So too for logic: knowing how
to think does not require being able to state the rules you are following in thinking.
It might be argued that, even if thinkers need not be able to immediately state
the rules they are following, they should be able to state these rules upon reflection.
The rules may be known tacitly, but they should not be so deeply tacit as to be
inaccessible. If they are inaccessible, then they aren’t really ‘known’ or ‘followed’
at all: it is simply the case that the subject is disposed to conform to them, and
we shouldn’t use the label ‘knowledge’ for mere behavioural dispositions.6 But I
don’t think this is right: as I will argue in Chapter 3, the capacities involved in
following logical rules have a first-personal aspect as well as a third-personal aspect.
There is something it is like to follow a logical rule. So our tacit knowledge does not
consist solely in dispositions to conform. But the first-personal aspect shows up in
experiencing particular inferences as right or wrong; it need not put us in a position
to know, merely by reflection, which rules we are following.
Against this, Zalabardo (2011, 134) argues that our capacity to recognize partic-
ular inferences as valid ‘can be applied, not only to particular inferences, but also to
types of inference’. This would mean that, if thinkers are able to recognize particular
inferences as valid, they should also be able to recognize universal logical rules as
valid. Zalabardo draws a comparison with grammar (2011, 134-135):
The very same ability that enables any English speaker to recognize the
sentence Mary arrived the house as ungrammatical will enable speakers
with the requisite concepts to acknowledge the truth of the proposition
that the verb to arrive never takes a direct object. In this way, the capacity
to recognize grammatical sentences can be a source of knowledge, not
only of particular propositions, but also of universal generalizations.
But this seems implausible. The ungrammatical sentence sticks out as wrong, without
any analysis. By contrast, to see that ‘to arrive’ never takes a direct object, we
need to imaginatively consider a series of sentences – some with a direct object,
others with an indirect object – and note which ones seem right and which seem
wrong; then we can generalize from these instances to a rule, but our generalization
might be wrong if we started with too limited a set of instances. So too for logic:
6Compare Dickie’s objection to ‘profoundly implicit’ propositional attitudes (2017, 2582).
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particular inferences seem right or wrong, but to get to a general rule, we need to
generalize, and our generalization could be wrong if we started with too limited a
set of inferences.
Indeed, many proponents of nonclassical logics might offer just this explanation
of the general acceptance of classical logic. After all, these proponents often accept
that classical logic is valid in many ordinary contexts (Russell 2019, 558). So, for
example, an intuitionist who held that classical principles are invalid only in infinite
settings (Brouwer 1908) might argue that our acceptance of classical principles is a
result of generalizing wrongly from finite settings.
Moreover, when we experience a particular inference as right or wrong, it need
not be clear whether the inference is right or wrong in virtue of a logical rule or some
other rule. This is why logic students have to learn the difference between a materially
valid inference like ‘If Moose Jaw is north of Timmins, then Timmins is south of
Moose Jaw’ and a logically valid inference like ‘If Moose Jaw is north of Timmins,
then something is north of Timmins’. This lack of direct first-personal access to the
rules which make our inferences compelling provides another explanation for the
existence of conflicting beliefs about which logic is correct.
So advocating a theory at odds with your practice isn’t always irrational. But
I don’t mean to say that it’s never irrational. While following a rule doesn’t itself
generate evidence about the rule you’re following, a third party might observe which
rule you tend to conform to and point this out. If you have it pointed out to you that
you’re affirming a rule which you don’t follow, or rejecting a rule which you do follow,
you’re irrational if you don’t respond in some way. Suppose, for example, that you
advocate intuitionistic logic and that someone points out that you actually follow
Double Negation Elimination. There are several ways you might respond. First, you
might take it as a reason to revise your theory and come to accept classical logic.
Second, you might classify your conformity to DNE as an error and try to avoid
making such errors in future. Third, you might give an alternative explanation –
for example, that the cases where you followed DNE were all cases where you knew
the thought was either true or false. More generally, you might try to explain your
reasoning as materially rather than formally valid. If you don’t do any of these
things, then you are irrational.
To conclude, a constitutivist has no trouble accommodating Type A disagreement:
it doesn’t entail that the advocate of an incorrect logic is automatically irrational,
let alone that they are failing to think.
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2.2.2 Type B disagreement: using conflicting logics
Type B, the more difficult kind of disagreement to make sense of, occurs where two
thinkers actually follow different logical rules. Suppose that R reasons classically,
while D reasons intuitionistically, in the sense that R tends to accept all classical
inferences and D tends to accept only intuitionistic inferences. If classical logic is
correct, then R is following the correct rules and D is following the wrong rules. Are
we forced to say that D is not thinking?
One possibility is that, deep down, D is really using classical logic but systemati-
cally refusing to draw certain inferences. Perhaps D has dispositions to draw classical
inferences, but those dispositions are, in certain cases, blocked by D’s theoretical
commitment to intuitionism. It’s a familiar fact that dispositions can be blocked or
‘masked’ in this way (Choi & Fara 2018). In this case, we could say that D is still
thinking, although less well than R.
There are a couple of problems with this explanation. First, it is made plausible
in the present case by the fact that intuitionism is weaker than classical logic, in the
sense that if an inference is intuitionistically valid then it is also classically valid.
This kind of explanation is less workable where the deviant thinker is using a logic
stronger than the correct logic – for instance, if intuitionistic logic were correct, and
classical logic the deviation. Of course, we could insist that the deviant thinker
really has a set of dispositions corresponding to the correct logic, and that their
theoretical commitments merely lead them to accept certain additional inferences
which don’t follow from the rules that their dispositions pick out, but this seems like
an unmotivated position to take: it might be that the deviant thinker is genuinely
disposed to draw the inferences specified by the incorrect logic.
Second, this explanation fails to take seriously the first-personal dimension of
responsiveness to logical rules – the fact that the subject who has the capacity finds
compelling inferences that fall under the rule. Given this fact, whether a subject’s
capacities correspond to classical or intuitionistic logic cannot be determined merely
third-personally; it also depends on which inferences the subject finds compelling.
In some cases, it might be that D really does find the classical inferences compelling.
But if they only find intuitionistic inferences compelling, it would be wrong to say
that they are ‘really’ following classical rules.
In cases where the above strategy is unavailable, and a subject does have capacities
to follow logical rules other than the correct ones, we might not be forced to hold
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that this subject is failing to think. We could instead loosen our view of what
relation to logical rules is required for thinking. I argue in Chapter 3 that this
relation involves logical capacities, but we might instead accept a view similar to
that of Quine (1960) and Davidson (1973; 1985), requiring only that the subject
tend to conform to the right logical rules, not that the subject have dispositions or
capacities picking out those rules. In short: as long as you mostly conform, you are
thinking, no matter what the explanation for your conformity is. A subject who
tends to reason intuitionistically or relevantly or in accord with any other logic that
largely overlaps with classical logic will tend to conform to classical logic.7 So on
the Quinean view, such a subject will still be thinking. (The Quinean view does,
however, allow for subjects who think ‘accidentally’: who, as a fluke, conform to the
correct rules enough to count as thinking.)
If we don’t want to weaken our position in this way, then we are forced to hold
that the deviant subject is failing to think. But this position, while hard to accept,
is not as extreme as it might sound. For one thing, if our capacities can change
over time, it may be that much of the subject’s activity still counts as thinking:
only those segments of the activity during which the subject’s capacities pick out an
incorrect logic fail to count as thinking. For another thing, as I’ll argue in Chapter
5, our failures to think can be subjectively indistinguishable from thinking, and can
involve reasoning and the use of that-clauses. So the claim that someone is failing to
think is not refuted by showing that their activity looks like thinking, or that they
are under the impression that they are thinking.
Finally, I want to emphasize that this anti-deviant conclusion is premised on
accepting that there is one true logic. It shouldn’t be surprising that, for a monist,
those subjects who follow deviant logics are at risk of producing nonsense. Conversely,
much of our dissatisfaction with this conclusion is, I think, really a dissatisfaction with
the idea that one logic is absolutely correct. The felt need to ‘save’ deviant thinkers
from the conclusion that they fail to think really reflects an implicit sympathy for
pluralism. This takes us to the next stage of the discussion.
7We might even weaken the position still further to hold that which logical rules you count as
following is determined in part by your environment, along the lines of the externalism about logical
form discussed in Ludlow (2003). But I find this degree of externalism hard to make sense of.
2. Disagreement and pluralism 58
2.3 Pluralism and Disagreement
At this stage we drop the monist assumption that there is a single correct logic,
allowing instead that more than one logic is correct – in particular, that there may be
multiple correct (and non-equivalent) sets of rules for the conditional and negation.
Dropping this assumption leaves the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking
ambiguous. Once we allow that more than one logic is correct, it’s no longer clear
which logical rules a thinker must tend to conform to.
One response would be to allow that following any finite set of logical rules is
sufficient (other things being equal) for thinking. This position tallies well with
Warren’s (2015, 4) ‘unrestricted inferentialism’, the view that any set of inference
rules for an expression suffices to determine a meaning. Warren concludes that a
language containing Prior’s tonk is a possible language, whose sentences express
propositions.8 This response would be consistent with logical pluralism, but it would
make the constitutive claim nearly vacuous: any subject who followed some set of
logical rules would count as thinking.
I am going to argue that constitutivism is consistent with two more limited kinds
of logical pluralism. The first kind, which I call domain variance, holds that there
are multiple domains of thoughts, such that while there’s a single correct logic for
each domain, different domains can have different logics. The second kind, which I
call the minimal kit, holds that for a given domain of thoughts there are multiple
correct logics, such that following any one of them is sufficient for thinking. Both
responses, I will argue, allow for a degree of logical pluralism while maintaining the
core of the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. I’ll suggest, however, that the
first response is feasible only if the second is.
2.3.1 Domain variance
In an early paper called ‘Truth’, Dummett argued that we are entitled to reason
classically with statements in a given domain if, but only if, statements in that
domain are decidable (1959, 66). When it comes to domains where statements are
not decidable, we ought to reason intuitionistically instead. Dummett’s claim is
8Here are the rules for tonk (Prior 1960).
Tonk Introduction From p, infer p tonk q.
Tonk Elimination From p tonk q, infer q.
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an instance of domain variance: the view that different logics might be correct for
different domains of thought.
This idea is taken up by Kissel & Shapiro (2017, 3), who argue that ‘the correct
logic is dependent on the domain of discourse’. Formal logic spells out the implicit
norms of thinking, but these norms may be different depending on what we’re
thinking about. Even within mathematics, Kissel & Shapiro argue, some theories
are consistent only on the assumption of a logic weaker than classical logic.9 So
the norms of various logics are constitutive of various mathematical
theories: there are classical theories, intuitionistic theories, and perhaps
even relevant theories, quantum theories, sub-structural theories, ... If
you are working in a classical theory, you ought to reason in such and
such a way; if in an intuitionistic theory, in this and so way, etc. (2017,
17)
The upshot: while there’s a single correct logic for reasoning in any given domain,
there’s no single correct logic for reasoning as such (2017, 20):
the reason why there is no One True Logic is that the norms implicit
in these practices are different from each other. Each of the logics is
truth-preserving in its domain, in the sense that if the premises of valid
argument (in the indicated logic) are true in the domain, then so is its
conclusion. None of the logics, or perhaps only the weakest of them, is
truth preserving across the board.
Though they don’t discuss this, Kissel and Shapiro’s pluralism seems equally ap-
plicable to domains outside of mathematics. For example, there may be different
logics for thought about ordinary objects, ethical thought, mathematical thought
and scientific thought.
Does domain variance provide a way to make constitutivism consistent with
logical pluralism? A dilemma posed by Haack suggests not. Haack argues that
if the ground for distinguishing the domains refers to content, one will be
disposed to say that the systems are not really logical, and if the ground
for distinguishing the domains refers to form, one will be disposed to say
that the systems are not really rivals. (1996, 46)
9For example, Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis (a theory of infinitesimals) is inconsistent if the
background logic is classical, but consistent in intuitionistic logic (Shapiro 2014, 72-75). There are
serious questions about whether Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis makes sense, even granting that it is
consistent (Rumfitt 2018, 15), but other examples are available: for example, naive set theory with
a dialetheist background logic. A different sort of example involves theories that are distinct only
when the background logic is distinct, such as Heyting Arithmetic and Peano Arithmetic.
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Let’s take the horns of the dilemma in turn.
On the one hand, if the domains are distinguished by the logical form of the
thoughts involved – for example, if one logic is appropriate for tensed thoughts and
another for untensed thoughts, or one logic for thoughts containing modal operators
and another for thoughts without them – then domain variance is not really a kind
of pluralism. It’s equivalent to Hjortland’s proposal that we only need ‘one logical
theory, but the theory itself recommends restricted logical principles for different
parts of the language’ (2017, 654). For we can just conjoin the logics to get a single
correct logic for all domains. If this is pluralism, then anyone who accepts both
propositional and predicate logic is a pluralist.
On the other hand, Haack argues, if the domains are distinguished by subject-
matter, then the rules that vary between domains are not topic-neutral; if logical
rules are topic-neutral, then the rules that vary between domains are not logical. So
we have pluralism, but not logical pluralism. (Moreover, if only the rules which hold
in all domains are logical, then there’s a risk of logical nihilism (Russell 2018b, 345),
or at least a very weak logic.)
I’m going to argue that we should resist this horn of the dilemma. Before I
do so, however, let me strengthen the problem by noting an additional way that
domain variance seems to put pressure on topic-neutrality. Consider the question
of what logic holds for thoughts that cross different domains. For example, if p
is a mathematical thought and subject to intuitionistic logic, while q is an ethical
thought and subject to classical logic, what is the right logic for p and q?
While this example might seem artificial, the fact that domains of thought are not
completely sealed off from each other seems to guarantee that such domain-crossing
thoughts will sometimes occur. One possible response is that where the logic for p is
weaker than the logic for q, the weaker logic holds for complex thoughts composed
of p and q. But there is not always a weaker logic: sometimes the sets of entailments
recognized by two logics will overlap partially, with neither being contained in the
other.
We might hold instead that there’s a minimal background logic that governs
domain-crossing thoughts – perhaps the intersection of the logics for the different
domains. But now there’s some pressure – derived, again, from the thought that logic
is topic-neutral – to say that only the minimal background logic is really logic, and
the rules for particular domains just reflect general principles about those domains.
In other words, the pluralist has to resist the proposal, made by some proponents of
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nonclassical logics (Beall 2018), that a weak logic specifies the core of consequence
relations in all domains, and in each domain additional (non-logical) principles hold
which strengthen the local consequence relation. The proponent of the weak logic
‘recaptures’ stronger rules locally without taking them to be part of the logic.
Both Haack’s dilemma and the domain-crossing problem seem to show that
domain variance is not a kind of logical pluralism, because the domain-variant
rules violate topic-neutrality. If these arguments are right, they cast doubt on
the consistency of logical pluralism with constitutivism. One way out might be to
abandon topic-neutrality, but that way isn’t open to me. As I argued in Chapter 1,
the thought that logic is topic-neutral, in the sense that logical concepts are always
applicable, is not merely traditional: it’s connected with the expressive role of logical
concepts, which constitute a general, open-ended ability to respond to tension and
support among thoughts. My only way out, then, is to show that this sense of
topic-neutrality is consistent with domain variance.
Here’s the idea. While the precise rules for negation may vary from domain to
domain, there’s a single, topic-neutral notion which is at the core of negation in
any domain. Intuitively, while the early Dummett thought that Double Negation
Elimination was appropriate in some domains and not others, he took negation itself
to have a common meaning across domains. In every domain, negation expresses
tension between thoughts. And the same might be said about the conditional: while
the precise rules may vary, in every domain it expresses support between thoughts.
One way to put this would be that the rules in different domains constitute different
conceptions of a single concept.
If this idea can be made to work, then the concepts of negation and the conditional
are topic-neutral, while the precise rules for these concepts can vary with subject-
matter, as required by domain variance. In this way, domain-variance is consistent
with topic-neutrality, and so pluralism is consistent with constitutivism.
To make this idea work, we need to spell out the sense in which the logical
concepts can remain the same while some of the rules vary. What does the core of a
logical concept consist in? One approach to this problem would be to find common
meanings for the logical constants which hold in different logics, against Quine’s
(1970, 100) claim that a change of logic is a change of meaning.10 Here I’m going to
10For model-theoretic approaches, see McDowell (1997a), Rumfitt (2012) and Fine (2014). For
proof-theoretic approaches, see Restall (2014), Hjortland (2013) and Dicher (2016). Quine later
takes a related position, holding that some logical truths are analytic – in the attenuated sense that
we learn their truth in learning the words involved – while others are not (1974, 80).
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defend only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for a logic to contain negation and
the conditional. I’m going to argue that such a logic has to include certain minimal
principles.
Note, however, that once we have this idea, we can also use it to develop a second
kind of logical pluralism. There might be only a single domain of thoughts, but
multiple different logics suitable for thinking about the domain because they all
contain the same logical concepts. I develop this idea in the next section.
2.3.2 The minimal kit
I’ve argued that constitutivism is consistent with one kind of logical pluralism –
domain variance. In this section, I develop a second kind of pluralism, on which for
a given domain of thoughts, there is more than one correct logic, such that following
any correct logic is sufficient (other things being equal) for thinking. I argue that
this kind of pluralism is consistent with constitutivism. It’s also consistent with
domain variance, but for simplicity I’m going to assume, in this section, that there
is only one domain of thoughts.
The proposal is that there is a (limited) range of logics such that a subject
following any logic in the range can count as thinking. Any logic in the range has
to contain certain rules, which I call the minimal kit (Hale 1999, 51; 2002; Leech
2015). I’ll begin by discussing which rules a logic must contain to be suitable for
thinking with. Following this, I consider an objection about the sense in which logic
is consitutive of thinking on this proposal. Finally, I make some brief comments on
which deductive systems contain the minimal kit.
So: which rules are in the minimal kit? One proposal comes from recent work by
Suki Finn (2019a, 2019b). Finn argues that there are certain logical rules which a
logic must include if it is to be adequate. These rules have the property of being
‘self-governing’: they are of the very structure that they govern. For example, Finn
argues that all rules of inference are conditional in structure: they are of the structure
If the premises instantiate structure X, then infer conclusion Y (2019b, s. 3). She
then argues that Modus Ponens governs all conditionals, and therefore governs all
rules of inference. It’s not entirely clear what is meant by ‘governs’, but a plausible
reading is that a rule governs a structure iff sensitivity to the rule is required for
understanding instances of the structure. In the present context, the idea would be
that to understand conditional structures you have to follow Modus Ponens. This
reading echoes Boghossian’s suggestion that ‘there is no alternative but to accept
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“conditional theory”—Modus Ponens in effect—if you are so much as to have the
conditional concept’ (2003, 247). Now, given that Modus Ponens is itself a rule of
inference, it is itself of conditional structure, and is thus self-governing in Finn’s
sense.
An initial proposal, then, might be that the rules in the minimal kit are precisely
those that are self-governing. But while I do want to build on Finn’s ideas in giving
an account of the minimal kit, I don’t want to use them so directly, for several
reasons. First, very few rules are self-governing in Finn’s sense: she proposes Modus
Ponens and Universal Instantiation, and rejects other contenders. But requiring only
these rules would impose a very weak constraint on the range of possible logics for
thinking. Second, Finn’s view of self-governance relies on the assumption that all
logical rules are conditional in form. But it’s not clear that this is the case. Some
logical rules, like the Law of Non-Contradiction, are, intuitively, not even broadly
conditional in structure. The Law of Non-Contradiction could be formulated as it is
not the case that p and not-p, or do not judge p and not-p, or it is incorrect to judge
p and not-p; none of these are governed by Modus Ponens.
The third point is not an objection to Finn’s notion of self-governance, but to
the idea of using it to determine which rules are in the minimal kit. It’s simply
unclear why self-governance should be a condition on being constitutive of thinking.
Finn argues that self-governing rules generate the adoption problem – the problem
that it would be impossible for someone who didn’t already follow the rule to adopt
it, because adopting it presupposes that you already follow it (Padró 2015). This
is compelling; but generating the adoption problem doesn’t seem like a sufficient
condition for being constitutive of thinking. There could be a rule that is unadoptable
– perhaps it is of some alien and self-governing structure – but which is not constitutive
of thinking.
In fact, it seems to me that self-governance is not the most fundamental notion
in Finn’s account. A rule’s being self-governing is a consequence of the fact that
the rule governs all rules of inference. For example, Modus Ponens is self-governing
because it governs all inferential rules, or at least all rules of conditional structure.
This suggests that we should look more directly at which rules govern all inferential
rules, or at least which rules govern the general structures that rules have: if there
are any such, they’ll have a strong claim to being constitutive of thinking. But are
there?
It’s helpful to start a little bit further back, by considering the types of rational
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relation in which thoughts stand to each other. By ‘rational relation’, I mean a
relation that plays a role in fixing a thought’s place in the web of thoughts. I argued
in 1.2.1 that there are at least two general kinds of rational relations: support and
tension. A thought might support another thought, as this is an oak supports this is
a tree. And a thought might stand in tension with another thought, as this is an
oak stands in tension with this is a maple. I argued that appreciating such rational
relations requires grasp of the conditional and negation. If there are core rules for
the conditional and negation, these will be the rules in the minimal kit. (The same
rules will also be self-governing in roughly Finn’s sense: just as any codification of
the rules for the conditional will presuppose some notion of support, any codification
of the rules for negation will presuppose some notion of tension.)
Which logical rules, then, are at the core of the conditional and negation?
Two plausible candidates, which I proposed in 1.4.1, are Modus Ponens and Non-
Contradiction. Appreciating that p supports q requires sensitivity to Modus Ponens,
which says, in intuitive terms, to believe q if you believe p and you take it that p
supports q. Appreciating that p and r are in tension requires sensitivity to Non-
Contradiction, which says not to believe p and not-p. So these rules are such that a
thinker must be sensitive to them in order to appreciate any relation among thoughts,
and so in order to understand any thoughts at all. I claim, then, that a logic adequate
for thinking with must contain Modus Ponens and Non-Contradiction.11 Just how
to formulate these rules is discussed in the next section.
Note, however, that these are likely not the only rules that are required. For one
thing, Modus Ponens is a rule for eliminating the conditional; a usable logic would
also need some way of introducing the conditional. Perhaps this:
Conditional Proof If Γ, P ` Q, then Γ ` P → Q
We might also need rules for other connectives, such as conjunction or disjunction.12
11Łukasiewicz held a similar view and even proposed the same kit, plus a rule of substitution
(1937, 248): ‘Absolute truths of thought did not collapse in 1930. Whatever discredit anyone may
try to cast upon many-valued logics, he cannot deny that their existence has not invalidated the
principle of exclusive contradiction. ... Also valid remain the rules of inference, namely the rule of
substitution, which corresponds to the Aristotelian dictum de omni, and the rule of detachment,
analogous to the Stoic syllogism called modus ponens. Owing precisely to these rules we are building
today not one but many logical systems, each of which is consistent and free of contradiction. It
may be that other absolute principles, with which all logical systems must comply, also exist.’
12Maddy (2002, 71) argues that the rudimentary logic we think with uses conjunction and
disjunction with Strong Kleene truth-tables, and the conditional and negation with partial truth-
tables; in (2014, 94) she accepts the Strong Kleene tables for the conditional and negation too.
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For another thing, I haven’t said anything about structural rules – rules which
are closed under substitution for sentences (Restall 2000, 24). It seems likely that
Reflexivity is in the minimal kit:
Reflexivity P ` P
But other structural rules, like Weakening, are more controversial (Hlobil 2016, 90;
Brandom 2018, 72).
Weakening If Γ ` Q, then Γ, P ` Q
So the minimal kit will need some structural rules, but I haven’t said which. A thinker
might also need a rule of substitution to get from general rules to instances of those
rules (Besson 2019a, 184; Cohnitz & Nicolai (ms.)). Finally, the minimal kit might
need some rules governing subsentential structure, such as Universal Instantiation.13
In short: my claim is that MP and LNC are in the minimal kit, not that they exhaust
it.
A natural objection arises at this point: isn’t the minimal kit the One True
Logic? If it is, then the minimal kit proposal is not a kind of pluralism at all, but
a minimalist kind of monism. But I don’t agree that the minimal kit is the One
True Logic. The reason for this is that a subject who followed only the rules in the
kit would not be able to think: the rules are just too minimal. A logic suitable for
thinking needs more than just the minimal kit; the pluralist point is that there’s
no unique more that it needs. There are many different ways of supplementing the
kit to get a logic suitable for thinking. (Of course, even following a logic suitable
for thinking is not sufficient for thinking – as I emphasized in Chapter 1, there are
other necessary conditions which I haven’t investigated.)
This response invites a second objection, which parallels the objection against
domain variance we discussed earlier. Consider some rule – say, Double Negation
Elimination – which is not in the minimal kit, but which is in some of the logics
suitable for thinking. It’s possible to think without following DNE, because a thinker
could follow intuitionistic logic, which doesn’t contain it. So DNE is not constitutive
13Brandom (1994) tries to prove that any language with negation and a conditional must have
subject-predicate structure if it has subsentential structure at all. But the argument is very hard
to pin down. Moreover, subsentential structure raises novel issues. There’s a question about how
logical form relates to empirical syntactic structure, and whether it is a problem if empirical syntax
turns out to have no use for categories like singular term and predicate (Collins 2007; 2015).
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of thinking. But (given what I’ve argued) logical rules have to be constitutive of
thinking. So DNE is not a logical rule. In general, then, rules outside of the minimal
kit are not logical rules; they are contingent, not necessary for thinking. And this
means that, while the minimal kit might be a kind of pluralism, it’s not logical
pluralism.
This objection brings out an important point. Accommodating pluralism along
these lines does force us to revise the sense in which logic is constitutive of thinking.
Previously, we said that logical rules are constitutive of thinking in that subjects have
to follow them in order to think – but this excludes the rules outside the minimal
kit. Instead, we should say that logical rules are constitutive of thinking in that
subjects have to follow one of the right logics in order to think. This is a version of
the ‘relativized constitutivism’ which Steinberger (2017, 156) attributes to Carnap:
Might it be constitutive of thought not that there is a unique set of
logical norms to which thinking is subject, but rather that the thinker
acknowledge the normative authority of one set of logical laws among
a range of different but equally acceptable options? According to this
picture there are more than one, potentially numerous, sets of norms.
None of them has an exclusive claim to being constitutive for thought,
but in order to count as thinking one must acknowledge the authority of
exactly one (any one) of them. ... On this view, thought, much like the
rule of law, is characterized by its multiple normative realizability.
Carnap’s view requires acknowledging the authority of the rules, while mine requires
actually following them, but the structure of the views is the same. To think, you
need a logical framework, but no framework in particular. Given this modification,
we can hold that DNE is constitutive of thinking, relative to logics which contain
it, and therefore that it is a logical rule. A subject who follows classical logic has
to follow DNE in order to think (unless they adopt a different logic), but not every
subject needs to follow classical logic.
2.3.3 Recap
The arguments of this section have been a bit tangled, so let me sum up my position.
Constitutivism is consistent with two kinds of pluralism: different domains can have
different correct logics, and a single domain can also have multiple correct logics.
Putting these kinds together, we have a picture in which subjects can differ in the
rules they follow both within and between domains, while still thinking.
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To illustrate: suppose there are two domains (the finite and the infinite) and two
logics (classical and intuitionistic). Then there are four ways that a subject might
think: classically in both domains; intuitionistically in both domains; classically for
the finite and intuitionistically for the infinite; or the reverse. Now, if we consider
the range of possible domains and the range of possible logics, it’s clear that there
are many more possibilities than this.
To be clear, however, I’m not saying that a subject who followed any of these
possibilities would be right, all things considered. But they wouldn’t be failing to
think, at least not for logical reasons.
The resulting position is both pluralist and constitutivist. Different individuals,
different communities or different species of thinkers might follow different rules,
in one domain or in all of them, but it’s still not the case that anything goes.
For example, we deny that a community might follow the rules for the trivializing
connective tonk, pace Warren (2015). In Warren’s interpretation, the Tonkers have
no negation or conditional in their language (nor any other non-trivial connective):
for example, the Tonkish symbol equiform with our ‘not’ expresses a vacuously unary
constant function which takes any value to true.14 We also rule out less extreme
logics. For example, we also rule out Kripke’s (perhaps rather tongue-in-cheek)
proposal that a positive logic, with no connective that takes truth to falsity, is
‘adequate for science’ (2015, 383; cf. Brîncuş & Toader 2018).
2.4 Which logics contain MP and LNC?
Which logics contain the rules in the minimal kit? It turns out that this is not a
straightforward question, particularly when it comes to the Law of Non-Contradiction.
So I won’t attempt a definitive answer here, but will merely make some tentative
remarks. In this section I will use ‘Modus Ponens’ and ‘Law of Non-Contradiction’
to refer to the rules for thinking which I motivated above and in Chapter 1:
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
Law of Non-Contradiction Do not judge p and not-p.
I’ll use different terms to refer to the rules which hold, or fail to, in various deductive
14The Tonkers can nonetheless follow standard classical rules for negation only because those
rules don’t fix the standard semantics; as Warren observes (2015, 18), the Tonkers wouldn’t be able
to follow the bilateral rules I’ll discuss at the end of the next section.
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systems, and which aim to capture the force of Modus Ponens and the Law of
Non-Contradiction.
As above, I refer to a logic as a set of entailments between sentences of an
artificial object-language together with some superstructure, a model theory or proof
theory, which generates the entailments. An entailment is a metalanguage sentence
of the form Γ ` Q, where Γ is a (possibly empty) set of sentences. This builds in
a few assumptions which I want to flag. First, I’m assuming that an entailment
can have only a single conclusion. Some theorists argue for multiple-conclusion
logics, where an entailment is of the form Γ ` ∆, and says that if all sentences
in Γ are true, at least one sentence in ∆ is true (Shoesmith & Smiley 1978). In
principle, I don’t want to rule out the possibility that some subject might think by
following a multiple-conclusion logic. But I won’t consider the possibility here; in
any event, multiple-conclusion arguments don’t seem to be part of our reasoning
practice (Steinberger 2011b).
Second, I’m assuming that Γ is a set of sentences, not a sequence. In other words,
the order of premises doesn’t matter, and repetition of premises doesn’t matter
(Restall 2000, 3). This amounts to assuming two structural rules:
Exchange If Γ, P,R ` Q then Γ, R, P ` Q
Contraction If Γ, P, P ` Q then Γ, P ` Q
Again, both of these rules might be denied. If we suppose that premise combination
stands for concatenation, as in categorial grammar (Lambek 1958), Exchange fails. In
a resource-conscious logic where premises get ‘used up’, like linear logic, Contraction
fails (Troelstra 1992). Someone might make a case that the correct logic for thinking
should reject either or both of these, but I won’t have room to consider that possibility
here.15
Third, while it’s fairly clear how a proof theory generates an entailment, there
are more options in the model-theoretic case. For present purposes, Γ ` Q means
that whenever all of Γ have a designated value, Q has a designated value. The
designated values are true and (in logics that allow it) both true and false. But
you might also define entailment as preservation of only truth, or preservation of
non-falsity. Different definitions will generate different sets of entailments from the
same truth-tables.
15Beall & Murzi (2013, 166) and Shapiro (2015, 80) propose dropping Contraction to block a
version of Curry’s paradox.
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Now I can set out the logics I will consider. I’m only going to consider propositional
logics, and I won’t fully lay any of them out; since the focus is on which logics contain
the philosophically motivated rules above, I’ll only refer to some salient features of
each logic, providing references to places where full presentations can be found.
• Classical logic or CL, with the connectives interpreted in the usual way using
two-valued truth-tables, such that every proposition is either true or false, and
no proposition is both. For defences of classical logic, see Rumfitt (2015) and
Williamson (2018).
• Intuitionistic logic or IL, which rejects Double Negation Elimination (¬¬P ` P )
and the Law of Excluded Middle (` P ∨ ¬P ). For arguments in favour of
intuitionism based on objections to classical reasoning about infinities, see
Brouwer (1908; 1951) and for arguments based on the theory of meaning, see
Dummett (1991). For a presentation see van Dalen (2001).
• The relevant logic R, which, like other relevant logics, aims to respect the
principle that in a valid argument the premises should be relevant to the
conclusion, so as to avoid ‘paradoxes of material implication’ such as P →
(Q→ P ). R is presented in Anderson & Belnap (1975).
• Strong Kleene Logic or K3. Kleene (1952, §64) developed three-valued truth-
tables for the logical connectives, such that a sentence can be true, false
or neither. The third value is undesignated. It might apply in cases of
indeterminacy of truth-value, ignorance of the correct truth-value, reference
failure or some other defect. The entailments of K3 are those which preserve
truth given this semantics (importantly, this isn’t the same as preserving
non-falsity).16
• Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox LP (Priest 2006), which is also three-valued,
but the values are true, false and both true and false. The truth-tables for LP
are the same as those for K3, but the third value represents both rather than
neither. So LP has two designated values. The entailments of LP are those
which preserve either true or both: in other words, if all of Γ are either true or
both, Q is either true or both.
16There are other truth-tables with two undesignated values, such as Ł3 (Łukasiewicz 1930) and
the ‘internal’ B3 (Bochvar 1937), also known as Weak Kleene Logic, which I won’t consider here.
These truth-tables and others can be found in Haack (1996, 168).
2. Disagreement and pluralism 70
• The logic of First Degree Entailment or FDE, which is four-valued, allowing
sentences to be true, false, both or neither (Dunn 1976). The entailments of
FDE are those which preserve designation, i.e. either truth or both, like those
of LP. FDE has a generality which is sometimes used to argue that it is the
correct logic (Beall 2018): if you take FDE and then rule out sentences taking
the value neither, you get LP; if you rule out the both value, you get K3; and
if you rule out neither and both, you get CL. For discussion and defence of
FDE, see Anderson & Belnap (1975, §81) and Beall (2018).
I don’t at all claim that this exhausts the main contenders for a logic to think with,
but it’s a reasonably broad selection which will give us the lay of the land.
Let’s start with Modus Ponens. There are a couple things we might mean in
asking whether a given deductive system ‘contains’ Modus Ponens. First, we might
be asking whether
Detachment P → Q,P ` Q
is a valid form of argument within the logic. On a model-theoretic approach,
Detachment is valid iff Q is true (or: has a designated value) on condition that P
and P → Q are true (or: have designated values). On a proof-theoretic approach,
Detachment is valid iff Q can be proven from P → Q and P .
Second, we might be asking whether the following statement, known as Pseudo
Modus Ponens, is valid:
Pseudo Modus Ponens ` (P ∧ (P → Q))→ Q
Now, in the present case, I think it’s clear that Detachment captures our informal
idea of Modus Ponens better than Pseudo Modus Ponens does. As I argued in 1.5,
a logic that didn’t contain any rules of inference (like Detachment) but only the
conditionals that corresponded to them (like Pseudo Modus Ponens) would be unable
to treat any proposition as supporting any other proposition. Still, considering
the standing of Pseudo Modus Ponens within different logics will help set up our
discussion of the Law of Non-Contradiction below.
So let’s ask: which logics validate Modus Ponens?
Detachment is valid in CL and IL and in the relevant logic R. Pseudo Modus
Ponens also holds in these logics.
Detachment also holds in the three-valued logic K3. LP and FDE lack a condi-
tional; if we define P → Q in the usual way, as an abbreviation for ¬(P ∧ ¬Q), then
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Detachment fails for this conditional. Pseudo Modus Ponens holds in LP, which
validates all classical theorems, but it fails in K3 and FDE, which in fact have no
theorems. Feferman (1984, 264) comments that, in light of these problems with the
conditional, ‘nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried on’ in K3 or
LP, and Hazen & Pelletier (2020) say the same about FDE.
But there is a lot more to say about this. In particular, it is possible to add a
detachable conditional which is not defined in terms of negation and conjunction.
Hazen & Pelletier (2020) propose adding such a conditional to FDE, K3 and LP. So
these logics with a conditional added would, it seems, be able to express relations
of support. However, the conditional of Hazen & Pelletier violates other familiar
principles, including Contraposition, P → Q ` ¬Q→ ¬P . We might be willing to
abandon Contraposition, but this leads to a more general point.
In asking whether Detachment holds in various logics, we have taken for granted
some conception of what makes the → a conditional in these logics, beyond merely
being subject to Detachment. Being subject to Detachment might be necessary for
being a conditional, but it can’t be sufficient. If all we required was that there be
some connective ⊗, such that P ⊗Q,P ` Q, then any logic containing conjunction
would meet the test (since if P ∧Q ` Q then, by Weakening, P ∧Q,P ` Q). But
conjunction is not a conditional. So more is required to count as a conditional than
satisfying Modus Ponens. What more is a hard question, disputed by proponents of
different logics, and not something I’ll try to settle here.
For present purposes, then, my conclusion is that a subject who followed the
rules of CL, IL, R or K3 would be able to express relations of support, and that a
subject who followed the rules of FDE or LP plus a detachable conditional would
too, presuming that the added connective was a genuine conditional.
Things get even less straightforward when we ask which formal logics contain
the Law of Non-Contradiction. There are various things we might take this to mean.
First, we might be asking whether the following sentence, which I’ll call the Principle
of Non-Contradiction, is a logical truth or theorem:
Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) ` ¬(P ∧ ¬P )
CL, IL and R all validate PNC, while it fails in K3 and FDE. LP is a well-known
tricky case (Grim 2004): PNC is a logical truth in LP, but it can also be false. This
is possible because in LP a statement can be both true and false.
However, there’s some reason to doubt that PNC is the right way to formally
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capture the Law of Non-Contradiction. For one thing, as LP shows, a logic can
validate PNC while still tolerating contradictions, and even allowing them to be
true. More philosophically, PNC is for Non-Contradiction what Pseudo Modus
Ponens was for Modus Ponens: both condense a logical rule into a logical truth.
Non-Contradiction, conceived as a rule, prohibits judging contradictions; PNC states
that the negation of a contradiction is a logical truth, such that we are always entitled
to judge it.
Before considering more radical proposals, let’s consider a more familiar one. We
might try to formally capture the Law of Non-Contradiction by asking whether, in
the system, a contradiction entails everything:
Explosion P,¬P ` Q
One line of reasoning in favour of Explosion goes like this. In an explosive logic, a
contradiction entails everything. But we know that not everything is true. (This
is reminiscent of Putnam’s (1978) argument that ‘not every statement is both true
and false’ is an unrevisable a priori truth.) In an explosive logic, then, there is very
strong reason not to accept a contradiction. And this is a sense in which Explosion
expresses some of the force of the Law of Non-Contradiction. By this standard, CL,
IL and K3 are in; paraconsistent logics such as LP, FDE and R are out.17
But there are problems with this solution too. Intuitively, there’s a difference
between ‘don’t believe a contradiction’ and ‘from a contradiction, infer everything’.
Given this difference, it’s possible for a proponent of a nonclassical logic, such as a
relevantist, to object to Explosion on the basis that P and ¬P may have nothing
to do with Q, without evincing any willingness to accept contradictions. Moreover,
Kürbis (2019, 111) argues that ‘it is a contingent feature of a language that some
sentences are false’. Even if a language all of whose sentences were true would not
be learnable, it would seem strange to rely on such considerations in our definition
of a logical law.
Another possibility is that Non-Contradiction should be understood not as a rule
or theorem, but as a semantic principle: in my earlier terminology, we should look
for it in the superstructure of a logic rather than in the entailments. In particular,
we might require that the logic satisfy the following principle:
Semantic Non-Contradiction (SNC) P and ¬P are not both true.
17For a discussion of other forms of Non-Contradiction derivable in R, see Restall (2004).
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If we maintain that it is correct to judge a proposition only if the proposition is
true (or designated), then if Semantic Non-Contradiction is satisfied, it will never
be correct to judge both P and ¬P . Among the logics we’ve considered, Semantic
Non-Contradiction holds in CL, IL, R and K3; it fails in LP and FDE, both of which
allow for P and ¬P to be true together (as P is both true and false iff ¬P is).
There is, however, an additional difficulty that arises if we want to say that
thinkers should follow Semantic Non-Contradiction. As a principle about the truth-
values of propositions, SNC is not the kind of thing that our logical capacities can
pick out; unlike the other logical rules we’ve considered so far in this subsection,
SNC doesn’t license or mandate any particular pattern of inferences. (You might say
that SNC rules out judging that P and ¬P are both true: but this form of judgment,
which is available only for subjects who can think about their own thoughts and
predicate truth of them, is not what we were looking for. Non-Contradiction should
constrain our relation to P and ¬P , not to P is true and ¬P is true.)
This makes it unclear what it would be for a subject to follow SNC. The natural
suggestion is that, even if a subject doesn’t follow SNC directly, the logical rules that
the subject follows should force SNC to hold. But this natural suggestion collides
with the categoricity problem pointed out by Carnap (1943). The problem is that the
standard classical entailments do not fix the standard interpretation of the logical
connectives, and in particular do not rule out interpretations in which P and ¬P are
both true. To see this, consider that an entailment Γ ` P holds in an interpretation
iff it is not the case that all of Γ are true while P is false. All classical entailments,
then, will hold in an interpretation in which all propositions are true. But in such
an interpretation, P and ¬P are both true.
What this means is that, if we want the logical rules that the subject follows
to force SNC to hold, then those rules cannot be the standard classical rules. The
problem is that, as Smiley (1996, 7) writes, consequence ‘depends exclusively on the
impossibility of the premisses being true and the conclusion false, and the possibility
or otherwise of their all being true is irrelevant’. In other words, entailments can
require that if Γ are true, P is true, or that P is always true, but they cannot require
that if Γ are true, P is false, or that P is always false. This precludes them from
forcing SNC to hold (Church 1944; Button & Walsh 2018, 303).18
Why is it that Modus Ponens was relatively straightforward to specify as an
18Raatakainen (2008) argues that the same problem applies to intuitionistic logic, although Murzi
& Hjortland (2009) respond that intuitionists can avoid it by identifying truth with proof.
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entailment, while Non-Contradiction seems so elusive? I think we can see the problem
if we compare some intuitive characterizations of the Law of Non-Contradiction
with the formal notions we have been using. Intuitively, Non-Contradiction says
that ‘a proposition and its negation cannot both be accepted’ (Price 1990, 224).
Along similar lines, Peacocke (1987, 163) writes that ‘[w]hat is primitively obvious
to anyone who understands negation is just that ¬A is incompatible with A’. What
we want, intuitively, is a rule of prohibitory form: a rule that precludes accepting, or
mandates rejecting, contradictory contents.
But the standard conception of an entailment assumes that all rules are of
conditional form: it says that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true, or
that the conclusion can be proven from the premises. As Kürbis (2019, 122) observes,
standard proof theories use only
what might be called positive primitive notions: affirmation, assertion,
truth. They avoid negative primitives, such as negation, denial, falsity.
The latter are supposed to be defined in terms of the primitive notions
of the theory. Put this way it may not be so surprising that the project
fails: it is a natural thought that nothing negative can be got from the
purely positive. The philosophical insight I will tentatively draw ... is
that negative as well as positive primitive notions are needed in the theory
of meaning.
Kürbis concludes that it is impossible to define negation proof-theoretically without
using some negative primitive notion (see also Sylvan 1999, 305).
This, I think, is the source of our difficulties with the Law of Non-Contradiction.
If the Law of Non-Contradiction is of prohibitory rather than conditional form, then
we will need to introduce some negative primitive notion to adequately formalize
it. Moreover, if Kürbis is right that defining negation requires a negative primitive,
then negation is likely self-governing in Finn’s sense, because it is impossible to
understand explicit rules for negation without already being sensitive to those rules.
Let me sketch one proposal that uses a negative primitive notion.19 Bilateralist
theorists propose that we recognize rejection as a cognitive act on par with judgment
or assertion. They argue, pace Frege (1919), that rejecting a thought is not reducible
to judging or asserting its negation; the logical rules we follow specify not only what we
should judge, but also what we should reject. In Rumfitt’s (2000) proposal, we extend
19Another proposal is to define negation in terms of incompatibility. Incompatibility accounts
have been given for CL (Peacocke 1993) and intuitionistic relevant logic (Tennant 1999), but I’m
not sure how to extend them to the other logics we’re considering.
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the object-language with force markers: + marks the force of judgment/assertion
and − marks the force of rejection. The rules governing negation, then, look like
this:
+¬ Introduction −P ` +(¬P )
+¬ Elimination +(¬P ) ` −P
−¬ Introduction +P ` −(¬P )
−¬ Elimination −(¬P ) ` +P
We also have a reductio rule due to Smiley (1996; Rumfitt 2002, 312n). Where α, β
range over propositions with force markers and α* is the result of reversing the force
of α,
Smileyan Reductio If Γ, α ` β and Γ, α ` β*, then Γ ` α*.
I won’t set out the rest of the rules in Rumfitt’s system here. As long as we’re never
permitted to judge and reject the same content, we are also never permitted to judge
a content and its negation (Rumfitt 2002, 310). And from the rules above (with an
obvious rule for conjunction), we can deduce
Rejective Non-Contradiction ` −(P ∧ ¬P )
which mandates rejecting any contradiction. In this way, Rumfitt’s rules seem to
capture the point of the Law of Non-Contradiction.
If bilateralism is the right way to formally capture the Law of Non-Contradiction,
which formal logics meet the test? Rumfitt’s rules are classical. Nonclassical logicians
will want to reject one or more of the rules in his system. Humberstone (2000,
364) and Kürbis (2016, 635) offer bilateralist intuitionist systems that reject −¬
Elimination and the classical half of Smileyan Reductio – the half which allows
proving a positive claim – but neither of these changes undermines the derivation of
RNC. So CL and IL are in.
Bilateralism interacts interestingly with K3, LP and FDE, as suggested in the
following comments by Restall (2013, 81; corner-quotes omitted):
Friends of truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts both must distinguish
the assertion of a negation (asserting ¬P ) and denial (denying P ). If
you take there to be a truth-value glut at P the appropriate claim to
make (when asked) is to assert ¬P without thereby denying P . If you
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take there to be a truth-value gap at P the appropriate claim to make
(when asked) is to deny P without thereby asserting ¬P .
A thinker who allows for truth-value gaps, as in K3, will not accept +¬ Introduction
or −¬ Elimination. If P is neither true nor false, then it is appropriate to reject P ,
but not appropriate to assert ¬P ; since ¬P will also be neither true nor false, it is
appropriate to reject ¬P , but not appropriate to assert P . (For an example of the
failure of +¬ Introduction, we may reject a claim like ‘The King of France is bald’
without being willing to assert its negation (Rumfitt 1997; Dickie 2010).20) Again,
this doesn’t block the derivation of RNC.
What about someone who holds that a sentence can be both true and false, as in
LP? Priest (2005, ch. 6) maintains that assertion and rejection are incompatible,
which suggests some friendliness to a bilateralist framework.21 However, an adherent
of LP would have to abandon −¬ Introduction and +¬ Elimination. If P is both
true and false, then it is appropriate to assert P but not appropriate to reject ¬P .
In the same circumstances, it is appropriate to assert ¬P but it is not appropriate
to reject P . As we would expect, abandoning +¬ Elimination blocks the derivation
of RNC.
Finally, someone who accepted FDE would have to drop all four rules: +¬
Introduction and −¬ Elimination because of truth-value gaps, and −¬ Introduction
and +¬ Elimination because of truth-value gluts. Along with the adherent of LP,
then, the follower of FDE is not committed to RNC.
If RNC is the right way to capture the Law of Non-Contradiction, then it appears
that someone who followed LP or FDE would not have a general ability to express
tension among their thoughts.
However, I don’t think this point is conclusive. I’ve said that adherents of
nonclassical logics would have to reject certain rules in Rumfitt’s framework, but I
haven’t said what would go in place of those rules. It’s possible that the substitute
rules that constrain assertion, rejection and negation would give negation sufficient
expressive power to underwrite a grasp of tension among thoughts. So while bilat-
eralism seems more promising than the other formalizations we’ve considered, it
does not, as presented here, offer a straightforward way of determining which formal
logics contain rules suitable for thinking with. The main conclusion to draw at this
20For a bilateralist framework allowing for this ‘weak rejection’, see Incurvati & Schlöder (2017).
21However, some say Priest should hold that assertion and rejection are compatible (Goodship
1996, 153-155; Ripley 2015). For a defence of the incompatibility, see Incurvati & Smith (2010).
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point is that what it means for a deductive system to contain Non-Contradiction,
in the philosophical sense at issue in my earlier arguments, is not at all straight-
forward. Classical and intuitionistic logic, unsurprisingly, are safe, but for all the




In Chapter 1, I argued that a subject’s representational activity counts as thinking
only if the subject manifests sensitivity to logical rules. To think any thought p – say,
that’s a wild turkey over there in the woods – you have to recognize some range of
other thoughts as standing in relations of support or tension with p. For example, p
supports the thought that’s a bird over there and stands in tension with the thought
it’s really a grouse. To respond to rational relations like these, I argued, you need to
follow logical rules. But I relied on an intuitive sense of what this ‘following’ (or, as
I’ll also say, ‘understanding’) involves. In this chapter I give an account of it. (In
Chapter 2, I explained how my views can accommodate logical pluralism. In this
chapter, for ease of exposition, I’ll write as if there is a single correct set of logical
rules.)
An account of logical rule-following has to explain how a thinker ‘observes the
rules of logic without thinking about them’ (Ryle 1949, 47). To do this, it has to
avoid two opposed problems. On the one hand, it would be implausible to suggest
that thinkers have to have knowledge of logical rules, of the sort that we learn in
introductory logic classes. For example, take
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
While it might be argued that thinkers have to have tacit knowledge of Modus
Ponens – a suggestion I’ll return to below – it is surely not viable to suggest that
thinkers have to explicitly know that Modus Ponens is a valid rule. For one thing,
many thinkers have no belief to this effect, and therefore (on most accounts) no such
knowledge.1
On the other hand, Modus Ponens is not an empirical generalization about how
thinkers operate. When someone reasons that it is raining, and if it’s raining, the
streets are wet, so the streets must be wet, it is not an accident that their reasoning
1For another thing, for any inference-rule we can name – including rules as apparently basic as
Modus Ponens – there is a philosopher somewhere who believes that the rule is not valid. For doubts
about Modus Ponens, see McGee (1985) and Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010). Such philosophers
are still thinking, however misguidedly.
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conforms to the rule. There’s some sense in which it’s right to say that they reasoned
this way because their reasoning was an instance of Modus Ponens. Indeed, it’s hard
to see how valid inference could be knowledge-transmitting – put differently, how
knowledge could be closed under valid inference (Sundholm 2002; Rumfitt 2011, 352)
– if this were not the case.
In one form or another, these problems have received extensive discussion in the
literature on inference (see e.g. Boghossian 2003; Wedgwood 2006; Wright 2014), and
I won’t aim to give a comprehensive account here. The novel claim I’ll make is that
our sensitivity to logical rules involves logical capacities: inferential dispositions which
display a distinctive first-person/third-person asymmetry. From the perspective of
the thinker, certain inferences just appear compelling, without any additional reason
why they are compelling. From an outside perspective, however, we can see that the
inferences the thinker takes to be compelling are those which fall under a rule like
Modus Ponens.
Put together with the conclusion of Chapter 1, this account of sensitivity to
logical rules generates logical constraints on thinking: there are limits on how illogical
we can be in our representational activity while still thinking. Precisely what those
limits are the subject of the next chapter.
The rest of this chapter goes as follows. I’ll start in 3.2 by saying a bit more
about why sensitivity to logical rules is not to be characterized as states of explicit
knowledge to the effect that those rules are valid. In 3.3, I’ll suggest that logical
rules must play a causal-explanatory role in our reasoning, and that this motivates a
dispositional account of our sensitivity to those rules. In 3.4, however, I’ll show that
the simplest version of a dispositional account fails, because it leaves out the agential
or first-personal character of reasoning. This leads, in 3.5, to the more sophisticated
capacities account which I think we ought to accept. I offer some remarks there
about whether having such capacities amounts, in any sense, to having knowledge of
logic, and conclude by responding to an objection.
3.2 Cognitivism
In this section I’ll briefly explain why I reject cognitivism about the relation between
thinkers and logical rules. I won’t discuss the view in detail, but will simply indicate
the problems that make noncognitivist views seem more promising.
Before I begin, however, it’s important to distinguish two different views that
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are called ‘cognitivism’. The first view, critically discussed by Wright (2018), is that
at least some thinkers, at least some of the time, have knowledge that some logical
rules are valid. Such knowledge would be knowledge of certain propositions: for
example, ‘Modus Ponens is valid’, or ‘If p is true and if p then q is true, then q is
true’, or ‘it is legitimate to infer from p and if p, then q to q’.
The second view, defended by Corine Besson (2012; 2019a; 2019b) is that our
understanding of logical rules consists in knowledge that those logical rules are
valid. In other words, what underwrites a thinker’s inference from p and if p, then
q to q is knowledge of some proposition to the effect that Modus Ponens is valid.
This proposition is ‘explicitly or consciously represented’ in the mind (2019a, 173).
This is the view I will label cognitivism.2 Importantly, according to the cognitivist,
knowledge of Modus Ponens isn’t used as a premise in our reasoning – it plays
a different role. It is ‘knowledge that enables reasoning’ (2019b, 61); having this
knowledge ‘gives you a reason to infer according to MP’ (2012, 80).
Cognitivism is designed to accommodate two phenomena which crude disposi-
tional accounts struggle with (2012, 77). First, someone who understands MP and
believes p and if p, then q is not bound to infer q; they can refrain from doing
so without counting as irrational or abnormal, for example if they think that q is
false. Second, it’s possible to exercise your understanding of MP without inferring
according to MP – for example, you can observe that some conclusion would follow
from some premises via MP without judging that conclusion.
Clearly these are requirements an account of our sensitivity to logical rules should
meet. Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose that some of us, some of the time,
have knowledge of logical rules – however hard it may be to explain the etiology of
such knowledge (Hale 2002; Wright 2018). But cognitivism requires the stronger
claim that whenever a thinker is sensitive to a logical rule, they know a proposition
which states that rule. And I think this claim is deeply implausible, even for simple
rules like Modus Ponens.3
Consider a subject who reasons: it’s raining; if it’s raining, then it’s a bad day
for a picnic; so it’s a bad day for a picnic. Absent some further fact which spoils
2To be clear, the two versions of ‘cognitivism’ are not unrelated: roughly speaking, if Bessonian
cognitivism is true, then Wrightian cognitivism had better be true too, or else nobody ever infers in
a way that reflects an understanding of the rule they conform to.
3I’m arguing here that knowing that the rule is valid is not necessary; I will not address the
question of whether such knowledge would be sufficient. On the sufficiency claim, see Wright (2014),
who draws connections with Carroll (1895).
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the inference, this is a perfect case of Modus Ponens reasoning; provided that the
subject had justified beliefs in the premises, they now have a justified belief in the
conclusion. But it seems, nevertheless, to be possible that the subject does not know
any proposition to the effect that Modus Ponens is valid.
On most accounts of knowledge, knowing p requires believing p. But it seems
possible that this subject has no belief either way on whether Modus Ponens is valid.
As Boghossian writes, this is ‘far too sophisticated a requirement’ (2001, 25). For
instance, it seems possible that, if asked whether it is legitimate to infer from p
and if p, then q to q, our subject would display no disposition to assent or dissent –
they might just say they have no idea. If they have no prior exposure to formalized
reasoning, or lack concepts of inference or entailment, they might not even understand
the proposition (Boghossian 2001, 10). So there’s no basis for supposing that they
believe that Modus Ponens is valid. Besson (2012, 79) accepts this consequence in the
case of young children, pointing out that it might be reasonable to deny that young
children are sensitive to MP; but the same problem applies equally to mature adults,
who may be able to follow MP arguments without such propositional knowledge.
Besson (2012, 79) also appeals to the division of linguistic labour, which allows
for nonexperts to count as understanding technical terms by deferring to experts: for
example, I can use elm and beech without being able to tell these kinds of trees apart.
She suggests that someone without much conceptual sophistication could likewise
count as understanding concepts like entailment by deference to experts. But it
seems to me that there could be a whole society in which there were no logicians at
all, and so no experts to defer to. In this (sadly deficient) society, people could still
be sensitive to Modus Ponens, despite lacking even a deferential grasp of concepts of
implication or entailment.
A different line of response is that, ordinarily, we are said to believe not only
the propositions that we are disposed to assent to, but also the consequences – at
least the direct consequences – of those propositions. But it’s not clear that invoking
this closure condition helps here. It would help only if the validity of Modus Ponens
was a consequence of the subject’s prior beliefs: but the subject may have no prior
beliefs about logic whatsoever, and therefore no prior beliefs that entail the validity
of Modus Ponens.
Perhaps it could be argued that the validity of Modus Ponens is a logical truth,
and therefore a consequence of any set of beliefs at all. But this is a desperate
move. If the only fact in virtue of which the subject counts as believing p is that
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p is logically true, the subject’s belief in p can hardly be cited to explain anything
further, such as the validity of the subject’s reasoning. In any event, holding that a
subject believes in Modus Ponens on this basis would commit us to accepting that
the subject also believes in every other logical truth on the same basis – not an
attractive position. Moreover, if the subject counts as knowing the validity of Modus
Ponens on this basis, then they should also count as knowing every other logical
truth on the same basis. In other words, the subject must be logically omniscient.
The same is true if we require a thinker to know only the weaker claim that the
particular premises they are inferring from entail the particular conclusion that they
are inferring to. Again, it seems that a subject could make an inference without
having the requisite beliefs, or even the concepts needed to form such a belief
(Boghossian 2014, 7-8). In response to this point, Zalabardo (2011, 126) argues that
‘[a] subject’s inclination to infer q from p should normally be taken as sufficient
grounds for ascribing to him a belief in the existence of at least a probabilistic
link between the truth of p and the truth of q’, even if the subject isn’t able to
consciously entertain the proposition that p entails q. But while it’s plausible that an
inference requires such an inclination to infer, there’s no good reason to redescribe the
inclination as a ‘belief’, especially in subjects who are unable to make the inclination
explicit in a propositional form. Unlike an ordinary belief, which is inferentially
integrated with other beliefs, evidence and action (Evans 1982, 336), the inclination
Zalabardo appeals to is not manifest in any role other than the particular inference
it is about. If an inclination to infer suffices for the truth of cognitivism, then
cognitivism is trivial, and we are better off investigating the nature of the inclination
to infer.
So it seems doubtful that anyone who infers validly in accordance with Modus
Ponens has a belief that Modus Ponens is valid, or even a belief that a particular
instance of it is valid – let alone knowledge of one of these things. Our sensitivity to
the rule, then, cannot consist in such knowledge.
I’m not suggesting that this objection is conclusive. There’s more the cognitivist
might say – either to support the attribution of logical knowledge even in cases
where the thinker disclaims it or is unable to articulate it, or to undermine the sense
that a thinker who overtly rejects a logical rule can nonetheless follow that rule in
inference. But I think this is enough to show that noncognitivist approaches are
worth investigating. At the end of the chapter, I’ll suggest that there is a sense in
which we know logical rules, but not the sense appealed to by the cognitivist.
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3.3 The causal-explanatory role of logic
In this section, I argue that logic has a causal-explanatory role in reasoning, and use
this to motivate a simple dispositional account of our inferential capacities.
By ‘the causal-explanatory role of logic’, I mean the following. Judging p, if p,
then q and then q may not amount to an inference. An inference requires that, in
some sense, you judged the conclusion because you judged the premises. Implicit
in this requirement is a causal condition: there must be a causal relation between
judging the premises and judging the conclusion. What’s more, this relation must
be of the right sort: judging the premises must cause you to judge the conclusion
because the premises entail the conclusion. As Wedgwood (2006) puts it, the beliefs
in the premises must cause the belief in the conclusion in virtue of rationalizing
it. Or compare what Peacocke (2004, 175) calls the ‘fixed-point principle’: ‘It is a
condition for a judgment to be rational that it be made in part because it is rational’.
In this section, I’ll work my way towards the causal-explanatory role of logic by
considering some accounts that reject it.
3.3.1 Dogramaci’s associationism and the sensitivity condition
It seems obvious that, in inference, you judge the conclusion because you judged
the premises; but it’s not so obvious that this casual relation must hold ‘in virtue
of rationalizing’ the conclusion. One way of rejecting this further condition is to
maintain that inference requires only a certain causal relation between judging the
premises and judging the conclusion, but that the logical entailment plays no role
in this causal relation. Sinan Dogramaci has proposed an associationist account of
deduction which has this shape. He seeks ‘to unite the basis and conclusion of an
inference not by appealing to a consequence relation, but something psychological, a
mental state’ (2013, 392).
On Dogramaci’s account, you are in a position to infer when you stand in
a certain ‘unmediated psychological relation’ to the premise-judgments and the
(potential) conclusion-judgment. It is a three-place relation between the subject,
the premise-judgments and the conclusion-judgment: the subject is tempted by
the premise-judgments to judge the conclusion. Dogramaci calls this relation a
‘conditional intuition’. Inference, then, works like this: you judge p and if p, then q;
these judgments causally generate an intuition – a temptation to judge q. Succumbing
to this temptation, you judge q. The existence of the conditional intuition is necessary
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and sufficient for inference: the fact that the premises entail the conclusion has no
explanatory role.
As it stands, this account faces a simple problem. Since having a conditional
intuition doesn’t depend in any way on the validity of the inference it tempts you
to, there can be all sorts of defective intuitions. Suppose that you are tempted to
deny the consequent: whenever you judge if p, then q and not-p, you are tempted to
judge not-q. If you succumb to that temptation, then all the conditions for inference
are in place. But such a move doesn’t transmit justification, even if not-q turns out
to be true.
We might try to improve on Dogramaci’s position by holding that inference
requires, in addition to (i) a causal connection between the premise-judgments
and the conclusion-judgment, (ii) an entailment between the premises and the
conclusion. This is consistent with denying that the entailment plays a role in the
causal connection: the two conditions are independent.
I don’t think this will work. As Wedgwood has shown, this sort of view is subject
to problems about deviant causal chains: it allows for the possibility that ‘it is just
a fluke that these antecedent mental states both rationalize and cause the formation
of the new belief’ (2006, 670). For example, suppose that any time you judge a
conditional, you are tempted to judge the consequent of that conditional (i.e. judging
if p, then q tempts you to judge q). Most of the time, such intuitions will lead
you astray, but once in a while you might also – independently – have judged the
antecedent of the conditional, p. In such cases, according to the revised account,
your inference will transmit justification. But since you would’ve had the conditional
intuition whether or not you judged p, the intuition can do no justificatory work. The
idea underlying Wedgwood’s counterexample is similar to the sensitivity condition
in epistemology (Nozick 1981, 179): you know something only if, had it been false,
you would not have believed it.4 Similarly, your inference is justified only if, had the
premises not entailed the conclusion, you would not have been tempted to draw it.
We could simply add this sensitivity condition to the current account. Then an
inference would be justified if and only if (i) the subject is caused by judging the
premises to judge the conclusion, (ii) the premises entail the conclusion and (iii)
if the premises had not entailed the conclusion, the subject would not have been
caused by judging the premises to judge the conclusion. This account is not wrong,
4For the closely related safety principle, which holds that you know something only if you could
not easily have been wrong in a similar case, see Williamson (2000, 147).
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but it’s also not illuminating. In adding the sensitivity condition, we have in effect
admitted that the entailment between the premises and conclusion has some role
in shaping the causal relation between the subject’s acts of judging. But, as (iii)
is stated in counterfactual terms, the account fails to explain how this sensitivity
comes about. This is precisely what I want to explain.
3.3.2 The simple dispositional account
We can unify conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) at a deeper level by accepting the causal-
explanatory role of logic. An inference is justified only if the fact that the premises
entail the conclusion plays an appropriate role in explaining why the subject was
caused by judging the premises to judge the conclusion. As Wedgwood (2006, 670)
writes, ‘These antecedent states must cause one to form that belief or intention
precisely in virtue of their rationalizing one’s forming that belief or intention.’
This point has been recognized elsewhere. For example, in a discussion of
belief-desire explanation of action, Jerry Fodor notes that ‘causal relations among
propositional attitudes somehow typically contrive to respect their relations of content’
(Fodor 1987, 12). This, he says, is why, when someone reasons well, a description of
the causal history of their thinking is also a description of a valid argument. The
problem is to explain how exactly this could hold. As Fodor asks (1987, 14): ‘how
could the mind be so constructed that [the generalizations that subsume belief/desire
causation] are true of it? What sort of mechanism could have states that are both
semantically and causally connected, and such that the causal connections respect
the semantic ones?’5
As Fodor recognized, it’s difficult to devise such a mechanism when it comes to
all the ‘relations of content’ which could underwrite good reasoning. There are just
too many such relations for any set of dispositions to plausibly capture. Luckily,
we’re only aiming to give an account of logical reasoning, and for this a dispositional
story seems entirely apposite. The story would go as follows. Recall the inference
rule
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
5Note that this is not the general problem of how something that is not an event can have a
causal role. I take it that, even if only events can literally be causes, things other than events can
be part of a causal explanation. For example, the properties of my soup and the relation between
the soup, the pot and the stove can both be part of the causal explanation of the soup’s boiling
over, although neither a property nor a relation is an event.
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The capacity to infer according to Modus Ponens consists in a disposition which is
activated when a subject has two beliefs, of the form p and if p, then q. The result
of the disposition’s being activated is that the subject then judges that q. Call this
‘the simple dispositional account’.
Two features of the simple dispositional account deserve emphasis. First, the
disposition is a causal intermediary between the event of the subject’s judging p
and if p, then q and their judging q. This allows us to say that the subject judged
q because they judged p and if p, then q. Second, the disposition is defined such
that it operates properly only when the subject is in a position to draw an inference
validated by Modus Ponens. So the fact that the premises entail the conclusion is
part of the explanation for why the subject judged the conclusion. This allows us to
say that the subject was caused by the premises to judge the conclusion in virtue of
the fact that the premises entail the conclusion. The simple dispositional account
perfectly captures the causal-explanatory role of logic.
Of course, a fuller development of the account would need to further qualify
the description of the disposition: it’s not as if, any time two of my beliefs entail a
third proposition via Modus Ponens, I draw that inference. There must be further
activation-conditions: for example, it seems plausible that the subject has to consider
the premises together in order to be disposed to draw the inference (Besson 2009;
2012; Murzi & Steinberger 2013). But I won’t spend any more time on these details,
as the simple dispositional account faces a more serious problem.
3.4 The first-personal character of inference
Earlier, I quoted Peacocke’s fixed-point principle that a rational judgment must
be made because it is rational. Peacocke adds that this means ‘rational from the
thinker’s own point of view’ (2004, 176). In this section, I will argue that the
simple dispositional account leaves out the agential or first-personal character of
inference. On the simple dispositional account, inference happens mechanically when
an entailment is available. In reality, however, inferring is not just something that
happens, but something we do (Boghossian 2014, 16). (I should emphasize, however,
that ‘agency’ here is not meant to evoke explicit choosing; rather, I mean activity
which is not automatic and for which the agent is responsible. Having agency, in
this sense, is closely related to having control.)
To motivate this requirement, consider a case described by Bilgrami (1998):
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the case of Oblomov, the wholly passive subject.6 When Oblomov ‘thinks’, this
thinking is not something he does; rather, he is ‘assailed’ by thoughts. In other
words, Oblomov is subjectively aware of thoughts, but experiences them as simply
happening to him rather than as being under his rational control. In some cases,
Oblomov may undergo a series of thoughts which stand in logical relations: for
example, he is assailed by the thought p, and then by if p, then q, and finally by
q. But he does not experience the first two thoughts as providing a reason for him
to have the third. Now, let us suppose, further, that Oblomov has the disposition
proposed at the end of the previous section. Given this supposition, the occurrence
of q in Oblomov’s mind is caused by the occurrence of p and if p, then q, in virtue of
the fact that p and if p, then q entail q. In other words, Oblomov’s series of thoughts
here satisfies the simple dispositional account. It still seems to me that Oblomov
has not drawn an inference.
There are different ways of saying what is missing in Oblomov’s case. We could
say that his sequence of mental events lacks what Rödl (2018, 91ff.) calls the ‘first-
personal necessity’ of inference. While the first two thoughts necessitate the third,
there is nothing first-personal about this necessitation: Oblomov does not experience
the first two thoughts as necessitating him to judge the third. Similarly, Korsgaard
(2009, 69) writes that when you draw an inference,
it’s an act of self-determination, in the sense that the activity of your
own mind is part of what produces the belief in you. Suppose you believe
two premises, and a certain conclusion follows. You won’t automatically
believe that conclusion, because you might not notice the connection
between them. But if you do notice the connection, and put the premises
together in the way suggested by the connection, then you do something:
you draw the conclusion. In drawing the conclusion—or, as we say, in
making up your mind, in constituting your mind—you determine yourself
to believe it.
While Oblomov is disposed to conform to Modus Ponens, there’s no sense in which
he makes up his mind in coming to the conclusion.
Burge expresses the same point in the following remarks (1998b, 251):
[I]n reasoning, no thinker can be a mere observer of reasons and their
effects on reasoning. For having reason requires at some point having
some tendency to be affected by reason’s power in motivating reasoning.
6Bilgrami’s Oblomov is ‘an extreme version of’ the main character from Ivan Goncharov’s 1859
novel Oblomov. For further discussion of the case, see Rattan (2002, 149).
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Understanding what a reason is, is partly understanding its motive force
... Thinking is necessarily associated with reasoning—thinking guided by
reasons—and reasoning cannot in general be a mere ‘going on’. In making
inferences, a being is ipso facto an agent. ... In recognizing the effect of
reasons on one’s judgements and inferences, one cannot reasonably think
of oneself as powerless.
Burge’s discussion suggests that Oblomov doesn’t even count as understanding the
logical relations among his thoughts, because a condition for understanding these
relations is that he experience judging p and if p, then q as motivating him to judge
q.
A final characterization of what is missing here comes from Moran (2001, ch. 2),
who emphasizes that our attitude towards our beliefs is normally not spectatorial,
but deliberative: the job is not to find out what we already believe, but to decide
what to believe. (This is why we can ordinarily determine whether we believe p
simply by asking ourselves whether p.) Oblomov could, at best, relate to his mental
processes in a spectatorial way – as revealing to him what he already believes – but
not as a process of deliberation, of deciding what to believe.
The point all these discussions bring out is that inference is not only something
that happens, even something that happens within our awareness, but something we
do. Oblomov’s case shows that the simple dispositional account could be satisfied
while this condition was not met. So that account must be rejected.
3.5 Logical capacities and tacit knowledge
In this section I will offer a more sophisticated account of our relation to logical
rules which captures both the causal-explanatory role of logic and the first-personal
character of inference. As with the simple dispositional account, we will suppose that
subjects have dispositions which mirror the logical rules that validate their inferences.
This time, however, we will suppose that the dispositions have a distinctive sort of
structure – the structure of what I will call a capacity.
The notion of a capacity, as I am using it here, has a built-in asymmetry between
first-personal and third-personal aspects, such that a description of the capacity
from only one of these aspects will be incomplete. From a third-personal point of
view, the capacity for inferring according to Modus Ponens is defined by that rule,
which states what is done by a subject exercising the capacity. If we observe the
inferences drawn by the subject who has the capacity, we can see that they tend
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to fall under the pattern specified in Modus Ponens.7 But the capacity also has an
ineliminable first-personal aspect. And Modus Ponens does not express what it is
like for a subject to exercise the capacity. For it is stated at a level of generality
that need not be available to the subject exercising the capacity. The first-personal
description on its own, however, will fail to show the capacity’s relation to the rule –
as when we say that, from the subject’s point of view, it is just a brute fact that this
inference is compelling.
This feature of our relation to valid inferences is described nicely by Zalabardo
(2011, 130-131):
All of us, even the logically illiterate, have the ability to recognize valid
arguments, to a greater or lesser extent. Some of us are very good at it.
At least in the simplest cases, and outside our logic class, judgments of
validity can be perfectly immediate. ... [I]n the multitude of everyday
cases in which we recognize valid arguments without formulating the
underlying rules of inference, sometimes even without being capable of
formulating them, it is natural to say that our ability to recognize valid
arguments gives us knowledge, and that this knowledge is non-inferential.
And this will be so even if the sub-personal cognitive devices that sustain
this ability operate by recognizing certain universal inference patterns.
I don’t quite agree with Zalabardo’s framing of the point, though: we may not
be able to formulate the underlying rules, but that need not make our grasp of
them sub-personal. (I make some related comments in the next section.) I prefer
to frame the point in terms of a first/third-person distinction: first-personally, we
can immediately take an inference to be valid, while third-personally, we may be
recognizing it as an instance of a rule.
Let me say a bit more about the first-personal dimension of the capacity. The
subject exercising the capacity judges p and if p, then q and then moves from these
to q. To describe what this is like first-personally, we might say, in Peacocke’s phrase,
that once the subject has judged the premises, they find the conclusion ‘primitively
compelling’ (1987, 155). That is, they find it rationally compelling to judge the
conclusion given their belief in the premises, but primitively – not because of some
further belief, such as a belief in Modus Ponens or a belief that the premises entail the
conclusion.8 A subject who has the capacity will find compelling the transitions that
7I say ‘tend’ because a capacity may sometimes misfire. Just how much a capacity can misfire
before it fails to count as a capacity at all is a question I consider in 4.2.1.
8Isn’t it possible, though, for an intuitionist to understand classical negation without finding
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are caught by the associated rule, but not as transitions caught by the rule. Rather,
there need not be anything further available to the subject than that this inference is
an attractive one. In other words, the subject with the capacity is tempted to draw
particular inferences which evidently fall under the rule; they need not be tempted
to accept a general representation of the rule.
We may also want to allow for capacities where a subject finds a particular
content, or set of contents, ‘primitively unacceptable’. For example, this seems
like a plausible description of our relation to the Law of Non-Contradiction: when
confronted with a combination of beliefs which are explicitly contradictory, we find it
rationally unacceptable to hold on to all of the contradictory beliefs, but primitively –
not because of some further belief. Murzi (2020, 412) describes the process as follows:
‘upon deriving both A and ¬A, a rational agent stops her reasoning and examines
instead which of the assumptions on which A and ¬A depend must be given up.’
But whether we need to recognize a separate kind of capacity for this kind of case,
or whether primitively compelling inferences suffice, depends on how exactly the
Law of Non-Contradiction should be represented – a topic I discussed in 2.4, but
without reaching a definitive conclusion. In what follows, then, while I’ll refer to
‘primitively compelling’ inferences for readability, this should be taken to leave open
the possibility of primitive unacceptability.
Along similar lines, Harman (1986, 18) proposes that we have fundamental
dispositions ‘to treat some propositions as immediately implying others and some
as immediately inconsistent with each other’. For present purposes, I want to adopt
Harman’s observation that (in my terminology) finding an inference from p to q
compelling need not require that the compulsion be absolute or overriding: for one
thing, ‘[the subject]’s general disposition may be overridden by other considerations
in a particular case, for example, if [q] is absurd’ (19). Similarly, a disposition to
avoid believing contradictories ‘may be overridden in a particular case, as when [the
subject] is disposed to believe the premises of the liar paradox’. And finally, one may
not find compelling a transition which in fact falls under the rule if the particular
thoughts are too ‘long or complex or otherwise distracting’ – or, I think we can add,
if one is simply tired or not paying attention.9
instances of specifically classical reasoning at all compelling? I think this is possible; it’s what
Moore (2003b, 48) calls a ‘disengaged’ grasp of a concept. But for logical concepts to constitute our
responsiveness to rational relations among thoughts, one must grasp them in an ‘engaged’ way.
9For more interesting cases in which such compulsions are overridden, see Moore (2003b, 49).
Moore argues that possessing the concept of a swear word requires more than ‘knowing, in some
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Field (2009, 260) adds that some kinds of inference are only obvious once you
consider both the premises and the conclusion; if the conclusion isn’t brought to
your attention, then merely believing the premises doesn’t tempt you to draw
the conclusion. The clearest example is Universal Instantiation: believing Every
politician exaggerates doesn’t tempt you to believe Jean Chrétien exaggerates until
Jean Chrétien is brought to your attention. But it may be that other inference-rules
display the same phenomenon to a lesser degree.
We can characterize the first-personal dimension of a capacity in terms of reasons:
if p immediately implies q, then a subject who believes p generally has a reason
to believe q as long as they continue to believe p; similarly, if p is immediately
inconsistent with r, then a subject generally has a reason not to believe both. This
helps to bring out the sense in which an exercise of a logical capacity is rational
from the subject’s point of view. But this way of characterizing things needs to
be qualified. The ‘reason’ that the subject has merely in virtue of having a logical
capacity is not a justifying reason, but an explanatory one: it is a motivational
state which could explain the subject’s action (Parfit 1997; Alvarez 2017). A subject
might, for all I’ve said here, have a logical capacity to follow the rule for tonk; in
this case, the subject would find instances of the tonk rules primitively compelling,
and might sometimes draw these inferences, but would not be justified. So it’s not
built in to the nature of a capacity that it generate normative reasons, but it is built
in that it generate explanatory reasons. (Of course, where the rule is a good one,
the subject may also have a normative reason to draw the inference, but this doesn’t
follow merely from having a capacity to follow a rule.)
So primitive compellingness and unacceptability pick out a psychological phe-
nomenon, not a normative one. But, while compellingness and unacceptability do
normally manifest in subjective feelings that one should judge (or not judge), they
aren’t identical with such feelings. One might have a subjective feeling that one
should judge (or not judge) that arises from misunderstanding of the thoughts in
question, such that the feeling disappears when one comes to better understand the
thought. Or one might not have a subjective feeling when one misunderstands a
thought, but come to have the feeling when one understands it better. Frege draws a
similar distinction between whether a thought is really self-evident or merely seems
aloof, anthropological way, that the use of these words in certain contexts will shock certain people.
To possess the concept of a swear word one must have some tendency to share that shock, even if
one habitually and enthusiastically flouts it, or even if one habitually and nonchalantly flouts it.’
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so, and allows that a self-evident thought that is not obvious to us can become
obvious as we come to understand it (Burge 1998a, 342-343; Jeshion 2001, 970-971).10
Failure to recognize the first-personal/third-personal asymmetry in our inferential
capacities is, in my view, the root of much puzzlement about the nature of those
capacities. Let me give two examples. First, Markos Valaris (2017) has objected to
rule-following accounts of reasoning on the following basis. Reasoning is a way of
‘making up our minds’ about how things are in the world; in reasoning, our attention
is not on our thoughts but on the world. But logical rules are about relations among
thoughts, so if reasoning involved following logical rules, then in reasoning, our
attention would be on our thoughts, not on the world. So reasoning does not involve
following logical rules. In my view, the assumption that reasoning is either about the
world or about relations among our thoughts fails to allow for the distinction between
first-person and third-person descriptions of reasoning. First-personally, a subject’s
experience of reasoning may simply involve attention to what is the case. This is
consistent with the subject’s activity still being an activity of rule-following – a fact
which holds third-personally, where it turns out that the subject draws inferences
which are validated by logical rules.
Second, Besson has recently defended the idea that we directly apprehend the
validity of particular inferences, without going by way of any general principle
(2019a, 189): ‘Your reasoning need not go through the recognition of a general
logical principle, it can be direct.’ She points to ‘a long tradition of taking rational
insight to apply directly to particular propositions/arguments and taking the formal
principles to be secondary in the order of apprehension and justification of such
propositions/arguments’ (2019a, 188), citing Russell, Cook Wilson and BonJour.
She denies that insight into a particular inference requires knowledge of a logical
rule, suggesting instead that our knowledge of logical rules may involve induction
from particular instances of valid inference.11
I think it’s quite right that, first-personally, we directly apprehend the validity of
particular inferences. But if grasp of a general rule plays no role in this process, then
it’s puzzling how we manage to apprehend the right inferences, especially when it
comes to an inference we’ve never considered before. What could give us this insight,
10I’m not suggesting that the notion of compellingness entirely overlaps with Frege’s notion of
self-evidence. Frege’s notion is embedded in the rationalist conception of a ‘natural order of truths’
(Frege 1884, §17; Leibniz 1765, 412), which sits awkwardly with the holism of Chapter 1.
11Besson has confirmed (p.c.) that this modifies the view in her earlier papers, although it’s still
intended as a form of cognitivism.
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if not the rule? The first-personal/third-personal asymmetry in our logical capacities
shows that we can maintain both that thinkers directly apprehend the validity of
particular inferences and that they apprehend them as instances of general rules.
So we should accept that understanding logical rules involves logical capacities
in this sense. This fact has consequences, which I explore in the next chapter, for
the extent to which someone can violate logical rules and still count as thinking.
3.5.1 Do thinkers have logical knowledge?
Finally, I want to offer some comments on whether having logical capacities amounts
to knowing logical rules in any sense. Clearly, having a logical capacity to infer
according to Modus Ponens does not amount to having explicit knowledge that
Modus Ponens is valid. But could it amount to knowledge of Modus Ponens in some
other sense? There is some reason to think that it could. I described logical capacities
in terms of a first-person/third-person asymmetry, but the same structure could also
be described in terms of a distinction between a practical ability, which issues in
a sense of particular actions as appropriate or inappropriate, and the theoretical
representation of that practical ability, which displays it as grasp of a set of general
principles. And this structure is what many philosophers take to be characteristic of
tacit knowledge.
The notion of tacit knowledge is familiar as a characterization of the linguistic
competence of ordinary speakers. Suppose that English grammar can be described
by a systematic theory of meaning (Dummett 1975). While learning to speak English
does not involve explicitly learning this theory, we might still hold that the English
speaker has tacit knowledge of the theory, because the explanation for the speaker’s
competence parallels the structure of the theory: as Davies (1989, 132) writes, ‘tacit
knowledge of a particular systematic theory is constituted by a causal-explanatory
structure in the speaker which mirrors the derivational structure in the theory’.12 In
virtue of this causal-explanatory structure, the speaker is sensitive to the information
specified by the rules of the grammar. We can therefore say that the grammar is
psychologically real for the subject, as Peacocke writes, since ‘for a rule of grammar
to be psychologically real for a given subject is for it to specify the information
drawn upon by the relevant mechanisms or algorithms in that subject’ (1989, 114).
12See also Davies (1981, chs. III and IV), Evans (1981), Fricker (1982), Peacocke (1986) and, for
objections, Quine (1970a) and Wright (1987, ch. 6). The connection between inference and these
debates is picked up in Engel (2005, 34).
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So I propose, tentatively, that logical capacities are states of tacit knowledge.
Someone who has a logical capacity is sensitive to the features of thoughts specified
by the relevant logical rule: they find transitions that fall under the rule primitively
compelling. In virtue of having these capacities, the causal-explanatory structure
underlying the thinker’s activity mirrors the logical rules stated in a description of
the capacity. As with other kinds of tacit knowledge, a statement of the associated
rules will go beyond what it is like for the thinker exercising the capacity. This is
not to say that it doesn’t matter how we specify what is known; we should try to
specify it in a way that brings out the features which cause particular transitions
to appear primitively compelling. Still, it may be that there are multiple, equally
correct ways of specifying the content of a thinker’s tacit knowledge of logic. For
example, there might be no basis for choosing between various proof-theoretically
equivalent sets of rules.
3.5.2 Logical capacities and separability
According to the account I’ve just given, a subject is sensitive to a logical rule if, and
only if, the subject has a logical capacity to make the transitions specified by the rule.
In this section, I’ll briefly consider a formally motivated concern that this position
might raise: that the rules picked out by logical capacities have to be separable, and
therefore can’t be classical.
The account I’ve given relied on a conception of logic as a set of rules. Any such
account has to explain the fact that not every set of inference-rules determines a
genuine logical connective. For example, consider the rules defining Prior’s (1960)
connective tonk:
Tonk Introduction From p, infer p tonk q.
Tonk Elimination From p tonk q, infer q.
These rules are trivializing: if added to a language in which something can be
proved, they allow everything to be proved. In response to this kind of problem,
inferentialists have proposed additional constraints on which rules are legitimate.
Two such constraints are harmony and separability.
Harmony, a requirement proposed by Dummett (1991, 219) and deriving from
Gentzen (1969, 80), is meant to capture the idea that deductive inference serves
to transmit evidence from thought to thought, so the grounds which license you to
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infer a thought of some form should be in harmony with the consequences which
you are licensed to infer from a thought of that form.13 The rules for tonk are
clearly disharmonious, but there are problems in giving a harmonious formalization
of classical logic (Dickie 2010). I won’t say any more about harmony here, however;
even if it is a defensible constraint on inferential rules, nothing in my own account
creates additional pressure to satisfy it, or sheds additional light on it.
The situation is different with separability, which is meant to capture an ‘atomistic
conception of our understanding of logical expressions’, where ‘in principle a speaker
could understand e.g. ∧ without understanding ∃, → without understanding ¬, and
so forth’ (Murzi 2020, 395). As Tennant writes, one should
be able to master various fragments of the language in isolation, or one
at a time. It should not matter in what order one learns (acquires grasp
of) the logical operators. It should not matter if indeed some operators
are not yet within one’s grasp. All that matters is that one’s grasp of any
operator should be total simply on the basis of schematic rules governing
inferences involving it. (2002, 319)
Separability is a general constraint on a set of logical rules. It requires that ‘every
provable sentence or rule in the system has a proof that only involves either structural
rules or rules for the logical operators that figure in that sentence or rule’ (Murzi
2020, 395).14 My talk of logical capacities may seem to lend additional support to
separability, because it appears that the capacity involved in understanding negation
is distinct from the capacity involved in understanding, say, the conditional, so it
should be possible to have one without the other.
The reason this might be problematic is that there are well-known difficulties in
giving a separable formalization of classical logic. For example, consider the following
classical theorem:
Peirce’s Law ((P → Q)→ P )→ P
Peirce’s Law contains no connective other than →, but it cannot be derived from the
standard rules for → alone; it requires using the rules for ¬ too. This is a failure of
separability. Such failures have been used to argue for accepting nonclassical logics
(Dummett 1991; Tennant 2002, 319ff.). If logical capacities have to specify separable
rules, does this mean that the rules that our capacities specify cannot be classical?
13For formulations of harmony, see Steinberger (2011a) and Murzi & Steinberger (2017). For
objections to harmony, see Rumfitt (2017).
14As Murzi notes, it is equivalent to the conservativeness requirement from Belnap (1962).
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That would be too quick, for two reasons. First, it is possible to give a (harmonious
and) separable formalization of classical logic, although always with some nonstandard
features. One option is to permit multiple conclusions, such that the most general
form of an argument is that if all of the premises are true, then at least one of the
conclusions is true (Restall 2005). But it seems implausible that our capacities really
specify such rules: we don’t tend to make multiple-conclusion arguments in ordinary
reasoning (Steinberger 2011b).
A more promising option is bilateralism, which treats rejection as a primitive
kind of force on par with assertoric force, such that rejecting p is not reducible to
asserting not-p (2.4; Rumfitt 2000). Allowing for inference rules to constrain patterns
of assertion (judgment) and rejection makes it possible to give a harmonious and
separable formalization of classical logic. This would suggest that we have logical
capacities not only to judge a thought on the basis of judging others, but, more
broadly, to judge or reject a thought on the basis of judging or rejecting others.
Developing my account in a bilateralist way would require recognizing primitive
unacceptability as the first-personal aspect of following a rule that requires rejecting
a conclusion, just as primitive compellingness is the first-personal aspect of following
a rule that requires accepting a conclusion.
A third option comes from Murzi (2020), who offers a different formalization of
classical logic which uses single conclusions and only assertoric force. Murzi makes
two nonstandard moves. Absurdity, ⊥, is treated as a ‘logical punctuation sign’,
rather than a sign for a proposition which could occur in proofs, though we are never
entitled to assert it (cf. Tennant 1999). In other words, it represents the way that,
‘upon deriving both A and ¬A, a rational agent stops her reasoning and examines
instead which of the assumptions on which A and ¬A depend must be given up’
(Murzi 2020, 412). And just as in standard natural deduction systems we can assume
some proposition and discharge the assumption in the course of a proof, in Murzi’s
system we are allowed to assume a rule and discharge that assumption; similarly, we
can arrive at a rule as the conclusion of a proof. The activities of introducing and
eliminating rules are governed by ‘higher-level rules’ – rules for inferring to and from
rules.
In fact, these higher-level rules are not as exotic as they might seem. Geach (1976,
87) refers to the Stoic distinction between schemata, which go from propositions
as premises to propositions as conclusions, and themata, which go from arguments
to arguments, or, as we might say, from rules to rules. He takes our ordinary
3. Logical capacities 97
practice of reasoning to include both; an example of an ordinary thema would be ‘a
plaiting together of two arguments into a chain, in which the ultimate conclusion
is taken to follow from the original premises’ (Geach 1976, 88). Higher-level rules
are a generalization of schemata and themata, since they can relate both rules and
propositions as premises and conclusions. To develop my account in this way, we
would have to recognize capacities that take rules as inputs and outputs. If Geach is
right, however, we already have independent reason to recognize such capacities as
constituting our grasp of the structural rules which govern how arguments can be
put together.15
The first point, then, is that there are separable formalizations of classical logic,
so if logical capacities have to specify separable rules, this doesn’t mean that the
rules that our capacities specify cannot be classical. Second, however, I doubt that
logical capacities have to specify separable rules, or even that my account lends any
additional support to separability as a constraint on a set of logical rules.
Separability requires that we could fully understand some connective ⊗ solely
in virtue of our sensitivity to the rules for ⊗, without understanding any other
connectives. But the mere fact that logical capacities can be separately identified
(by the rules they pick out) does not entail that, say, the capacities involving → are
enough on their own for a full understanding of →. It might just be the case that,
to understand everything about →, you also need to understand ¬.
Brandom (1994, 127) rejects conservativeness as a general constraint on intro-
ducing concepts, observing that nonconservativeness
just shows that [the concept added] has a substantive content, in that it
implicitly involves a material inference that is not already implicit in the
contents of other concepts being employed. ... Conceptual progress in
science often consists in introducing just such novel contents.
He endorses separability, however, as a constraint on logical concepts, because he
thinks the point of logical concepts is to make explicit the material inferences we
are already committed to: if the logical rules are not conservative, ‘the introduction
of the new [logical] vocabulary licenses new material inferences, and so alters the
contents associated with the old vocabulary’ (2000, 68). But if logical concepts are,
pace Brandom, necessary for thinking, then it shouldn’t be surprising if they form a
nonconservative extension of a conceptual scheme without them, as they usher in a
15There might be reason to restrict our ability to plait together arguments when their premises
contradict each other: see Tennant (1978, 183-4). But some structural rules will be required.
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new kind of representational activity.
More generally, the fundamental role that logical connectives play in our grasp
of thoughts should make it unsurprising if they display a local holism, where under-
standing one connective requires understanding others. Priest (2006, 92) writes that
‘[t]he non-conservative nature of the extension may be attributed to the fact that
the old set of rules was simply incomplete’. A set of rules with a conditional but no
negation, or vice versa, may simply be incomplete.16 This kind of holism also occurs
elsewhere in our basic conceptual scheme: for example, although the concepts object
and property are separately identifiable, it would be impossible to fully understand
one without the other; it seems unlikely that we could derive all the conceptual
truths about objects without invoking the concept of property, or vice versa.
None of this is meant to show that separability must be rejected. But I think it is
enough to show that accepting logical capacities doesn’t provide further support for
separability, and that even if we do accept separability, this doesn’t rule out classical
logic.
16There might be independent reasons for accepting this result. For example, it has been argued in
connection with Kripke’s adoption problem that we cannot understand any rule of inference without
understanding Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens, because any rule of inference is both
general and of conditional form (Padró 2015; Finn 2019b). But UI and MP are themselves rules of
inference. So UI and MP form a local holism, where understanding either requires understanding
the other.
4 On the limits of illogical
thinking
4.1 Logic as constitutive of thinking
In Chapter 1, I argued that a subject’s representational activity counts as thinking
only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In Chapter 3, I argued that this
sensitivity consists in the exercise of logical capacities. So thinking requires exercising
logical capacities. Conversely, if you aren’t exercising logical capacities, you aren’t
thinking. In this sense, logic is constitutive of thinking.1 In this chapter, I’ll discuss
the limits on illogical thought that follow from this view.
The claim that logic is constitutive of thinking, in the sense I’ve argued for,
can be found in several different places in recent philosophy (generally of Kantian
extraction). AW Moore (2003b, 92) expresses it as follows in his commentary on
Kant’s moral and religious philosophy:
[O]ne does not count as thinking unless one has an inclination of this
sort, an inclination to yield to the demands that rationality places on
thought. This is, in part, what thinking is. Thinking essentially involves
the exercise of concepts. And the exercise of concepts is not possible
without due respect for the demands of rationality, since these determine
what counts as keeping faith with concepts and thus what counts as
exercising them at all. ... Exceptional episodes of irrationality in one’s
thinking must be precisely that: exceptional. They must be episodes in
which some isolated failure on one’s part to make sense fits into a larger
pattern of sense that one makes.
Christine Korsgaard claims, similarly, that ‘[t]he laws of logic govern our thoughts
because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t thinking’ (2009, 32), although she
is clear that this doesn’t mean such laws are ‘impossible to violate’ (30). And in
Making it Explicit (1994, 636), Robert Brandom argues that ‘To be in the game at
1The sense of ‘constitutive’ here is the same as that of Korsgaard (2008; 2009). It is close to
the sense of ‘constitutive’ used by MacFarlane (2002) and Leech (2015), except that they take it to
require full, rather than partial, conformity to logical rules. It is distinct from what MacFarlane
(2002) and Leech (2015) call ‘constitutive normativity’, which does not require any conformity. It is
also distinct from the usage of ‘constitutive’ in contemporary metaphysics to refer to the relation
between a material object and its matter (e.g. a statue and its clay).
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all, one must make enough of the right moves – but how much is enough is quite
flexible.’
All of these philosophers hold that thinking requires some degree of logicality, but
none of them take a definite position on just how much and what kind of illogicality
is possible before we fail to think. And without clarity on this issue, we don’t know
exactly what it means to say that logic is constitutive of thinking. In this chapter,
then, I explain what the limits on illogical thinking are.
I’m going to argue that there are two different limits on illogical thinking. First,
thinkers must have the capacities to follow logical rules. This requires that they tend
to find instances of logical rules compelling. Second, thinkers must exercise those
capacities. This requires that they not think in obviously illogical ways. Clarifying
the relevant notions of tendency and obviousness is the job here.
4.2 The first limit on illogicality
In this section I argue for the first limit on illogical thinking:
First Limit Thinkers must tend to find instances of logical rules primitively com-
pelling or primitively unacceptable.
Without this tendency, a subject doesn’t count as having logical capacities at all.
And without having logical capacities, the subject is not thinking. I’ll clarify what
this limit means by considering a worry: that it is committed to drawing an arbitrary
line between thinking and nonthinking.
This limit on illogicality marks a failure of competence, not of performance. I
argued in the last chapter that someone who has a logical capacity will find certain
judgments or inferences primitively compelling or unacceptable: for example, if they
believe p and if p, then q, they will find q compelling; if they consider p and not-p,
they will find it unacceptable to judge both. Of course, sometimes a subject might
not find an instance of a rule primitively compelling or unacceptable because they’re
tired, or not paying attention, or because the thoughts involved are too complex.
These cases don’t raise questions about your ability to think. The troubling cases
are those where there is no interfering factor, but you still don’t find an instance of
the rule compelling or unacceptable.
Here, too, a capacity doesn’t have to be perfect. It can sometimes fail, even where
the conditions are right. You might have the capacity to follow Non-Contradiction,
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but in some cases not find a contradiction unacceptable; in these cases, you might
just accept the contradictory beliefs. Your capacity might even fail a fair proportion
of the time. My claim is only that it can’t fail to an arbitrary degree: at some
point, you don’t count as having the capacity at all. When you get to this point,
it’s merely lucky if you find a contradiction off-putting; you’re no longer sensitive to
Non-Contradiction. At this point you lose your grip on what it is for two thoughts
to be in tension, and so you cease to think.
This seems plausible, but it invites a worry. Broadly speaking, this sort of
worry arises for any account which holds that thinking is a distinctive kind of
representational activity which mature human beings engage in, discontinuous with
the representational activities of other subjects who lack the requisite conceptual
resources. On the one hand, thinking is supposed to be sharply discontinuous from
nonthinking; on the other hand, the extent to which we tend to find instances of
logical rules compelling is clearly a matter of degree. Such accounts thus face a
problem about how to characterize the line between thinking and nonthinking.
Davidson (1999, 11) writes:
Both in the evolution of thought in the history of mankind, and in the
evolution of thought in an individual, there is a stage at which there
is no thought followed after a lapse of time by a subsequent stage at
which there is thought. To describe the emergence of thought would
be to describe the process which leads from the first to the second of
these stages. What we lack is a satisfactory vocabulary for describing
the intermediate steps.
These intermediate steps occur in a few different cases. In individual maturation:
an infant lacks the conceptual resources needed for thinking, while an adult has
them. When does the child begin to think? At the level of the species: human
beings evolved from earlier hominids, which evolved from earlier primates. Which
creature was the first to think? These cases are about the emergence of thought, but
the same issue occurs with the disappearance of thought as a result of illogicality.
A thinker gradually loses their sensitivity to logical rules to a greater and greater
degree, until they never find the consequences of their beliefs compelling, or find a
contradiction unacceptable. At what point do they cease to think?
Before addressing the problem, let me briefly mention an episode in the history
of philosophy which raises similar issues. Locke and Leibniz disagreed about the
consequences of the principle that nature makes no leaps, sometimes known as the
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Law of Continuity. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke had used
the principle to argue against drawing a sharp line between human beings and other
animals:
All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps, and a continued series
of things, that in each remove differ very little one from the other. ...
There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason
as some that are called men: and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are
so nearly joined, that, if you will take the lowest of one and the highest
of the other, there will scarce be perceived any great difference between
them... (1689, 3.6.12)
It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where
insensible and irrational end... The difference is exceeding great between
some men, and some animals; but if we will compare the understanding
and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference,
that it will be hard to say, that that of the man is either clearer or larger.
(1689, 4.16.12)
In the New Essays on Human Understanding, Leibniz responded that, while nature
indeed makes no jumps, ‘the beauty of nature ... asks for the appearance of jumps’
(1765, 472). While intermediate species are possible, they do not exist on our planet:
although in some other world there may be species intermediate between
man and beast (depending upon what senses these words are taken in),
and although in all likelihood there are rational animals, somewhere,
which surpass us, nature has seen fit to keep these at a distance from us
so that there will be no challenge to our superiority on our own globe. ...
So I believe that the stupidest man (if he is not in a condition which is
contrary to nature, through illness or some other permanent defect which
plays the part of an illness) is incomparably more rational and teachable
than the most intellectual of all the beasts; although the opposite is
sometimes said as a joke.
Leibniz argues that even the most irrational human beings pose no challenge to this
thesis, as they possess capacities which no other animal possesses, even if some factor
is interfering with their exercise.
Both Locke and Leibniz supposed that there is some important difference been
human beings and other animals, and both struggled with how to maintain this thesis
in the face of intermediate cases. Leibniz argues that the intermediate cases don’t
actually exist, or at least not on Earth, but this seems beside the point: the worry
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is just as pressing if the intermediate cases are merely possible, or extraterrestrial.
Locke accepts the actual existence of intermediate cases, but doesn’t offer much help
with classifying them; rather, he seems to accept that these cases cast doubt on the
sharp difference between rationality and arationality. Both authors presuppose that
nature makes no jumps, such that intermediate cases are at least possible. But I
don’t want to dispute this principle here.2
4.2.1 The vagueness of thinking
I’m going to respond to the worry as follows. I’ll begin by sharpening the worry into
an explicit contradiction. Next, I’ll suggest, in response to the worry, that we should
accept that thinking is a vague concept. This opens up a whole range of conceptual
resources for dealing with the problem. I’ll briefly comment on whether accepting
this vagueness might have unwelcome metaphysical consequences.
To sharpen the worry, suppose that we can order possible subjects by the
degree to which they tend to find instances of logical rules primitively compelling or
unacceptable, where 0 is the lowest degree of sensitivity and 100 is the highest (that
is, perfect sensitivity to the rule). Then it’s uncontroversial that, other things being
equal,
(1) A subject with degree 100 is thinking.
Since logic is constitutive of thinking, we will also want to claim that
(2) A subject with degree 0 is not thinking.
For such a subject clearly lacks the requisite tendency to find instances of the rules
compelling. Finally, however, it seems plausible that
(3) If a subject with degree n is thinking, then a subject with degree n–1 is
thinking.
But, of course, 1, 2 and 3 are inconsistent. They constitute a sorites paradox.
The problem suggests that the limit on illogical thinking which we’re considering
is really incoherent, because it involves commitment to 1, 2 and 3. Notice that
this problem afflicts my view specifically. Someone like MacFarlane (2002),or Leech
(2015), who denies that thinkers must be sensitive to logical rules to any degree, can
2Hegel denies the principle, arguing that nature does make jumps, e.g. in phase transitions:
cooling water ‘does not become hard a bit at a time, as if it became first like a porridge and would
then gradually harden to the consistency of ice, but is hard all at once’ (Science of Logic 322).
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deny premise (2). Someone like Kimhi (2018), who requires thinkers to perfectly
follow logical rules, can deny premise (3), as it is false where n is 100.
I’m going to suggest, however, that the problem merely reflects the vagueness of
the concept thinking – something we have good reason to accept – and that nearly
any viable account of vagueness can be brought to bear here as an account of the
limit of illogical thinking.
To start, then, there are good reasons to accept that thinking is vague: the
concept has several different properties usually taken to be indicia of vagueness.3
First, thinking displays borderline cases. Consider a subject whose representational
activity is highly incoherent, but who on occasion displays some attempt to follow
out the consequences of their views or to avoid explicit contradictions. Or consider
the familiar difficulty in classifying young children and certain animals as either
thinking or not thinking, when it’s unclear whether their representational activity
is sophisticated enough to count. Second, thinking lacks clear boundaries, for just
the same reason. Recognizing this doesn’t require a very theoretically committed
conception of thinking, such as the one I’ve developed in this dissertation: just reflect
on the progression from mulling over your day (clearly thinking), to drowsy, imagistic
free-associating, to dreaming (clearly not thinking). Third, thinking is, as seen above,
soritical. For all these reasons, it seems plausible that thinking is a vague concept.
It’s not surprising, then, that it should be hard to say just how much conformity to
logic is enough to count as thinking, or that an attempt to say so precisely leads to
paradox.
This is a diagnosis of the problem, but it doesn’t yet offer a treatment. In my
view, nearly any viable account of vagueness can be brought to bear here as an
account of the limit of illogical thinking; different accounts of vagueness yield different
accounts of the shape of the limit. Let me offer two examples.
First, epistemicism (Williamson 1994; Sorensen 2001) is the view that vague
concepts have sharp boundaries, though it is impossible for us to know where those
boundaries lie. Here, the epistemicist will say that there is a sharp line between
thinking and nonthinking – a precise degree of sensitivity to logical rules which is
required for thinking – but that we cannot know where that line is. So the right
response to a borderline case is to say that the subject is either thinking or not,
3Quine (1992, 59) makes a similar suggestion about understanding. Heal (2010, 77) argues that
what ties together our uses of ‘thinking’ is not an essence or intension but rather ‘some relation
back to the agreed or paradigm cases’, where the relation ‘may well differ from context to context’.
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but that we cannot know which. This may seem puzzling, but the epistemicist
can at least hold that the puzzlement is not particular to thinking; the very same
puzzlement occurs in more mundane cases like tallness or redness.
Second, the supervaluationist will hold that there are many different admissible
precisifications of thinking, drawing the line in different places. However, the super-
valuationist introduces the notion of an ‘admissible precisification’, which reflects a
way of drawing a line that respects certain constraints built in to the concept (Fine
1975). For example, if a subject with degree m is thinking, then a subject with
degree n>m is thinking; if a subject with degree m is not thinking, then a subject
with degree l<m is not thinking. If truth is truth in all admissible precisifications,
then if m is a borderline case, it is neither true nor false that a subject with degree
m is thinking. In other words, the right response to some of the intermediate cases
may be that we should neither affirm that the subject is thinking nor affirm that the
subject is not thinking.
Other accounts of vagueness could also be brought to bear here.4 On views other
than the epistemicist one, there will generally not be a sharp line between thinking
and nonthinking – which seems to accord with our intuitive judgments. I’m not going
to discuss which account of vagueness is right, because the relevant considerations
are those which apply to vagueness generally, rather than anything specifically to do
with thinking. For present purposes, the existence of these different accounts should
be enough to defuse the worry that the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking
entails a contradiction in virtue of the vagueness of thinking.
4.2.2 The metaphysical reality of thinking
There is, however, another problem in the vicinity. What does the vagueness of
thinking entail about the metaphysical reality of thinking? If thinking is a vague
concept, is there still a fact of the matter about whether some subject is thinking?
This problem arises if we accept an account on which vagueness is a feature of
representations, rather than of the reality they represent (Russell 1923).5 If there are
no vague properties, then there is no single property of thinking that our concept of
thinking picks out. (There are properties for each of the precisifications of thinking,
but none of these is the property of thinking.) As Lewis writes, ‘[T]he reason it’s
vague where the outback begins is not that there’s this thing, the outback, with
4On vagueness generally see Keefe & Smith (1996).
5So it doesn’t apply to the epistemicist.
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imprecise borders; rather there are many things, with different borders, and nobody
has been fool enough to try to enforce a choice of one of them’ (1986, 212).
If reality doesn’t contain a property which is the property of thinking, then, to
be blunt, thinking doesn’t exist. So the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking
says that logic is constitutive of something that doesn’t exist. This is bad enough; it
also threatens the claim I’ll defend in Chapter 6, that thinking, and therefore the
logical limits of thinking, have normative weight. If thinking doesn’t exist, then how
can the difference between thinking and failing to think matter?
In response, I want to make two points. First, if the Lewisian claim – that
vagueness is a feature of representations, not reality – is read in a strong, eliminativist
way, then there’s good reason to resist it. Second, if it’s read in a weaker, more
deflationary way, then the difference between thinking and failing to think might
still matter.
On the strong reading, we should eliminate vague language from serious theorizing,
because the entities that vague terms purport to represent do not exist. On this
reading, there really is a problem for constitutivism, because it attempts to seriously
theorize about something that doesn’t exist. But this reading would also have us
eliminate theorizing about planets, animals and artefacts, as well as colours, bodily
states and moral properties. This is just not a tenable view. If serious theorizing is
this closely tied to what is metaphysically real, then we have good reason, independent
of logical constitutivism, to find a metaphysics and a meta-metaphysics which allow
us to hold that vague things and properties can be real.6 (Though I don’t know
what such an account should look like.)
On the weaker reading, we accept that vague objects don’t exist, but we are
still allowed to talk as if they did (outside the Ontology Room, as it were). In
other words, metaphysical eliminativism need not entail linguistic elimination; not
every usable predicate needs to correspond to a real property. I want to suggest
that someone who accepted this reading could still hold that the difference between
thinking and failing to think matters, even if there’s no property of thinking.
If there’s no property of thinking, it would make sense to accept what Field
(2017) calls an egocentric account of thinking. On such an account, terms like ‘judges’
and ‘infers’ don’t pick out a set of real properties and relations that subjects stand
in to thoughts. Rather, each of us uses these terms to track our acts of translating
other subjects’ utterances into our own. If A makes some utterance s and B says, ‘A
6Of course, there are problems for vague objects – see e.g. Evans (1978).
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judges p’, this means that B is willing to translate the utterance s as meaning p in
B’s idiolect. But there’s no objectively correct translation scheme. It’s possible that
B would translate A’s utterance in one way, while C would translate it in a different
way (or find it untranslatable), and there’s no further fact making one of them
right. Similarly, it might be possible that B takes A to be thinking, while C takes A
to be failing to think, and there’s no further fact making one of them right. This
would help explain why thinking, like other vague predicates, has multiple correct
stopping-places: while there are paradigmatic cases of thinking and paradigmatic
cases of failing to think, competent users can draw the boundary between them
in different places, and can recognize that other stopping-places would be equally
correct (Raffman 2014, 94).
On an egocentric account, although the difference between thinking and failing
to think doesn’t correspond to a real property, a practice of applying or refusing
to apply the predicate thinking might still have a point. At an individual level, if
C takes A to be failing to think, then C will treat A as lacking general abilities to
respond to rational relations among thoughts; at best, A is hardwired to recognize
certain connections, but is unable to revise those connections. So if C takes A to be
failing to think, then there are a whole range of cognitive projects that C will not
engage in with A. At a social level, if the term ‘thinking’ has some positive normative
valence, then a practice of applying or withholding the term from subjects depending
on how logical they are might serve to coordinate different subjects around a common
set of logical rules.7
4.3 The second limit on illogicality
In this section I argue for the second limit on illogical thinking:
Second Limit Thinkers must not disregard primitively compelling or primitively
unacceptable judgments or inferences.
The idea here is that even if you have logical capacities, it doesn’t follow that all
of your representational activity involves their exercise. In some cases, you aren’t
exercising those capacities, and so are not thinking.
This limit marks a failure of performance, not of competence. So while a subject
who violates the First Limit never thinks (at least, until they regain their logical
7Dogramaci (2015) argues that this is the point of applying or withholding the term ‘rational’.
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capacities), a subject who violates the Second Limit fails to think on that occasion,
but they might well think on other occasions.
Whatever logic a thinker follows, the thinker’s grasp of that logic will consist
in finding certain judgments and inferences primitively compelling or unacceptable.
The thinker cannot knowingly disregard such a compulsion. The clearest case of this
phenomenon is attempting to judge an explicit contradiction, and I will take this as
my example in this section. But if you think that logic sometimes permits judging a
contradiction, you can substitute whichever other structures you do take logic to
rule out.
The relation between this limit and the previous one is nicely brought out by
Korsgaard’s observation that there are two ways of failing to build a house. The
first way is to try to build a good house but fall so far short that what you’ve built
isn’t a house at all. The second way is to try to build something other than a house
– perhaps a non-house that looks like a house.
[The builder] may be doing one of two things. He may be guided by
the norms, but carelessly, inattentively, choosing second-rate materials
in a random way, sealing the corners imperfectly, adding insufficient
insulation, and so on. But he may also, if he is dishonest, be doing this
sort of thing quite consciously, say in order to save money. In that case,
surely we can’t say that he is trying to build a good house? No, but now
I think we should follow Socrates’ lead, and say that he is not trying to
build a house at all, but rather a sort of plausible imitation of a house,
one he can pass off as the real thing. (2009, 31)
Someone who isn’t trying to meet the standard of a good house at all, but is trying
to fall short of that standard (for whatever reason), is, Korsgaard argues, not trying
to build a house at all. We can draw the same distinction among ways of failing
to think. First, someone might try to follow logical rules, but be so insensitive to
the rules that they violate the First Limit. Second, someone might not try to follow
logical rules at all. At the times when they aren’t trying to follow the rules, they
aren’t thinking.
This distinction maps on to another that is made in these discussions: the
difference between logical mistakes and logical aliens (Nunez 2018). Someone who
tries to follow logical rules but occasionally falls short is making a logical mistake.
Such a person may still be thinking, if they stay within the First Limit. Someone
who isn’t trying to follow logical rules at all is attempting to be a logical alien – a
thinker who follows rules other than the rules constitutive of thinking. They might be
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trying to follow some set of rules that isn’t among the rules suitable for thinking, or
they might be trying not to follow any rules at all. Insofar as there can be no logical
aliens, this person is not thinking. (Of course, since different sets of rules might be
suitable for thinking, there’s a weaker sense in which it is possible to be a logical
alien: from the perspective of someone who follows intuitionistic logic, someone who
follows classical logic, or some relevant logic, is a logical alien.)
4.3.1 What makes a contradiction obvious?
I’ve been talking about ‘not trying’ to follow logical rules, but what exactly does
this mean? Clearly we don’t ordinarily form an explicit intention to follow logical
rules – for example, by representing them and making an effort to conform to them.
As I argued in Chapter 3, a thinker might have no explicit beliefs at all about logical
rules. So what would it be to not try to follow them?
In fact, I think the answer falls straightforwardly out of my remarks in 3.5 about
the first-personal dimension of a logical capacity. I argued that a logical capacity
generates primitive compulsions when a thinker is in a state covered by the rule,
except where there is some interfering factor such as tiredness, inattention or the
complexity of the thoughts at issue. This compulsion is a reason for the thinker to
judge (or not judge) the content in question, but the reason can also be overridden
by other reasons. A subject is disregarding a rule iff the subject does not act as
the rule requires, but there is no interfering factor and no overriding reasons.8
This is what happens when we try to judge an obvious contradiction. An obvious
contradiction, like K committed the murder and did not commit the murder, is, as
it were, intellectually repugnant: we can’t understand the content without seeing
that it violates a logical rule. A subject who has the logical capacity for negation
will find it primitively unacceptable to judge this content. To do so, then, involves
disregarding the rule.
Attempting to judge an obvious contradiction, therefore, involves a failure to
think. But notice that this doesn’t apply to cases where interfering factors, like
tiredness or inattention, spoil the operation of the capacity. In such cases, that the
content is contradictory is not obvious. Whether p’s contradictory nature is obvious
8The notion of disregarding a logical rule needs to be spelled out such that the following sort of
reasoning doesn’t count as ‘disregarding’ Modus Ponens: p; if p, then q; but not-q; so not-p. This
kind of reasoning clearly involves the thinker’s grasp of Modus Ponens, but the thinker doesn’t seem
to draw a conclusion using that rule. The problem originates in Harman (1986); for discussion, see
Besson (2012), and for a proposed solution, see Murzi & Steinberger (2013).
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to a subject depends not only on features of p, but also on features of the subject.
With this caveat, I suggest that anyone who attempts to judge such a content is,
while making the attempt, not thinking.
One upshot of this limit is that while it is possible to accidentally judge a
contradiction, it isn’t possible to judge one whose contradictory character you are
aware of. To my mind, this fits with the phenomena (cf. Sibajiban 1964; Marcus
2020, 6). On the one hand, judging some content and then realizing that it harbours
a contradiction is a relatively familiar phenomenon. On the other hand, it seems
impossible – even if you have good reason to believe p and good reason to believe
not-p – to just plump for a contradiction that you know is a contradiction.9
To spell this out, we can borrow a distinction, drawn by Edmund Husserl in
Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929), between explicit and non-explicit judging.
We judge something non-explicitly ‘as something completely vague that comes to
mind’ or ‘as the completely vague signification of a statement read, understood and
believingly accepted’ (1929, 56). Husserl holds that a contradiction can be judged non-
explicitly: we can, and do, assent to claims which in fact are contradictory, without
being aware of this fact. But a contradiction cannot be judged explicitly. Moreover,
if we make a judgment and then, upon reflection, realize that it is contradictory, ‘the
underlying total belief, the one that is being explicated, forthwith and necessarily
assumes the characteristic of nullity’ (58): we cannot hang on to our belief once aware
that it is a contradiction. Husserl makes a parallel claim about consequence-relations:
when we judge p, and come to see that q is a consequence of p, we ‘not only [judge]
the consequence in fact but “cannot do otherwise”’ (1929, 189).
9You might worry that I’ve mislocated the source of the oddness here. Sure, if I consider a
contradiction, it seems odd to decide to judge it. But that’s because I can’t decide to judge anything
at all. I can’t decide to judge a non-contradictory thought either. In other words, you might worry
that the oddness stems from assuming a kind of doxastic voluntarism. But I don’t think this is the
source of the oddness. You can judge a non-contradictory content if you have evidence for it, but you
can’t judge a contradiction even if you do have evidence. Suppose Inspector Morse is investigating a
murder in Pitt Meadows and that K is a suspect, having committed a similar crime years ago. Some
locals say they saw him walking away from Pitt Meadows on the night of the murder: this piece
of evidence supports the claim that K committed the murder. But K has a train ticket showing
that he left town shortly before that time: this piece of evidence supports the claim that K did not
commit the murder. Now there are various things Morse might conclude, but one thing he can’t
conclude that K did and did not commit the murder. But the problem with this is not that he lacks
evidence for both conjuncts. It is that the conjunction is a contradiction.
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4.3.2 Reductio proofs
You might worry that contradictions play an important role in reasoning, for example
in proofs by reductio (Quine 1948). But surely a non-thought can’t play any role
in a proof. To be clear, however, I’m not claiming that there are no contradictory
contents – only that such contents cannot be judged when their contradictory nature
is obvious. Moreover, reductio proofs actually rely on the primitive unacceptability
of contradictions. If contradictions weren’t unacceptable, then the fact that p entails
both q and not-q would be no reason for disbelieving p. We could just accept the
contradictory consequences.
In reductio proofs, the aim is not to judge the contradiction but to see that it
follows from certain suppositions, such that one of the suppositions has to be rejected.
Coming to see this does involve exercising your logical capacities, but it doesn’t
involve disregarding the unacceptability of a contradiction. At most, it requires
entertaining a contradiction within the scope of a supposition, without any belief-like
commitment.
4.4 Can we be certain someone isn’t thinking?
I’ve argued that there are two limits on illogical thinking. First, thinkers have to
tend to find instances of logical rules compelling, and second, they can’t disregard
such compulsions. Now, you might worry that recognizing such limits would have
a deleterious effect on rational discourse. They seem to give us license to dismiss
subjects who seem to make logical mistakes, or whose inferences we can’t follow, as
failing to think and therefore not worth the time.
I think this is a fair concern. In response, I want to emphasize the gap between
the metaphysical question of whether someone is failing to think and the epistemic
question of whether we can be certain that they’re failing to think. These questions
come apart in principle, not just in fact. As Moore (2003a, 186) writes, ‘the claim
that something is nonsense is always empirical [and] provisional’.
First, the facts that determine whether someone is failing to think are not directly
manifest in their utterances, behaviour, or any other evidence available from the
outside. Whether someone violates the First Limit depends on whether they tend to
find certain inferences compelling, and whether they violate the Second Limit depends
on whether they disregard such feelings; neither of these facts can be ascertained with
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certainty from outside. For example, suppose A asserts a contradiction. We can’t
tell with certainty whether (i) A didn’t find it unacceptable because they lack logical
capacities; (ii) A didn’t find it unacceptable because they were tired or inattentive or
didn’t understand the thoughts involved; (iii) A did find it unacceptable, but decided
upon theoretical reflection that this contradiction had to be true; or (iv) A did find
it unacceptable, and disregarded this feeling. Only in cases (i) and (iv) is A failing
to think.
Second, we can’t tell with certainty which rule someone is following, for reasons
that are essentially those of Kripke (1982). For any finite set of inferences a third
party observes, there will be many different rules that validate those inferences
and diverge elsewhere. So if all we have to go on is a finite set of inferences, we
can’t tell with certainty which rule someone is following. As a result, we can’t tell
with certainty whether they’re following one of the sets of rules that is suitable for
thinking. (To be clear, I don’t agree with Kripke that there’s no fact of the matter
about which rule they’re following – it’s just that we can’t be sure.)
Third, it’s not as if we begin with knowledge of which thoughts someone is
thinking and then ask which rules they’re following; rather, we interpret their pattern
of activity as a whole. So if someone regularly utters sentences that ordinarily mean
p, if p, then q and not-q, we might interpret them as meaning something other
than p or q in one of these sentences, such that the triad is no longer inconsistent.
Interpretive charity will often favour a local reinterpretation over the global result




5 Nonsense: a user’s guide
Note. This chapter is a bit of an interlude from my main line of argument.
It develops a general account of what happens when we fail to think
because of some semantic defect. Indirectly, the chapter responds to
a worry that the earlier discussion likely raised. In Chapters 1 to 4, I
argued that logic is constitutive of thinking, and defended two constraints
on how illogical a subject’s representational activity can be while still
counting as thinking. One upshot is that sometimes we fail to think
because our activity is insufficiently logical. In this chapter, I explain
how the failure to think can seem like thinking – in particular, how it can
include phenomena such as reasoning. This chapter is, however, written
as a standalone piece; it doesn’t presuppose the views defended elsewhere
in the dissertation, and applies to a broader class of failures to think
than those due to illogicality alone.
5.1 Introduction
Many philosophers suppose that we can think we are saying or thinking something
meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing
nonsense. But what is nonsense?
Early twentieth-century philosophy of language abounded in allegations of non-
sense. Russell (1919) suggested that violations of logical type-restrictions result in
nonsense. Wittgenstein (TLP 6.54) held that much philosophical discourse, including
most of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, was meaningless. Ayer (1936) argued that
verifiability is a semantic constraint, such that metaphysical language is meaningless.
Ryle (1949) held that when we make a category mistake, we produce nonsense.
But the idea is still around. Here are two more recent uses of it:
[J]ust as we cannot know a priori or with Cartesian certainty whether any
particular thing we think or say is true, so we cannot know a priori or
with Cartesian certainty that in seeming to think or talk about something
we are thinking or talking about – anything at all. We cannot know a
priori that we mean. (Millikan 1984, 10)
Look, it can be true that people think they have a thought when they
don’t. They can be deeply attached to a linguistic formulation that upon
reflection doesn’t say anything. ... So a lot of our thoughts are really not
thoughts, they’re things masquerading as thoughts. (Appiah 2017)
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Rather than giving a definition of nonsense, I’ll take the concept to be fixed by
its theoretical role. ‘Nonsense’ is a term of criticism. It picks out a failure to express,
or have, a thought: a failure more basic than saying or thinking something significant
but false (Routley 1969; Goddard 1970). It wouldn’t be a useful term of criticism,
however, if failures to make sense were always obvious. Rather, it’s implicit in the
way philosophers have used the concept that something can appear to make sense
even though it does not. This is why many twentieth-century philosophers took it as
their job to expose latent nonsense.
The concept of nonsense is closely related to the theory of meaning. The theory
of meaning specifies the facts in virtue of which a sentence, as used by a particular
speaker or community, has a given content. It thereby entails conditions for saying
something meaningful at all; when we violate one of these conditions, we produce
nonsense (Cappellen 2013, 25). We might wonder, however, whether meaning is the
sort of thing that is suited to being theorized at all. If we experience something
as meaningful, how can theory tell us it is meaningless? I’m not going to provide
a defence of theorizing about meaning here.1 But I would note that the concept
of nonsense doesn’t require us to exclude experience altogether: we can allow that
meaning is ordinarily something that shows up in experience (Zwicky 2019). What we
cannot say, if we are to use the concept of nonsense critically, is that the experience
of meaningfulness is sufficient for meaning. Theorizing can sometimes show that an
apparent thought was really nonsense.
In this paper I’m not going to argue that we should use the concept of nonsense
in the way twentieth-century philosophers did; nor will I take a position on which
cases count as nonsense.2 Rather, I’m interested in what nonsense would have to
be, for the project of those philosophers to be a viable one. I’m interested, in other
words, in what would be required of an account of nonsense for the concept to do
critical work. In my view, such an account needs to explain two things:
1. How nonsense can appear meaningful, and
2. How nonsense is in fact not meaningful.
These requirements lead to two constraints on an adequate account of nonsense. The
1For discussion of the idea that meaning is what a theory of meaning is a theory of, see Dummett
(1975) and McDowell (1976). For criticism, see Wright (1981).
2So I will not be arguing against philosophers who suggest that many cases of apparent nonsense
– such as category mistakes – are really just necessary falsehoods (Pap 1960; Goldstick 1974; Camp
2004; Magidor 2013); for responses, see Routley (1969) and Glock (2015, s. 7).
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Engagement Constraint, discussed in 5.2 below, is that nonsense can be used
in certain ways. The Austerity Constraint, discussed in 5.3, is that nonsense
does not express thoughts. Some extant accounts fail, I will argue, because they do
not meet one constraint or the other. In 5.4, I offer an account which meets both
constraints and respond to some objections. Finally, in 5.5 I conclude with a hard
question raised by nonsense.
5.2 The engagement constraint
In this section I’ll defend the following constraint on accounts of nonsense:
The Engagement Constraint Nonsense can be engaged with.
‘Engagement’ is a loose term for various ways in which we seem to use nonsense, not
just mention it, bringing to bear our ordinary conceptual capacities. As Annette
Baier writes (1967, 520), nonsense ‘need be neither useless nor lacking in order and
discipline’. We need to account for engagement if we are to explain the appearance
of sense that nonsense can present. In particular, there are two main ways of using
nonsense that we have to explain: reasoning with nonsense and embedding nonsense
within that-clauses.
5.2.1 Reasoning with nonsense
We draw apparent inferences from nonsense. Different instances of nonsense will
appear to license different inferences, depending on the concepts involved. I’ll
illustrate this point with two examples: a version of the Liar Paradox and a category
mistake.3
So suppose the following sentence is nonsense:
(1) 1 is false.4
To someone under the illusion that 1 expresses a thought, it will seem that 1 entails
(2) ‘1 is false’ is false.
3Some deny that semantic paradoxes and category mistakes result in nonsense (see previous note).
For my purposes, nothing hangs on this, as long as it is conceded that there exists nonsense that
looks sufficiently sentence-like to underwrite ‘inferences’ like the one in the text. Any philosopher
who wants to use ‘nonsense’ as a term of criticism must think that such instances exist.
4For accounts on which the Liar expresses no proposition, see Kripke (1975) and Rumfitt (2014).
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Now consider a different instance of nonsense:
(3) Goodness is hexagonal.
Someone who thinks that 3 makes sense will think 3 entails
(4) Something is hexagonal.
By contrast, someone who thinks that 1 makes sense would be ‘wrong’ to think that
1 entails 4. We have here a notion of ‘correctness in inference’ for nonsense.
Let us say that someone who reasons from 1 to 2, or from 3 to 4, is reasoning
with the relevant instances of nonsense. Then our reasoning with 1 differs from our
reasoning with 3. Of course, supposing 1 and 3 really are nonsense, these ‘inferences’
are defective. Nonsense doesn’t entail anything.5 But an account which fails to
capture these sorts of moves is missing a crucial way we engage with nonsense,
drawing on the conceptual and linguistic capacities we exercise in ordinary speaking
and thinking.
Moreover, reasoning with nonsense can be central to our recognition of it as
nonsense. This is characteristic of the critical use of the concept of nonsense by
philosophers like Russell and Ryle (Goddard 1970, 12). Consider Russell’s discussion
of existence. Russell held that existence was a second-order predicate applicable
to first-order predicates. He denied that there was any first-order equivalent (1919,
206):
As regards the actual things there are in the world, there is nothing at
all you can say about them that in any way corresponds to this notion of
existence. It is a sheer mistake to say that there is anything analogous to
existence that you can say about them. You get into confusion through
language [...]. I mean, it is perfectly clear that, if there were such a thing
as this existence of individuals that we talk of, it would be absolutely
impossible for it not to apply, and that is the characteristic of a mistake.
To show that a certain concept doesn’t exist, Russell supposes that it does exist and
considers how it would apply. That is, Russell notes that, if there were a first-order
existence predicate, then for any object o, it would be true to say that o exists using
this predicate. And Russell supposes that a genuine predicate cannot be such that it
must be true of everything: if you can’t be wrong, then you can’t be right either; so
there is no first-order existence predicate. But of course, if Russell is right about
5Assuming that the notion of entailment is semantic and not merely syntactic.
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this, then there is no such thing as the thought that o exists, and therefore no such
truth about o.
Here is another example. Recall
(1) 1 is false.
In reasoning with 1 I may start by supposing that 1 is false. Then I infer that, since
1 says that it is false, and it is false, 1 is true. Of course, if 1 is true, then, since
it says that it is false, 1 is false. Now I know I’m in trouble, as 1 seems to be true
if and only if it is false, but no sentence can be both true and false. So I conclude
that 1 does not express a thought at all: it is nonsense, and is therefore neither
true nor false and does not entail anything. Again, reasoning with 1 was crucial to
recognizing the problem.
5.2.2 Nonsense-attributions
This brings us to the second way of engaging with nonsense. Once we recognize that
a given thought is illusory, or that a given sentence doesn’t express a thought, we can
express our recognition of this fact using a that-clause (Sorensen 2002; Cappellen
2013).
The kind of thing I mean is best brought out with an example. Suppose that
I’ve been reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and am gripped by the Picture Theory
of Meaning. Yes, I say: a picture really is a fact! (TLP 2.141) But as I progress
through the book, I begin to suspect that its propositions are meaningless by its
own lights. Wittgenstein, I think, was right: ‘anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical’ (6.54). I express my realization as follows:
(5) It is nonsense to say that a picture is a fact.
Call such sentences nonsense-attributions. They seem to use rather than mention the
phrase in the that-clause.6 For example, it seems that we could not understand ‘It is
nonsense to say that goodness is hexagonal’ without having the concept of a hexagon.
In general, the cognitive value of a nonsense-attribution, the rational difference that
accepting it makes (Frege 1892), depends on understanding the concepts used within
6I’m aware that nonsense-attributions sound odd. Perhaps this is better: ‘To say “A picture is a
fact” is nonsense’. I’m happy to grant this, as long as it is clear that this locution can be read in a
non-metalinguistic way, where understanding the whole requires understanding the double-quoted
words.
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the that-clause.
Some might argue that nonsense-attributions are metalinguistic – that the non-
sense is merely being mentioned. I don’t deny that they can be read in a metalinguistic
way, but there is also a non-metalinguistic reading.
On the metalinguistic reading, a sentence of the form ‘It is nonsense to say that S ’
says the same as one of the form ‘The string S does not express a thought’. On this
reading, the cognitive value of a nonsense-attribution is that a particular sequence of
symbols does not express a thought. Note that it’s possible to appreciate this without
being able to understand any element of the sequence of symbols: for example, I
might learn that a particular sequence of letters in shorthand script doesn’t say
anything, even though I can’t read shorthand.
On the non-metalinguistic reading, we need to understand the concepts used
within the that-clause to understand the nonsense-attribution. To see that such a
reading is available, let’s return to the Tractatus example:
(5) It is nonsense to say that a picture is a fact.
Now contrast this with another sentence:
(6) It is nonsense to say that das Bild eine Tatsache ist.7
If you don’t speak German, you won’t be able to engage with the content of the
that-clause in 6, while you will be able to engage with its content in 5. For example,
you won’t be able to identify the concepts used within the that-clause. For this
reason, 5 is informative in a way that 6 is not. However, on the metalinguistic
reading, both 5 and 6 point out that certain strings do not express thoughts. The
reading on which 5 says more than 6 must consider nonsense-attributions as more
than metalinguistic.8
You might wonder how nonsense-attributions work semantically. For present
purposes, I’m saying nothing about this: the point is simply that any viable account
7You might object that 8 is ungrammatical (Quine 1961, 135). That might be right. But it
would provide further evidence that nonsense-attributions are not covertly metalinguistic, as ‘It is
nonsense to say “das Bild ist eine Tatsache”’ is unquestionably grammatical.
8Someone who favours the metalinguistic view might point out that they know more about ‘A
picture is a fact’ than about ‘Das Bild ist eine Tatsache’: they know the meanings of the words in
the former string. But on the metalinguistic view, this knowledge plays no part in understanding 5.
So 5 is not more informative than 8. At best, 5 can be combined with other knowledge to draw
inferences that cannot be drawn from 8. My point is that 5 is in itself more informative than 8 for
our Anglophone Tractatus reader.
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of nonsense ought to validate the intuition that nonsense-attributions are informative
in a non-metalinguistic way. This intuition doesn’t dictate the semantics we give.
Later in the paper, when I give my positive account of nonsense, I will explain what
is going on in nonsense-attributions.9
I’ve described two ways we seem to use nonsense rather than only mentioning
it: first, we reason with nonsense, and second, we make nonsense-attributions. To
account for these phenomena, we must satisfy Engagement. I’ll now show that a
prominent account fails to satisfy the constraint.
5.2.3 The minimalist account
The minimalist account says that, when we produce nonsense, we produce mere
words which fail to bear meaning: at the level of language, there is a string of symbols,
but at the level of thought, there is nothing. A.W. Moore takes this position (2000,
198-9):
...there is one and only one way in which an utterance can fail to be a
representation, namely because the words involved in it have not been
assigned suitable meaning: they have not been assigned such meaning as
would give the utterance content.
Later, he writes that even the most apparently significant nonsense, like the philo-
sophical nonsense we produce ‘when trying to express the inexpressible’, is ‘none
other than the the pure and utter nonsense of ‘Phlump jing ux.”
This position is often thought to follow from Frege’s Context Principle, which
says that words have meaning only in the context of a sentence, or that concepts can
occur only in the context of a thought (Frege 1884, x). Supposing that some sentence
does not express a thought, the suggestion is that the elements of the sentence cannot
express any concepts either.
I’m going to argue that the minimalist account fails to satisfy Engagement. After
this, I’ll show that the Context Principle does not, in fact, support this account.
The basic problem is that, on the minimalist account, when we produce nonsense we
aren’t using our conceptual capacities. But our engagement with nonsense draws on
precisely these capacities.
9Nonsense-attributions are related to another type of sentence in which nonsense is used within
a that-clause, e.g. ‘Wittgenstein believes that a picture is a fact’. It’s disputed whether such a
sentence makes sense (Diamond 2000, s. 4; Sorensen 2002), but there’s some intuitive pressure to
say it does. While I won’t have room to discuss this, I believe my account can be extended to deal
with such sentences.
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Let’s take the two forms of engagement in turn. First, recall the move from 3 to
4:
(3) Goodness is hexagonal.
(4) Something is hexagonal.
If the words in 3 don’t bear any meaning, but the words in 4 do bear meaning,
then the string ‘hexagonal’ in 3 doesn’t have the same meaning as it does in 4. But
any account of the move from 3 to 4 must invoke this common feature of the two
sentences. If ‘hexagonal’ doesn’t have the same meaning in 3 and 4, then it’s unclear
why moving from 3 to 4 is better than moving from 3 to, say, ‘Something is square’.10
More generally, reasoning with nonsense relies on the presence of meaningful words
and structures in nonsense. So the minimalist account cannot explain reasoning with
nonsense.
Second, recall the difference between the nonsense-attributions 5 and 6:
(5) It is nonsense to say that a picture is a fact.
(6) It is nonsense to say that das Bild eine Tatsache ist.
If the words within the that-clauses in 5 and 6 do not bear any meaning, then the
only difference between 5 and 6 is that they contain different strings of letters. But
then we’re forced to adopt the metalinguistic reading of nonsense-attributions: what
5 and 6 tell us is that certain strings lack meaning. And we’re unable to explain why
5 seems to tell an English-speaking reader more than 6 does.
For these reasons, the minimalist account does not satisfy Engagement.
Now, all of this heavy weather about the minimalist account’s defects might seem
unnecessary. After all, the proponents of the account don’t argue that we should
accept it because it preserves the appearances. Rather, they argue that we should
accept it because it follows from an important principle about meaning. Here is
Moore (2000, 199):
The guiding principle here is that there cannot be as it were positive
semantic reasons for an utterance’s failing to make sense. It cannot be
because of what the parts of the utterance do mean, that the whole thing
does not mean anything. The meaning of the parts is their contribution to
10The fact that the same string, ‘hexagonal’, occurs in both 3 and 4 is insufficient, given the
possibility of homonyms.
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the meaning of a range of wholes. ... The only thing about a word that can
prevent utterances in which it is used from being proper representations
is its not having any meaning at all.
Cora Diamond makes the same case in a different way. Supposing that the meaning
of a term is its contribution to the meanings of sentences, then if a sentence is
meaningless, its constituent terms must also be meaningless. So ‘a sentence which
does not make sense does not contain words which can be said to mean what they
do elsewhere’ (1981, 21; cf. Diamond 1988; Conant 2002). Now, if the meaning of a
term is essential to its identity, then no term in a meaningless sentence is the same
as a term in a meaningful sentence (1981, 11):
If I know the rules of the language, I know what a sentence composed in
such-and-such a way out of such-and-such Elements says; but I do not
know (there is no such thing as knowing) that what I see or hear is this
Element, unless the whole of which it is part has a sense to which the
meaning of this Element contributes in the way determined by the rules.
In both formulations, the argument depends crucially on the following principle:
CP The meaning of a term is its contribution to the meanings of sentences.11
I’m going to argue that there are two ways of reading CP. On the first reading, the
meaning of a term is its contribution to the meaning of the particular sentence in
which it occurs. This reading of CP is implausible, but does support the minimalist
account. On the second reading, the meaning of a term is its contribution to the
meaning of sentences in general in which it occurs. This reading of CP is plausible,
but doesn’t support the account.12
On the first reading, the meaning of a term is its contribution to the meaning of
the particular sentence in which it occurs. For example, the meaning of ‘hexagonal’
in 4 consists in its contribution to the meaning of 4. On this reading, we cannot ask
for the meaning of a term in general – we cannot, for example, ask what contribution
‘hexagonal’ makes to sentences of the form ‘a is hexagonal’. Rather, we can only ask
what contribution a term makes in a particular sentence.
This does support the minimalist account. For suppose that 3 has no meaning.
Then there is nothing to be said about the contribution that ‘hexagonal’ makes in its
11To account for context we should say ‘utterances’, but for present purposes we can ignore this.
12Glock (2015, s. 5) responds to the same argument in a different way.
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occurrence in 3. The fact that ‘hexagonal’ does contribute to the meaning of other
sentences, like 4, is irrelevant, given that meaning is particular rather than general.
The problem is that on this reading CP makes it unclear how linguistic under-
standing is possible. We learn the meaning of a word from a finite set of sentences.
If there’s no general contribution that a word makes to each sentence of which it
is a part, then it’s unclear how we could ever understand what a word means in a
sentence we haven’t encountered before. In Diamond’s terms, we could never be sure
that the terms in a new sentence are the same as terms we already know.13 So we
should reject this reading of CP.
On the second reading, the meaning of a term is its contribution to the meaning
of sentences in general in which it occurs. As Diamond puts it – stating the view she
rejects – ‘it is the general possibility a word has of contributing to sense that confers
meaning on it’ (1981, 18). Since meanings are general, we can learn the meaning of
a word from some finite number of instances and apply this understanding in new
cases.
This reading doesn’t trivialize CP. CP tells us that if we don’t understand the
contribution a term makes to sentences, then we don’t understand the term. For
example, suppose I have a sophisticated theory about some object which I associate
with the sign ¬. Nevertheless, if I don’t understand that ¬p is true when p is false,
then I don’t understand the meaning of ¬.
Read this way, however, CP doesn’t support the minimalist account. The meaning
of ‘hexagonal’, for example, is the general contribution it makes to the meaning of
sentences. When the term occurs in 3, its meaning remains the same, because it
doesn’t depend on the meaning of the particular sentence in which it occurs. The
lack of meaning of the whole is no reason to deny that the parts have meaning.
Still less does it follow that, as Moore says, ‘It cannot be because of what the
parts of the utterance do mean, that the whole thing does not mean anything.’
Suppose that ‘goodness’ refers to a normative property and ‘hexagonal’ ascribes
a property applicable only to extended things. Then the reason why ‘goodness is
hexagonal’ is meaningless is precisely because of what its parts do mean. Both
‘goodness’ and ‘hexagonal’ have meanings, but the latter is not defined for the kind
13Indeed, on Diamond’s view it’s unclear how we can ever understand a new sentence. We can’t
know what its terms mean until we know what the sentence means. But how do we know what
the sentence means, unless we know what its terms mean? Diamond writes (1981, 21): ‘That
such-and-such a word is a working part of a sentence, and that it is its content we must grasp to
understand the sentence ... cannot be told by observation.’ But she doesn’t say how it can be told.
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of thing referred to by the former.14
I’ve argued that the minimalist account fails to satisfy Engagement. I’ve also
shown that CP does not support the minimalist account. But I don’t want to leave
the impression that the minimalist account is unmotivated. Rather, its deepest
motivation comes from difficulties about nonsense at the level of thought.
Consider a remark Wittgenstein makes in the Preface to the Tractatus: ‘to be able
to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable
(i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore
only be in language that the limit can be drawn’. Wittgenstein is pointing to an
asymmetry between language and thought: while there’s no difficulty in explaining
why a sentence is meaningless without presupposing that it is meaningful, there is
some difficulty in explaining why a ‘thought’ is meaningless without presupposing
that it is meaningful.
For suppose we say that, when a subject attempts to understand a nonsense
sentence, they exercise the same capacities they would exercise in understanding
the sentence’s words and structure elsewhere. It’s unclear, then, why a subject
attempting to understand nonsense fails to grasp a thought: the subject’s activity
looks the same as in the good case. It looks like any substantive explanation of why
a given attempt at thinking failed will characterize it in ways that assimilate it to
successful thinking. The motivation for the minimalist account is that it precludes
any such substantive explanation.15
I’m not going to respond to this issue here. I’ll respond to it later on by giving an
account which allows for such substantive explanations without assimilating nonsense
to sense at the level of thought.
5.3 The austerity constraint
In this section I defend a second constraint on accounts of nonsense:
The Austerity Constraint Nonsense does not express thoughts.
In a nutshell: if nonsense expresses thoughts, it can play the same role as sense. To
14I’m not claiming that this kind of explanation (sometimes called a coupling theory (Routley
1966, 180)) explains all cases of nonsense.
15Compare Conant (1992), who similarly rejects any substantive explanation of why logically
alien thought is impossible.
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the extent that nonsense can play the same role as sense, the concept of nonsense
loses its critical force. So nonsense must not express thoughts.
5.3.1 Nonsense thoughts
To approach the Austerity Constraint, let’s consider an account which directly
violates it: the nonsense thoughts account, on which nonsense expresses genuine but
defective thoughts.16 This account easily satisfies Engagement. Since a nonsense
thought is a thought, it can form part of chains of reasoning. A nonsense thought
can also fall within a that-clause, as in nonsense-attributions.
Despite these benefits, nonsense thoughts are a dead end. They make nonsense
too much like sense. Consider two important theoretical roles played by thoughts.
First, thoughts explain a central kind of understanding: I’ve understood a sentence
if I grasp the thought it expresses. Second, thoughts explain a central kind of
communication: I’ve successfully communicated with you if you grasp the thought I
intended to express (Grice 1957). Now, if there are nonsense thoughts, then both
roles can be played by nonsense as well as by sense. Suppose that 3 expresses the
nonsense thought that goodness is hexagonal. I understand 3 if I grasp this thought;
if I grasp a different one, I’ve failed to understand 3. If I utter 3 to you and you grasp
this thought, then I’ve used 3 to successfully communicate. But if a nonsense thought
can do the same work as an ordinary thought, then the concept of nonsense loses its
critical force. That a given area of discourse is nonsense becomes an evaluatively
neutral fact, not a defect.
In response, the proponent of nonsense thoughts should explain how nonsense
thoughts are defective compared to ordinary thoughts, blocking the assimilation of
our engagement with nonsense to our engagement with sense. I consider such a
response in the next section.
5.3.2 What’s wrong with nonsense?
The natural way to spell out the defectiveness of nonsense is to hold that nonsense
thoughts are not truth-apt.17 The proposal is that nonsense thoughts exist but
lack truth-value – they are neither true nor false – while ordinary thoughts have a
16Sorensen (2002) argues, relatedly, that there are meaningless objects of belief (albeit statements
rather than propositions).
17I’m going to talk about sentences as having truth-values, abstracting from the role of context.
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truth-value. As truth is an important aim of rational discourse (Dummett 1973, ch.
10; Priest 2006, s. 4.5), this is reason to avoid speaking nonsense.
To see why this won’t work, recall an argument from Dummett (1959), which
forces us to be more precise about the sense in which nonsense is neither true nor
false. Dummett is responding to Strawson’s account of empty singular terms, like
‘the King of France’. Strawson had suggested that statements like ‘The King of
France is bald’ are meaningful – we know how the world would have to be for them
to be true – yet neither true nor false (1950, 330). Dummett argues that this is
untenable. If the statement is meaningful, it can be used to make an assertion, and
if the world is not the way it would have to be for the assertion to be true, then
the assertion is false. Of course, such statements might display odd compositional
behaviour – ‘The King of France is not bald’ is also false – but, Dummett argues,
their normative status is the same as any other falsehood.
Similarly, if nonsense expresses thoughts, then it can be used to make assertions;
then, if the world is not the way it would have to be for the assertions to be true,
the assertions are false. An assertion of nonsense might display odd compositional
behaviour, as its negation will typically also be nonsense; but its normative status
is the same as any other falsehood. But nonsense was supposed to be a distinctive
normative status.
We can set out the objection more precisely using Dummett’s distinction between
assertoric content and ingredient sense (1973, ch. 12).18 These levels of content are
associated with different truth-values. Assertoric content is what is expressed by a
sentence in assertion. Dummett maintains that the point of assertion is to exclude
possibilities: in asserting p, we indiscriminately exclude all possibilities other than
those in which p holds. Either the actual world falls into the excluded class, or it
does not; so at the level of assertoric content, every assertion is either true or false.
Ingredient sense, by contrast, tracks the contribution a sentence makes to complex
sentences of which it is a part. Different sentences may have the same truth-value at
the level of assertoric content, but behave differently when part of complex sentences.
For example, consider the sentences a is F and b is F, and suppose that a is an
empty name and b names an object that doesn’t fall under F. Then at the level of
assertoric content, a is F and b is F are both false. But a is not F is also false,
while b is not F is true. Negation is sensitive to a distinction among kinds of falsity
which doesn’t show up at the level of assertoric content. In Dummett’s terminology,
18For further discussion, see Suszko (1977) and Shaw (2014).
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a is F is false at the level of assertoric content but neither true nor false at the level
of ingredient sense.
Now, the proponent of nonsense thoughts must specify at what level nonsense
thoughts are neither true nor false. Consider someone who asserts 3. We’re supposing
that the speaker succeeds in saying something – namely, that goodness is hexagonal.
The speaker succeeds in expressing a certain kind of content – the content charac-
teristic of declarative sentences. Some possibilities are excluded by this content. In
fact, all of them are. So the actual world is excluded. So the assertion of 3 is simply
false, at the level of assertoric content.
However, 3 will interact differently with negation than an ordinary falsehood.
Suppose someone asserts
(7) Goodness is not hexagonal.
There’s a reading of 7 on which it is false just as well as 3, and for just the same
reason.19 This compositional pattern is what it means for 3 to be neither true nor
false at the level of ingredient sense.
But this is insufficient to capture the defectiveness of nonsense. Assertoric content
is the notion bound up with the rational purpose of assertion: it captures the success
or failure of an assertion in light of that purpose. Ingredient sense, by contrast, is a
technical device serving to capture compositional effects. Truth-values assigned at
the level of ingredient sense have no normative weight.
So to say that the assertion is neither true nor false is not to say that it fails more
badly than a false assertion, but only that it is a false assertion of a particular sort,
displaying particular compositional behaviour. The assertion is bad only because, at
the level of assertoric content, it is false. Nonsense, however, is supposed to be a
failure more basic than the failure to say something true. So a treatment of nonsense
as expressing thoughts that are neither true nor false only at the level of ingredient
sense obviates the critical force of the concept of nonsense.20
Nonsense, therefore, must lack assertoric content. To maintain this, we must
satisfy Austerity: we must deny that nonsense expresses thoughts, rather than
holding that the thoughts it expresses are neither true nor false.21
19There is also an ‘external’ reading of 7 on which it is true. But in ordinary cases the two
readings don’t come apart (Routley 1966, 181).
20For additional arguments against assimilating nonsense to falsity, see Routley (1969) and
Goddard (1970).
21This is consistent with using a three-valued logic to represent the interaction of nonsense with
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5.4 A pretence account of nonsense
I’ve set out two constraints that an account of nonsense must meet. It’s hard to meet
both constraints, because they pull in opposite directions. The nonsense thoughts
account satisfies Engagement, but fails to satisfy Austerity. The minimalist account
satisfies Austerity, but not Engagement. In short: it’s hard to explain our dealings
with nonsense without assimilating nonsense to sense.
This tension is not only theoretical. We can see how it shows up in experience in
Diamond’s description of trying to understand someone who utters nonsense (2000,
157-8):
When you understand someone who utters nonsense, you are not, on
the one hand, remaining as it were outside his thought and describing
what goes on from the point of view of empirical psychology. But, on
the other hand, you are not inside his thought as you are when he makes
sense and you understand what he says, because there is no such internal
understanding, there is no thought that such-and-such to understand. ...
There is, as I said, no inside. But what it is to understand a person who
utters nonsense is to go as far as one can with the idea that there is.
For Diamond, this is how we should read the Tractatus: by imaginatively entering
into the illusion that its sentences express thoughts.
In this section I offer an account of nonsense in the spirit of Diamond’s suggestion
that engagement with nonsense is an exercise of imagination. First, I explain what
semantic pretence is.22 Next, I introduce some background about understanding and
logical form. Finally, I draw on this background to give the account, showing that it
satisfies both constraints.
5.4.1 Pretence and make-believe
Pretence accounts codify games of make-believe, of the sort that children play. A
game of make-believe will typically involve some really existing items (props), about
which something is expressly pretended to be the case (initial stipulations), and
principles for generating further content in the pretence (principles of generation)
sense. Kripke, for example, uses the third value for sentences that ‘do not express propositions’
(1975, 701). See n. 30 below.
22The classic source for pretence accounts is Walton (1990; 1993). For a thorough recent discussion,
see Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (2015). My view differs from that of Armour-Garb & Woodbridge
in using pretence to explain our engagement with nonsense, rather than to explain the functioning
of ordinary, successful language.
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(Armour-Garb & Woodbridge 2015, 39ff.). Consider, for example, a game about a
bank robbery. The props are a child, X, and some newspapers. The initial stipulations
are that X is a bank robber and the newspapers are cash. But the game’s content
is not fixed solely by these stipulations (Crimmins 1998, 5). Real-world facts – in
particular, facts about the props and their relations – can be incorporated into the
pretence. Thus, when X bolts with an armful of newspapers, in the pretence the
bank robber is making a getaway.
For present purposes, we’re interested in semantic pretence – pretence about the
meaning of certain sentences or purported thoughts. The props are words, concepts
and mental events; the initial stipulations assign meanings to these items which they
ordinarily lack. In this way semantic pretence can increase the expressive resources
of our language without increasing our stock of words.
Recent philosophical history offers some reason to think that a semantic pretence
account will meet our two constraints. Late in The Varieties of Reference, Evans
sought to give an account of sentences containing empty names, like ‘Sherlock Holmes
does not exist’ (1982, ch. 10). On the one hand, Evans held that empty names are
genuinely used, not just mentioned, in such sentences. Assuming that using a name
requires knowing what it refers to, this explains why you can’t understand ‘Sherlock
Holmes does not exist’ without knowing who Sherlock Holmes is. On the other hand,
Evans maintained that, since the sense of a name is a way of presenting its bearer, an
empty name has no sense. It follows that sentences containing empty names do not
express thoughts. Evans navigated between these two requirements with a semantic
pretence account of the use of empty names. Insofar as Evans’ two requirements
look a lot like the Engagement Constraint and the Austerity Constraint, we have
reason to think that a semantic pretence account will be adequate to nonsense more
generally.23
Before considering nonsense, it’ll be useful to begin with an example where
pretence operates on an otherwise meaningful sentence. Let’s stay with the bank-
robbery pretence. I’ll say that a sentence is ‘make-believedly true’ when an assertion
of it would be correct within the pretence (Evans 1982, 354ff.; Crimmins 1998, 15).
The basic rules of the pretence, then, are as follows.24
23The connection between Evans’ pretence theory and nonsense is drawn by Moore (2003a, 188).
24I use P, Q and R as variables running over sentences and P[‘a’/‘b’; ‘c’/‘d’; ...] for the result of
replacing ‘a’ with ‘b’, ‘c’ with ‘d’ and so on in P.
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Bank robbery pretence25
Props. The props are the terms ‘The bank robber’, ‘cash’ and sentences
containing those terms.
Initial Stipulations. For a sentence P which contains one or more of
‘The bank robber’ and ‘cash’, P is make-believedly true if and only if
P[‘The bank robber’/‘X’; ‘cash’/‘newspapers’] is true.
We also have two more general rules (Evans 1982):
Principle of Generation. If P is true, and if there is no set of make-
believedly true sentences Q1 ... Qn such that if Q1 ... Qn were true then
P would not be true, then P is make-believedly true.
Recursive Principle. If P1 ... Pn are make-believedly true and if P1 ...
Pn were true R would be true and there is no set of make-believe truths
Q1 ... Qn such that if Q1 ... Qn were true then R would not be true, then
R is make-believedly true.
These rules specify the set of make-believedly true claims. Some claims are expressly
made-believe, while others are determined by a function from real-world truths to
make-believedly true claims. This makes it possible to recover real-world content
from make-believe content, or vice versa (Yablo 2014, s. 10.2).
Now consider an assertion of ‘The bank robber dropped the cash while fleeing.’
This assertion might lack a truth-value, as phrases like ‘The bank robber’ and ‘the
cash’ may lack reference. But given the rules of the pretence, we know what has
to be the case for the assertion to be make-believedly true: the assertion is correct,
within the pretence, if and only if X dropped the newspapers while fleeing.
5.4.2 Logical form and partial understanding
A pretence account of nonsense raises special difficulties because the participants
pretend not only that something is the case, but that something makes sense. To
give such an account, we need some background about how we understand thoughts
and sentences.
I’m going to suppose that recognition of logical form is essential to our under-
standing of thoughts and sentences. By ‘logical form’, I mean the way a thought or
25I’m borrowing the helpful format of Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (2015).
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sentence is composed of its elements. I’ll speak of a sentence as ‘having’ or ‘being of’
a particular logical form, but this shouldn’t be taken to imply that a given sentence
can have only one form (Oliver 2010). For example, ‘If Hegel wrote the Logic, then
Hegel was brilliant’ is of the form ‘if p, then q’ and of the form ‘if a is F, then a is G’.
Why think that recognition of logical form is essential to understanding? Well,
it’s commonly thought that our understanding of a thought or sentence consists in
grasp either of its truth-conditions (Davidson 1967; Lepore & Ludwig 2002), or of the
valid inferences to and from it (Brandom 1994), or both. Logical form contributes
both to the truth-conditions of a thought and to its inferential role. So, whatever
the right account is, recognizing logical form is essential.
Logical form is general. A given form makes a uniform contribution to every
thought or sentence which has that form. For example, any thought of the form ‘a
is F ’ will be true if and only if a is F ; any thought of the form ‘¬p’ will be true if
and only if p is false. This generality allows us to know things about thoughts and
sentences that we don’t understand. Consider the sentence ‘Space is curved’. As long
as I recognize the logical form of ‘Space is curved’, then – even if I don’t understand
the sentence – I know that ‘Space is curved’ is true if and only if space is curved
(Higginbotham 1989).26 I know, too, that ‘Space is curved’ entails that something
is curved. We can draw inferences when we recognize a sentence as expressing a
thought of a certain form – even if we don’t know which thought.
This kind of understanding can come in stages, which it’s natural to think of as
levels of analysis. For example, take
(8) Space is curved and time is not real.
I may first recognize 8 as a conjunction:
8 is true if and only if ‘Space is curved’ is true and ‘Time is not real’ is true.
Next, I realize that the right hand conjunct is negated:
8 is true if and only if ‘Space is curved’ is true and ‘Time is real’ is false.
And so on. Dummett (1974) believed this process essential to the utility of logic:
partial analysis reveals some licensed inferences, and further analysis lets us see
further structure, licensing new inferences.
26Higginbotham calls this the ‘less demanding notion of meaning’ (1989, 170; see also Higginbotham
1994, 102 and Armour-Garb & Woodbridge 2015, 158).
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Can this process be extended to include non-logical concepts? In principle, it can.
For example, suppose that I understand ‘curved’, but don’t know what ‘space’ refers
to: with this partial understanding, I might already grasp that ‘Space is curved’
entails that space is not flat. But whether these inferences are valid depends on
whether ‘curved’ makes the same contribution to every sentence of which it is a
part. It could be that some inferences from ‘curved’ are valid when we’re talking
about everyday objects and invalid when we’re talking about space. In other words,
it depends on whether non-logical concepts are general in the same sense as logic.
So while, in principle, the process could be extended to non-logical concepts, such
extensions are risky in a way that logic is not.
5.4.3 Pretentious nonsense: the general idea
We’re now in a position to state a pretence account of nonsense. This is a pretence
where something that is not meaningful is make-believedly meaningful. In this
section I explain the general idea; in the next section, I work through two examples.
When we produce nonsense, we enter a pretence where a certain sentence expresses
a thought, or where a certain mental event was a thought. The props are not thoughts.
At the level of language, they are nonsensical sentences; at the level of thought,
they are mental events: failed attempts at using certain conceptual capacities to
think. Neither nonsensical sentences nor failed attempts at thinking stand in logical
relations, but we can pretend they do.
The initial stipulation is that a given item is or expresses a thought. Not any old
thought, though: a thought of a certain form. Given the stipulation that some bit
of nonsense expresses a thought of a certain form, we can exercise our conceptual
capacities just as we do with a partially-understood sentence. This allows us to reason
with nonsense. When we make a nonsense-attribution, we’re using the expressive
resources of the pretence to point out the prop as nonsense.
The pretence account of nonsense satisfies both constraints. Engagement is
satisfied because, as I will show, within a pretence we can both reason with nonsense
and embed it in nonsense-attributions. Austerity is satisfied because we only pretend
that nonsense expresses thoughts. Unlike the bank robbery game and others discussed
by some pretence theorists (Armour-Garb &Woodbridge 2015, chs. 2 and 3), pretence
does not operate here to allow a sentence to express a content other than the one it
appears to express.
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5.4.4 Examples of pretentious nonsense
Let’s see how this works. I begin with an example of reasoning with nonsense and
then give an example of a nonsense-attribution. Recall
(3) Goodness is hexagonal.
An utterance of 3 doesn’t say anything, but we may mistakenly suppose it does. In
making this supposition, we enter a pretence defined by the following rules.
‘Goodness is hexagonal’ pretence
Props. The prop is the sentence ‘Goodness is hexagonal’.
Initial Stipulations. ‘Goodness is hexagonal’ expresses a thought of
the forms ‘a is F ’, ‘a is hexagonal’ and ‘Goodness is F ’.
Principle of Generation. If P is true, and if there is no set of make-
believedly true sentences Q1 ... Qn such that if Q1 ... Qn were true then
P would not be true, then P is make-believedly true.
Recursive Principle. If P1 ... Pn are make-believedly true and if P1 ...
Pn were true R would be true and there is no set of make-believe truths
Q1 ... Qn such that if Q1 ... Qn were true then R would not be true, then
R is make-believedly true.
Before I discuss reasoning with 3, notice that we can simulate a truth-condition
for 3 within the pretence. It’s make-believedly true that 3 expresses a thought of the
form ‘a is F ’. We know that a meaningful sentence of this form is true if and only
if a is F, so we incorporate this knowledge into the pretence using the Principle of
Generation. Then, by the Recursive Principle, it’s make-believedly true that
(9) ‘Goodness is hexagonal’ is true if and only if goodness is hexagonal.
Of course, 9 is nonsense, since its right-hand side is nonsense. So I don’t propose
to follow Higginbotham (1989, 156) in claiming that we can know purported truth-
conditions like 9. Since 9 is nonsense, it is not true and so cannot be known. Or
again, since 9 is nonsense, it does not express a thought, so, assuming the objects
of knowledge are thoughts, it cannot be known. Rather, 9 expresses an illusion of
understanding; the reasoning sketched explains its etiology.
Next, consider the apparent entailment from 3 to 4. First, note that it’s make-
believedly true that 3 expresses a thought of the form ‘a is hexagonal’. We know that
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a meaningful sentence of the form ‘a is hexagonal’ entails 4, so we incorporate this
knowledge into the pretence by the Principle of Generation. Then it’s make-believedly
true, by the Recursive Principle, that 3 entails 4.
Let me comment on a few suspicious-looking aspects of this account. First, you
might worry that we set out to explain the apparent validity of the inference from 3
to 4, not the apparent truth of the claim that 3 entails 4. In fact, there’s no deep
problem here. As stated, the Principle of Generation only allows for incorporating
truths into the pretence. To solve this problem, we’d need to extend the Principle to
allow for incorporating rules of inference as well. Just as what’s make-believedly
true governs what’s correct to assert within the pretence, what’s make-believedly
valid governs what’s correct to infer within the pretence. Given such an extension,
we could incorporate a rule like ‘From a thought of the form ‘a is hexagonal’, infer
that something is hexagonal’, and use it to make-believedly validate the inference
from 3 to 4.
Second, you might worry about the Initial Stipulations about the form of 3. For
example, the pretence contains the stipulation that 3 is of the form ‘a is hexagonal’.
Are we entitled to this, if 3 doesn’t express a thought? We are. Earlier, I argued
against Diamond’s view that words in nonsense sentences don’t bear their ordinary
meanings; rather, they do bear their meanings, but nonsense sentences don’t express
thoughts. So there’s no reason to deny that 3 involves the ordinary phrase ‘is
hexagonal’: a phrase which invites completion by some appropriate singular term.
This obvious fact about 3 shapes the pretence into which we enter when we suppose
that 3 is meaningful.
This fits with a plausible idea about nonsense. When we’re under the illusion
that 3 makes sense, we’re not supposing merely that it expresses some thought or
other – for example, that it might be a coded expression of a state secret. Rather,
we’re under the illusion that it expresses a thought which has components in common
with ‘Goodness is rare’ and ‘France is hexagonal’. Among other things, then, it
must be of the form ‘a is hexagonal’. Why does 3 invite this illusion in particular?
Because the illusions associated with a particular item of nonsense are generated and
constrained by our ordinary ability to recognize patterns in speech and writing.27
Next, let me address the use of nonsense in nonsense-attributions. The idea
will be that, in order to make a nonsense-attribution, we have to enter into the
pretence that the nonsense makes sense, and use the expressive resources of the
27For further discussion of the role of pattern recognition in reasoning, see Besson (2019a).
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pretence to point out ‘from the inside’ that it does not. This is what Evans called a
‘game-to-reality shift’ (1982, 369):
[S]omeone who utters such a sentence should be likened to someone
who makes a move within a pretence in order to express the fact that
it is a pretence. He is not like someone who tries to prevent a theatre
audience from being too carried away by jumping up on the stage and
saying: ‘Look, these men are only actors, and there is no scaffold or
buildings here—there are only props.’ Rather, he is like someone who
jumps up on the stage and says: ‘Look, Suzanne and the thief over there
are only characters in a play, and this scaffold and these buildings are
just props.’ The audience must be engaged, or be prepared to engage, in
the make-believe, in order to understand what he is saying.
The analogue of a nonsense-attribution in the bank robbery game would be, ‘all this
cash is really just newspapers’.
I argued above that there are two readings of nonsense-attributions: a metalin-
guistic reading, on which the nonsense-attribution is about a string of symbols, and
a non-metalinguistic reading. I want to suggest, now, that the non-metalinguistic
reading is available only where there’s a pretence in which the nonsense-attribution is
make-believedly false: a pretence where the content of the that-clause make-believedly
expresses a thought. Where there’s no such pretence, the nonsense-attribution can
only be read metalinguistically.
Where there is an appropriate pretence, some sentence or mental event will be
used as a prop. It will be make-believedly true that the sentence in question expresses
a thought, or that the mental event is a thought. Within the pretence, then, we gain
an expressive resource for identifying the sentence or mental event in question: as
that which expresses, or is, a particular thought. The nonsense-attribution exploits
this expressive resource to identify the sentence or mental event in question and then
states that – outside of the pretence – it does not express, or is not, a thought. When
read in a non-metalinguistic way, then, the nonsense-attribution will be true if and
only if the prop underlying the that-clause does not express, or is not, a thought.28
Let’s consider an example. Recall the nonsense-attribution
(5) It is nonsense to say that a picture is a fact.
28While there’s no room to develop this, I believe this treatment can be extended to deal with
sentences like ‘Wittgenstein believes that a picture is a fact’. The truth of this sentence will depend
(loosely speaking) on Wittgenstein’s participating in a pretence in which the embedded sentence is
make-believedly true.
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On the metalinguistic reading, 5 expresses the fact that the string ‘a picture is a fact’
is meaningless. But suppose there’s a pretence that ‘a picture is a fact’ expresses a
thought. Within that pretence, 5 is make-believedly false.
Given that 5 is make-believedly false, a non-metalinguistic reading of 5 is avail-
able.29 On this reading, 5 says that that which make-believedly expresses a thought
– namely, the sentence ‘a picture is a fact’ – does not express a thought. Supposing
that ‘a picture is a fact’ really is nonsense, 5 says something true. But it identifies
the nonsense using expressive resources available only to one who has entered into
the pretence that it makes sense.
I mentioned earlier that nonsense-attributions sound a bit odd. Now we can see
why. Within the pretence, 5 is simply false, as ‘A picture is a fact’ is make-believedly
meaningful. Outside of the pretence, we aren’t engaging with the nonsense, so 5
can only be read metalinguistically. And surely we don’t enter the pretence midway
through 5, after ‘to say’. So what exactly is going on, semantically? Someone who
utters 5 is speaking from within the pretence to point out that, in fact, it is a pretence.
They are using expressive resources that are only available within the pretence to
communicate something about the pretence itself. This kind of utterance is parasitic
on the existence of nonsense; in an ideal language, it would have no place. But in a
language where nonsense exists, it has real cognitive value.
5.4.5 Objections and replies
This concludes my account of nonsense. Of course, semantic pretence accounts face
no shortage of objections (Richard 2000; 2013; Azzouni 2018; Kroon 2018; Woods
2018). In this section I discuss two of the most serious.
First, as Jody Azzouni has noted, inference ‘is invariably language-wide in scope.
Sentences, nearly enough, from any area of discourse, may be employed to deduce
results.’ This raises the problem of how ‘to understand inferences when they involve
both pretence and non-pretence sentences from which non-pretence conclusions are
drawn’ (2018, 700-701). For present purposes, the worry concerns reasoning that
moves from partly nonsensical premises to non-nonsensical conclusions. Suppose we
go from 10 and 11 to 12:
29This non-uniform treatment of nonsense-attributions entails some non-compositionality. For
example, while ‘It is nonsense to say that a picture is a fact’ involves a game-to-reality shift, ‘It is
not nonsense to say that a picture is a fact’ is more naturally understood as make-believedly true.
In fact, this is what we should expect. Compare an actor on stage who insists: ‘Suzanne and the
thief over there are not just characters in a play!’
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(10) A picture is a fact.
(11) If a picture is a fact, then some facts are hard to understand.
(12) Some facts are hard to understand.
What’s happening here? 10 is wholly nonsense. 11 is (let us suppose) also nonsense
because of its antecedent.30 But 12 is fine. The problem is that the reasoning from
10 and 11 to 12 seems to be either irrelevant or invalid. For if it takes place within a
pretence, it can be, at best, make-believedly valid, establishing only the make-believe
truth of 12, and is thus irrelevant to the genuine truth of 12. And if it takes place
outside of a pretence, it is invalid, vitiated by the meaninglessness of 10 and 11.
There’s no real problem here. We should cheerfully accept the first horn of the
dilemma: the reasoning from 10 and 11 to 12 is valid only within the pretence that
10 expresses a thought. So it is only make-believedly valid, and it shows only the
make-believe truth of 12. None of this undermines the fact (if it is one) that 12
expresses a truth. It only means that 10 and 11 are not a route to knowing that
truth.31
Second, you might worry that participating in a pretence requires the intention
to participate in a pretence (Azzouni 2018, 693-694). But those who are under the
illusion that some item of nonsense makes sense have no such intention. So they
cannot be participating in a pretence.
I don’t think that participating in a pretence requires the intention to participate
in a pretence. Rather, it requires intentions to proceed in accordance with certain
suppositions – suppositions which may not be true, but need not be known to be false.
In the present cases, these are suppositions to the effect that a certain sentence is
meaningful or that a certain mental event is a thought. In some cases (as in 3 above),
anyone engaged in such reasoning would know that the sentences are nonsense. In
other cases (as in the Tractatus), the usual speaker doesn’t believe that the sentences
in question are nonsense. Nor do they positively believe that these rather strange
sentences make sense. Rather, they take for granted that the sentences make sense.
30If nonsense is contagious in this way, we might use Bochvar’s logic B3 (also known as the
Weak Kleene scheme) to represent the interaction of nonsense with sense. Indeed, Bochvar (1937)
interprets the third truth-value as ‘nonsense’ or ‘meaningless’. However, the question of the correct
‘logic of nonsense’ is subtle and beyond the scope of this paper. See Halldén (1949), Åqvist (1962)
and Goddard & Routley (1973, ss. 5.3 and 5.4).
31This leaves intact the cases where nonsense is used in coming to know that it is nonsense – e.g.
the Liar Paradox and Russell on existence. In such cases, the fact that a given item is nonsense is
not known as the conclusion of an argument with nonsensical premises.
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Where the sentence is nonsense, proceeding on such a supposition suffices for entering
a pretence.
It might seem puzzling how an ordinary speaker could intend to follow the rather
technical rules that govern what is correct to say within a pretence. After all,
ordinary speakers need not possess concepts like logical form or make-believedly true.
But this problem isn’t specific to nonsense. It’s an instance of the more general
problem of how speakers are related to the rules that govern what is correct to
say within a language, the rules we codify in a theory of meaning. These rules are
formulated using concepts like truth-condition, which speakers need not possess. The
solution, in my view, is to distinguish between the practical ability a speaker has and
the theoretical representation of that ability (Evans 1981; Fricker 1982; Peacocke
1986; Wright 1986b; Davies 1989). The theoretical representation should specify
the features to which a speaker is sensitive, but it need not do so in terms which a
speaker would recognize. In the case of nonsense, the rules for a pretence specify the
features to which speakers are sensitive when they participate in the pretence, but
they need not do so in terms which speakers would recognize.
5.5 Conclusion. Is there a transparent level of sense?
I’ve argued that an account of nonsense must meet two constraints: the Engagement
Constraint and the Austerity Constraint. While many existing accounts fail to meet
one constraint or the other, I’ve proposed an account which meets both. Of course,
I haven’t shown that there are no other ways of accounting for nonsense. So, while I
claim that pretence is what explains our engagement with nonsense, this claim is
subject to other explanations that might be devised.
I’ll end by setting out a hard question which should be of interest to anyone who
finds the idea of nonsense compelling.
Philosophers have often thought that illusions of sense can be long-lasting and
difficult to overcome: while it may only take a second’s reflection to see through
‘Goodness is hexagonal’, it may take a lifetime to get past deep-rooted logico-
metaphysical confusions (Moore 2003a, 185). This raises the prospect of content
skepticism: skeptical doubt about whether we are really expressing thoughts. Can
we ever be certain that we are having a thought, or may our attempts always turn
out to be nonsense?32
32We should distinguish this from a global skepticism, about whether all of our sentences might
5. Nonsense: a user’s guide 139
We could reject this skepticism if there were a level of thoughts where illusions
of sense are impossible: a level where there’s no distinction between sense and the
appearance of it. Call this a transparent level of sense. Such a level of sense would
be analogous to a level of perceptual content at which it’s impossible to be mistaken:
for example, while you can be mistaken about whether you’re listening to a trumpet,
or looking at a copy of Naming and Necessity, perhaps you can’t be mistaken about
whether you’re hearing a brassy tone, or seeing an orangey-red hue. Of course, it’s
disputed whether there is such a level of perceptual content. And it’s just as unclear
whether there is a transparent level of sense (cf. Millikan 1984, 92).
Many early analytic philosophers thought there was. Frege and the early Wittgen-
stein, for example, thought that a logically perfect language would display its structure
with total lucidity, such that nonsense could never appear to be sense. A statement
like ‘the Good is more identical than the Beautiful’, expressed in such a language,
would be an incoherent jumble of signs (TLP 4.003). Later philosophers, like Austin
and Ryle, may have implicitly supposed that the domain of transparent sense was
the domain of ordinary language. When we go to the store and ask where the
toothbrushes are, or give somebody directions to the library, there is just no prospect
that our utterances will turn out to have been nonsense.
But I’m not sure. Nobody ever managed to find the logically perfect language,
and the line between ordinary and non-ordinary language has proven hard to draw. It
seems clear, though, that the question of a transparent level of sense is closely bound
up with the problem of how meaning can belong both to theory and experience. This
is a problem for future research.
turn out to be nonsense. It might seem possible to hold that we can know whether we are having a
thought, that there is a knowable condition for sense, while allowing that all our attempts might fail
to meet it. This position is, however, fraught. The condition for having a thought would itself be
the content of a thought; but then it isn’t clear how we could know the condition. These problems
of self-undermining are endemic to the philosophical terrain (Kripke 1982, 69-71; Heal 1989, ch. 6).
6 The value of thinking and
the normativity of logic
Note. In Chapters 1 to 4, I argued that logic is constitutive of thinking.
The present chapter is about how to parlay this claim into an account
of the normativity of logic. Like Chapter 5, this one is written as a
standalone paper. (It’s based on my paper of the same title, forthcoming
in Philosophers’ Imprint; as a result, there is some summary of material
from earlier chapters.) It defends a conditional claim, taking the con-
stitutivity of logic as a supposition rather than as a result established
earlier in the dissertation. In fact, the antecedent of the conditional is
weaker than the particular view I’ve established; the main argument of
this chapter would succeed given any member of a class of constitutive
views which I describe in 6.1.
6.1 Introduction
Discussions of how logic relates to thinking tend to take one of two approaches.
Some emphasize that logic is normative for thinking: it tells us how we ought to
think, or what it is to think well. Others emphasize that logic is constitutive of
thinking: it tells us what it is to think at all.1 This paper is about how to bring
these approaches together. In particular, the paper is about how to build an account
of the normativity of logic around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking.
Let me start with some background. First, the term ‘thinking’ is used in various
ways. Sometimes it is used as a catch-all for activity with representational content
– as, for example, by Descartes in the Second Meditation: ‘Well, then, what am
I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms,
denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.’ I am using the term in a
more discriminating sense. ‘Thinking’ is not a term for the genus, representational
activity, but for a particular species of representational activity. I take thinking to be
the representational activity composed of acts of judging and inferring, acts whose
contents are propositions or ‘thoughts’. In a full account of thinking, we might also
want to include acts such as entertaining a thought or reasoning under a supposition,
1For the former approach, see Field (2009). For the latter approach, see Putnam (1992, 247).
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but in this paper I leave these aside to focus on the core cases. I’m also assuming,
for purposes of this paper, that judging is binary rather than allowing for varying
degrees of confidence.2
Second, many discussions of the normativity of logic use ‘logic’ to refer to a
theory of the sort produced by logicians, or to the discipline to which these theories
belong.3 Typically, these theories are about a consequence relation that holds among
sentences of a formal language. This is not what I will mean by ‘logic’. I will mean a
set of inference-rules that apply to thoughts in virtue of the way they are composed.
For example, take Modus Ponens:
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.4
It is a nice question whether the consequence relation generated by the logical rules
applicable to thoughts coincides with any consequence relation studied by logicians,
such as classical or intuitionistic consequence, but since nothing in this paper turns
on this issue, I take no stand on it here. Throughout the paper, I will use rules such
as Modus Ponens as examples, but nothing turns on any particularities of these rules;
if you’re persuaded by counterexamples to Modus Ponens (McGee 1985; Kolodny &
MacFarlane 2010), you can substitute a different example.
There are several further assumptions I’m going to make about logic so that I can
focus on the question this paper is really about. I’m going to assume that we have
a way of demarcating logical from non-logical rules. I’m going to assume, contrary
to the arguments of logical pluralists (Beall and Restall 2005; Shapiro 2014), that
there is a unique set of rules that govern thoughts – what is often referred to as
the ‘One True Logic’. The relation between pluralism and logical normativity is too
complex to address here (Kouri Kissel & Shapiro 2017; Blake-Turner & Russell 2018;
Steinberger 2019b). It’s worth noting, though, that my arguments would also hold
on the weaker view that, while there are multiple correct logics, there is a ‘minimal
kit’ (Hale 2002, 299; Finn 2019b) of rules that hold in any correct logic.
Most importantly, I am going to assume that logic is constitutive of thinking.
When I say that logic is ‘constitutive’ of thinking, I mean that representational
2In 6.2 and 6.5 I flag two places where relaxing the binary assumption might make a difference
to the argument.
3For example, in arguing that logic isn’t normative, Russell (2020) takes the thing that isn’t
normative to be a theory specifying a consequence relation on a language.
4It’s natural to write down logical rules as imperatives, but this notational choice is not meant
to suggest that the rule on its own has normative force. For this point, see Harman (1986, 5) and
for some comments on how my view relates to Harman’s, see 6.5 below. For present purposes, all
we need is a way of specifying the class of transitions that the rule licenses.
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activity must tend to conform to logical rules if it is to count as thinking at all. To
be clear, this doesn’t exclude the possibility that thinking is also constituted by
some non-deductive – or even non-logical – inference-rules. It states a necessary
condition for thinking, not a sufficient one. By way of initial motivation for this
position, observe that there seems to be a limit on just how illogical someone’s
representational activity can be while they still count as thinking. As Jane Heal
(1989, 89) puts it, ‘completely unsuccessful and chaotic thought, thought in which no
shred of truth or rational connectedness is discernible, is an incoherent notion.’ This
limit on illogicality is just the flip-side of the constitutive role of logic.
In fact, there is not just one constitutive position but a family of positions, all of
which hold that some conformity to logic is required for thinking, but which vary
according to the kind and extent of conformity required. The strongest constitutive
view, that thinking requires perfect conformity to logical rules, is held by Kimhi (2018)
and has been attributed to Kant (Putnam 1992; Tolley 2006) and to Wittgenstein
(Conant 1992). A weaker constitutive view, that thinking requires only some degree
of conformity to logical rules, is held by Quine (1960), Davidson (1973; 1985) and
Stich (1990). In this paper, I’m going to work with a view on which a subject’s
representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests a disposition to
conform to logical rules. Call this ‘the dispositional-constitutive position’. Closely
related positions have been attributed to Reid (Rysiew 2002), and defended by
Heal (1994; 1999) and Wedgwood (2017). However, the main line of argument from
sections 6.2 to 6.4 will also apply to the other constitutive views. I should note
that the view of MacFarlane (2002) and Leech (2015) – that it is constitutive of
thinking that it be assessable by logical norms – is not a constitutive view in my
sense: as MacFarlane (2000, 54) makes clear, the view does not require any degree
of conformity to logic.5
5Beyond this definitional point, there are good reasons not to think of the MacFarlane/Leech
view as giving logic a constitutive role. We can see this by asking what makes it the case that some
activity X is assessable by logical norms. Not everything is so assessable, after all: snow-shoveling is
not. There are three possibilities. First, that what makes X assessable by logical norms is that it
conforms to them to some degree. In this case, the MacFarlane/Leech view collapses into a properly
constitutive one, but assessability is no longer what is constitutive of thinking – partial conformity
is. Second, that what makes X assessable by logical norms is some non-logical feature. In this
case, that non-logical feature is what is properly constitutive of thinking; assessability by logic is
derivative. The third possibility is that it is a brute fact that X is assessable by logical norms. In
this case, logic is properly constitutive of thinking, but at the cost of implausibility. Surely there are
many non-normative differences between thinking and snow-shoveling that explain why the former
is logically assessable and the latter is not. I think the second interpretation is likely the right one,
in which case logic has no properly constitutive role on the MacFarlane/Leech view.
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This paper does not aim to defend the dispositional-constitutive position. Rather,
the paper is about whether and how an account of the normativity of logic can
be built around logic’s constitutive role. This is a complex issue. One question is
whether the dispositional-constitutive position is on its own sufficient to account
for logic’s normativity, or, more broadly, whether it plays any part in an account
of logic’s normativity. Another question is whether the dispositional-constitutive
position is even consistent with the normativity of logic.
A ‘no’ to the second question would, of course, entail a ‘no’ to the first. To
start with the second question, then: the reason why you might worry that the
dispositional-constitutive position is inconsistent with logical normativity is as follows.
A standard is normative for the members of a given class only if it is possible for
there to be a member of the class which fails to meet the standard.6 But if logic is
constitutive of thinking, then there can’t be thinking which fails to meet whatever
standards logic sets, so those standards cannot be normative for thinking.
Or, to put the worry another way, if logic is constitutive of thinking, then logic
doesn’t tell us how we ought to think but rather what it is to think. It doesn’t
divide good thinking from bad thinking – it divides thinking from non-thinking. And
the claim that logic divides good thinking from bad thinking (in a broad sense of
‘good’ and bad’) seems to be a mere notational variant of the claim that logic is
normative for thinking. So if logic is constitutive of thinking, then it is not normative
for thinking.
However, this worry rests on misunderstanding the dispositional-constitutive
position. That position, as I’ve stated it, does not entail that any time a subject
violates a logical rule, the subject fails to think.7 What thinking requires is that the
subject tend to conform to logical rules; mistakes are possible as long as the subject
conforms to the requisite degree, where this conformity is explained by an underlying
disposition to conform. So there can be thinking which fails to meet the standards
logic sets. In other words, logic can both divide thinking from non-thinking and
6For detailed discussion see Lavin (2004). Leech has objected (2017, 366-7) that logical normativity
requires neither freedom of choice of how to think nor the possibility of failure to accord with logical
rules: ‘a perfectly rational being would still be right’. I agree that normativity does not require
free choice, but I do not think normativity can exist without some possibility for error. A perfectly
rational being would still be right, but only because there could exist imperfectly rational beings
who could be wrong (Nunez 2018, 1156 n. 10). Still, the strength of ‘possibility’ here is fairly weak:
for a standard to be normative for a given class it need only be conceptually possible for there to be
a member of the class which fails to meet the standard.
7In Lindeman’s terms (2017, 235-6), it is Threshold Constitutivism, not Naïve Constitutivism.
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divide good thinking from bad thinking. The constitutive role of logic is at least
consistent with logical normativity.
This leaves us with the first question: whether the dispositional-constitutive
position is on its own sufficient to account for logic’s normativity, or, more broadly,
whether it plays any part in an account of logic’s normativity. The aim of the paper
is to respond to this question. In other words, the paper is about how to get from
the dispositional-constitutive position to the conclusion that logic is normative.
My answer will be that while the dispositional-constitutive position is not on its
own sufficient to secure the normativity of logic, neither is it irrelevant to logic’s
normativity. Rather, the constitutive role of logic is essential to its normativity. The
main points of the account I will develop can be compactly stated as follows:
1. Logical rules are constitutive of thinking.
2. Thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
In my view, it is because logical rules are constitutive of a good that those rules are
normative.8
The paper goes as follows. In 6.2 I develop a natural line of thought about how to
develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity by drawing on
constitutivism in metaethics. In 6.3 I argue that, while this line of thought provides
some insights, it is importantly incomplete, as it is unable to explain why we should
think. I consider two attempts at rescuing the line of thought. The first, unsuccessful
response is that it is self-defeating to ask why we ought to think. The second response
is that we need to think. But this response secures normativity only if thinking has
some connection to human flourishing. In 6.4, drawing on neo-Aristotelian theories
of value, I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing. Logic is normative
because it is constitutive of this good. In 6.5 I show that the resulting account deals
nicely with problems that vex other accounts of logical normativity.
6.2 Logical self-constitution
In this section I sketch Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist account of the normativity
of practical reason and then develop a parallel account of the normativity of logic.
8The two-part structure of my account is distinctive. Some, like Korsgaard (2009) and Nunez
(2018), take the constitutive claim to be sufficient on its own for logical normativity. Others, like
Wedgwood (2017, 207-8), take the constitutive claim to be (albeit correct) irrelevant to logical
normativity.
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6.2.1 The constitutivist account of practical reason
Korsgaard argues that the principles of practical reason are constitutive of action:
they are built in to what it is to act. This, she argues, is the source of their
normativity.
Take, for example, the principle of instrumental reason: that if you intend some
end then you should intend the necessary means to the end. Korsgaard argues that
this principle is not imposed from outside on agents: rather, it is constitutive of
acting. For what distinguishes an action from a mere event is that an action is the
result of the agent’s intention, or ‘willing an end’. And ‘[t]o will an end just is to will
to cause or realize the end, hence to will to take the means to the end’ (2008, 56).
Acting on the principle of instrumental reason, then, is not one among various ways
of acting; it is what it is to act.
You might worry that this means we can never will an end and fail to will the
means: if we fail to will the means, then we must not have willed the end in the first
place. It would follow that we can never violate the principle of instrumental reason.
But Korsgaard argues that this is a mistake. It fails to appreciate the first-personal
character of the principles of practical reason: they articulate what we commit
ourselves to in acting.9 Thus, ‘willing an end just is committing yourself to realizing
the end’ (2008, 57). As we can fall short of our commitments, we can sometimes
will an end without willing the means. We cannot fall short to an arbitrary degree,
however: at some point we are no longer acting at all.
Korsgaard gives similar arguments for more robust principles of practical reason,
such as the Categorical Imperative. The upshot of these arguments is that the
principles of practical reason are ‘internal’ or ‘constitutive’ standards: ‘standards
that a thing must meet in virtue of what it is’ (2008, 112). As long as what you
are doing is acting, your action is a good action insofar as it meets the internal
standards of action. Performing bad actions, therefore, ‘is not a different activity
from performing good ones. It is the same activity, badly done’ (2008, 113).
Korsgaard suggests that internal standards do not need the same kind of jus-
tification as ‘external’ ones. If being habitable is part of the internal standard for
a house, then if you’re going to build a house, there is no room for the question
9There’s a difficult question about how Korsgaard’s notion of commitment is related to the notion
of a disposition. I don’t want to claim that commitments are merely dispositions in disguise, but
Korsgaard’s view that there is a limit on how far we can fall short of our commitments while still
having them brings the two notions close together. For further discussion of commitments, see
Bilgrami (2012).
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why you ought to build a habitable one. Similarly, if practical reason is the internal
standard for action, then if you’re going to act, there is no room for the question
why you should act in accordance with practical reason.
Of course, the question immediately arises: why should we ‘act’, in this sense?
Why should we ‘will’ an end, in the sense in which that requires willing the means,
rather than just following our desires? Korsgaard’s deepest answer to this question is
that acting is how we constitute ourselves as unified agents. We are confronted with
various sorts of temptations to act in different ways, and this is a sort of disunity. If
I simply follow the temptations, my conduct can be attributed to those temptations,
but not to me as a whole person. By conforming to the requirements of practical
reason, I unify myself in the face of this play of temptations. ‘For to will an end is
not just to cause it, or even to allow an impulse in me to operate as its cause, but,
so to speak, to consciously pick up the reins, and make myself the cause of the end.’
If I never will an end, ‘this means that I, considered as an agent, do not exist’ (2008,
59-60).
6.2.2 The constitutivist account of logical normativity
Korsgaard suggests (2009, 67) that a parallel account can be given of the normativity
of logic. The basic idea must be that logical rules are constitutive of thinking, just
as principles of practical reason are constitutive of acting. In this section I sketch
such an account. It will be helpful to begin with a line of thought that supports the
constitutive position before developing an account of logical normativity.
Let’s start with with the claim that having a thought requires a ‘setting’ (Heal
1994; Stroud 1979). It doesn’t make sense to suppose that someone could think a
single thought as the entirety of their mental life. Nor does it make sense to suppose
that someone could think a thought while being wholly insensitive to its relations to
other thoughts. Having any thought requires grasping some of these connections:
seeing the ways that other thoughts support it, or follow from it, or stand in tension
with it. (It doesn’t follow that, as inferentialists claim, there are ‘canonical’ relations
the acceptance of which is a necessary condition on understanding.)
Now, it is impossible to grasp these connections between thoughts without being
disposed to conform to some logical rules. These rules govern the connections between
thoughts which make understanding possible. Some examples will help to make
this clear, although I should emphasize that the general thesis can survive even if
particular instances turn out to be problematic. First, it seems that it would be
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impossible to grasp that one thought supports another without being disposed to
follow Modus Ponens, which says, in intuitive terms, to believe q if you believe p and
you take it that p supports q (Russell 1912, ch. VII). Or again, it seems that would
be impossible to grasp that two thoughts are in tension without some aversion to
believing contradictions – in other words, without a disposition not to believe p and
not-p. Without some tendency to reason in these ways, it would be meaningless to
take two thoughts to stand in relations of support or tension.
It follows that thinking requires dispositions to conform to some logical rules;
in this sense, logical rules are constitutive of thinking.10 Now, it can’t be the case
that such dispositions preclude ever making a mistaken inference, or mistakenly
rejecting a valid one. Rather, the dispositions will manifest in a tendency to conform
to the rule, except where the disposition is overridden by other factors – for instance,
inattention, tiredness or the complexity of the thoughts under consideration. But
while the dispositions need not manifest in every case, they must exist if the subject
is thinking at all.
In this way, the constitutivist will argue, logical rules are standards that thinking
must meet in virtue of what it is – internal standards for thinking. If you’re going
to think, then there is no room for the further question of why you ought to think
logically.
As before, however, the natural question is why we should think in the first
place. The parallel with willing an end suggests the following response: in thinking,
we constitute ourselves as unified subjects. We are confronted with a variety of
impressions – temptations to take reality to be one way or another. This is a
sort of disunity. If we passively followed these impressions, we might have various
representations, but we would not be subjects – the loci of points of view on reality.11
To be subjects, we have to actively commit ourselves to reality’s being one way or
another; we have to ‘make up our minds’ (Valaris 2017).12
10The existence of such dispositions might seem doubtful, given evidence that people tend to
reason incorrectly in some situations (Wason 1968). In response, I would make two points. First,
while the existence of these dispositions is an empirical question, the way this evidence bears on
them is not straightforward. For example, in the Wason selection task it is unclear whether test
subjects are engaged in conditional reasoning at all (Sperber, Cara & Girotto 1995, s. 2). Second,
the dispositions posited by the constitutivist are general, and can fail to manifest in particular cases,
as long as there is an explanation for the failure.
11Compare Lewis’s (1982) suggestion that we tolerate inconsistencies by fragmenting our total
body of beliefs.
12I do not mean to suggest that perfect unity is possible for beings like us. One reason for this
comes from cases like the Preface Paradox (Christensen 2004), where you believe p, q, r . . . and
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Let’s call this the ‘constitutivist account of logical normativity’.
6.3 A problem for constitutivism and two unsuccessful
responses
The constitutivist account of logical normativity faces an immediate problem: it
does not tell us why we ought to think. In this section I develop the problem and
then consider two unsuccessful responses to it. The first response is a dialectical one,
suggesting that the problem undermines itself, and the second response appeals to
an innate need to think. I argue that both attempts are unsuccessful, but the second
one points the way to a better approach.
6.3.1 The absence of value problem
We can see the problem by considering an objection made by David Enoch against
constitutivist accounts of practical reason. In the words of Enoch’s skeptic:
Perhaps I cannot be classified as an agent without aiming to constitute
myself. But why should I be an agent? Perhaps I can’t act without
aiming at self-constitution, but why should I act? If your reasoning works,
this just shows that I don’t care about agency and action. I am perfectly
happy being a shmagent – a nonagent who is very similar to agents but
who lacks the aim (constitutive of agency but not of shmagency) of self-
constitution. I am perfectly happy performing shmactions – nonaction
events that are very similar to actions but that lack the aim (constitutive
of actions but not of shmactions) of self-constitution. (2006, 179)
This is what we might call, following Shamik Dasgupta (2018), an ‘absence of value’
problem. It may be that a certain concept – being unified, being an agent – will
not apply to you unless you meet certain standards. But this fact is, for all that
has been said so far, ‘normatively inert’ (Dasgupta 2018, 310). Why does it matter
whether you are an agent?
Precisely the same problem will apply to the constitutivist account of logical
normativity. Suppose it is true that your representational activity will not merit the
also that, since you are fallible, at least one of your beliefs p, q, r . . . is false: an inconsistent set of
beliefs. The unavoidability of such cases for a rational and fallible subject (Harman 1984, 109; 1986,
16) might make them less bad, but they remain a source of disunity. Of course, the Preface Paradox
doesn’t arise in a picture that uses degrees of belief only, but even in a degree picture there is little
reason to think that any of us could achieve a totally coherent body of beliefs.
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title of ‘thinking’ unless it tends to conform to logical rules. Why does it matter
whether your activity merits this title? Perhaps if you fail to think, you fail to be a
subject – but why does it matter to be a subject?
While Enoch puts the problem in the mouth of a skeptic, there is nothing
particularly skeptical about it. The problem is better seen as a failure to explain
where the normativity comes in. It may be that someone who does not think is not a
subject at all, but this is consistent with there being nothing normatively significant
about being a subject. More needs to be said in order to explain why failing to be a
subject is a normatively significant failure.
We can see what is missing if we look at the problem from a different angle.
Enoch rather dismissively refers to the failure to meet an internal standard as a
failure to be ‘classified’ in a certain way.13 The point of his rhetoric is, I think, this:
for any concept K which has an internal standard of the sort we have been discussing,
there is, of course, another concept J with a different internal standard, such that
something which fails to be a K may still be a J; indeed, there will even be a concept
K*, such that something falls under K* if and only if it fails to meet the internal
standard for K. For example, you count as ‘nonthinking’ if and only if you fall below
the threshold for thinking. So, for the constitutivist to show that some standard
is normative, it is not enough to identify some concept to which that standard is
internal. The constitutivist has to show that this concept is distinguished; they have
to give a reason why it matters to be thinking rather than nonthinking.
It seems to me, however, that, when we look at the problem this way, things are
not as hopeless for the constitutivist as Enoch supposes. Is there really nothing we
can say about why it matters to be thinking rather than nonthinking?
6.3.2 The dialectical response
Here is a first response to the problem. Someone who raises the objection discussed
in the previous section is asking why they ought to think. In asking this question,
however, the objector is inviting the constitutivist to give an argument in response.
And in inviting argument, the objector is already committed to the practice of
accepting claims on the basis of argument – i.e. to inference. So the objector is
already committed to thinking rather than nonthinking.14
Why does the objector have to be committed in this way? Well, if they are not
13Cf. Railton’s worry (1997, 309) that constitutive arguments are ‘merely linguistic’.
14For a similar argument in the context of agency, see Silverstein (2015).
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so committed, then it is wrong to describe them as making an ‘objection’, because
this presupposes a commitment to thinking rather than nonthinking. And if they
have not made an objection, then the constitutivist has nothing to worry about. Call
this the ‘dialectical response’.
I don’t think we should be satisfied with this response. It depends on framing
the absence of value problem as an objection pressed by an objector. This is what
opens the door to arguing that the objector’s position is self-undermining. But we
are not obliged to frame the problem in this way.
The constitutivist account was supposed to explain why logic is normative. In
terms introduced by Dummett (1974), this is an ‘explanatory’ project rather than a
‘suasive’ one: the aim is not to persuade someone who denies that logic is normative
that it is, but rather to explain to someone who accepts that logic is normative why
it is.15 The absence of value problem suggests that the constitutivist has not fulfilled
this explanatory task until they have shown why the concept of which logical rules
are constitutive – the concept of thinking – is normatively significant. The problem,
then, need not be framed as an objection pressed by an objector: we can see it more
simply as a gap in the constitutivist’s own account.
6.3.3 The need to think
The second response to the absence of value problem is to argue that we simply
have to engage in the activity of which the relevant rules are constitutive. Some of
Korsgaard’s remarks suggest this approach (2009, 32): ‘the laws of practical reason
govern our actions because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting
is something that we must do.’ Similarly, the response to the question ‘why should I
think?’ may be that you have to.
This claim can be understood in a couple of different ways. One reading would
be that it is simply impossible not to think (i.e. there is no possible world where
you are not thinking). But this is not the reading we should adopt. First, it seems
straightforwardly false, since there are times when we are not thinking – for example,
in deep sleep. Second, it is inconsistent with the claim that sometimes we fail to
think in virtue of falling too far from the constitutive rules of thinking.
On a different reading, the idea is that the aim of thinking is inescapable. While
we we don’t always succeed in thinking, we are always driven to do so. This reading
15Note that some moral constitutivists take their project to be a suasive one, with the aim of
refuting a moral skeptic. I am assuming that this is the wrong approach when it comes to logic.
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seems more promising. To fill it out further, I’m going to appropriate some work by
Imogen Dickie on the mind’s ‘need to represent things outside itself’.16
Dickie characterizes a ‘need’ as a ‘personal-level goal-representing state’ (2015,
280) which, ‘like an intention, can guide action, but which, unlike an intention, does
not have propositional content’ (100). To be a goal-representing state is, roughly,
to represent some target and to guide us towards that target. Needs thus stand
to intentions as perceptions (on non-conceptualist views) stand to beliefs.17 Dickie
proposes, then, that the mind has a need to represent things outside itself. The
target of the need is representing; the need guides us towards that target, motivating
us to represent when we are not already doing so.
We can appropriate this account to respond to the absence of value problem on
behalf of the constitutivist about logical normativity. The answer to the question
why we should think is that we need to. What distinguishes the concept of thinking
from the concept of nonthinking is that only the concept of thinking picks out the
target of our need. As Dickie argues, if you have a need for x, and the need motivates
you to take certain steps to attain x, and those steps reliably lead to attaining x, then
those steps are ‘strongly justified’. For example, if your need to eat leads you to take
steps which reliably lead to eating, those steps are strongly (albeit not absolutely)
justified. So, having proposed that we have a need to think, the constitutivist can
argue that, since following logical rules is not only a reliable means to thinking but
constitutive of it, following those rules is strongly justified. That following logical
rules has some positive justificatory status, which not following those rules lacks,
seems like enough to address the absence of value problem.
I agree that needs can play this justificatory role. But Dickie’s characterization of
what it is to be a need is incomplete. Dickie characterizes a need as a non-conceptual
motivational state, but that is not a sufficient condition: a need also has to be a
state whose fulfillment is good for the subject who has the need. We can put this
point more carefully by drawing on Wiggins’ analysis of needs. For Wiggins, I have
a need for x (if and) only if ‘it is necessary, things being as they actually are, that
if I avoid being harmed then I have x’ (1997, 10). Being ‘harmed’ means falling
below ‘some however minimal level of flourishing that is actually attainable’ (13,
italics omitted). We have a need to eat not only because we have a non-conceptual
16I say ‘appropriate’ because Dickie’s account involves a very different set of issues and commit-
ments to those discussed here.
17So we can have a need for x without having the concept of x. For this idea of non-conceptual
content, see Peacocke (1992, ch. 3).
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motivation to eat, but because there is some minimal level of flourishing we cannot
attain if we do not eat.
To fix ideas, let us say that a non-conceptual motivational state is a ‘drive’.
Where a drive’s fulfillment is necessary for some minimal level of flourishing, the
drive is a ‘need’; otherwise, it is a ‘mere drive’. Now, the relation between needs
(in the proper sense) and flourishing is essential to the justificatory role that needs
can play.18 Mere drives do no justificatory work. Consider, for example, someone
who has a drive to do nothing but chop onions all day long. This state may reliably
generate its own fulfillment, but all that chopping is not thereby justified. The reason
is that the chopping is not necessary for the flourishing of the person with the drive.
So suppose that the constitutivist proposes that we have a non-conceptual
motivational state whose target is thinking. The constitutivist must then clarify
whether this state is a need or a mere drive. If it is a mere drive, then it cannot
solve the absence of value problem. The fact that we are driven to think is just like
the fact that someone is driven to chop onions all day: it is normatively inert.
It seems, then, that the constitutivist should claim that thinking is a need: that
it is necessary for some level of human flourishing. In fact, I think this is the right
way to go, and I will develop this suggestion in the next section. But it’s worth
noting that if thinking is a good for us, then this is why the constitutive rules of
thinking are normative. The feature of needs which does the justificatory work is not
that they have motivational force but that their fulfillment is good for the subject
who has them.
6.4 The value of thinking
Let’s take stock. We were attempting to build an account of the normativity of logic
around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. The initial proposal was that
logical rules are internal standards for thinking, and that thinking is how we unify
ourselves as subjects. The problem was there are many different concepts with their
own internal standards, such that it was unclear why it mattered if we fell short
of the standards for the concept of thinking in particular: why should we think?
The first response was that it is incoherent to ask why we should think, because
18To be clear, I think that the ‘need to represent’ is a need in the proper sense. But the consideration
Dickie cites in support of the need’s existence – its ability to explain our representational behaviour
(2015, 127) – show only that it is a drive. Showing that it is a need would require more normative
considerations.
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asking why already shows a commitment to thinking. The second response was that
we need to think. I argued that the first response failed, while the second response
could succeed only if thinking were necessary for human flourishing – more broadly,
only if thinking had some value.
In this section, after briefly considering a range of claims we might make about
the value of thinking, I’ll argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing.19
Before I start, however, let me comment on the shape of the account and how it
relates to constitutivism about normativity. One attraction of constitutivism is the
prospect of grounding normativity in the thinner notion of satisfying the internal
standard of a concept. Relatedly, constitutivism offers the prospect of an account of
normativity which a skeptic can only reject at the cost of literal inconsistency. By
supplementing the constitutivist account with a claim about the value of thinking, we
abandon both of these prospects. Why, then, should a constitutivist be interested?
At least in the logical case, I don’t think these prospects are what is most com-
pelling about constitutivism. What I’m after is an explanation of logical normativity,
and what I find compelling in constitutivism is the idea that logic tells us what it is
to think: that if we don’t even tend to conform to logical rules, we are not thinking
at all. This, it seems to me, is an idea we have independent reason to accept. The
interest of the account I will develop is that it makes this idea central to (though
not exhaustive of) an explanation of logical normativity.
6.4.1 Possible views of the value of thinking
Once we are willing to supplement the constitutivist account with a claim about the
value of thinking, a range of options opens up. Different claims about the value of
thinking lead to different views of the normativity of logic. In this section I briefly
survey the options, from the most minimal to the more robust, before discussing my
preferred option.
1. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to some particular end, which
some people have and others do not. On this view, logic would be normative,
but only for those who shared this end, and only instrumentally.
2. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to some particular end which
everyone has. On this view, logic would be normative for everyone, but only
19For a different attempt to bring together constitutivism with neo-Aristotelianism, see Hacker-
Wright (2012). See also Thompson (ms.) and Lott (2014).
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instrumentally. This gives logic its universality, but – as Hilary Kornblith has
noted – such a strategy incurs a ‘substantial burden of proof’:
any attempt to gain universal applicability by appeal to goals that
all humans in fact have will almost certainly run afoul of the facts.
Human beings are a very diverse lot; some of us are quite strange.
It is hard to imagine making a plausible case for any particular goal
or activity which is genuinely universally valued. (Kornblith 1993,
367; cf. Foot 2001, 44).
3. Thinking is instrumentally valuable as a means to every end, so that if you
have any ends at all, you need to think. This is because thinking is necessary
for deciding how best to pursue your ends. Kornblith suggests a similar view of
epistemic norms, noting that on such a view, ‘they are derived from our desires
in a way which removes any mystery surrounding them’, but are ‘universal
in their applicability and not merely contingent upon having certain values’
(1993, 372).
4. Thinking is valuable for its own sake.20 However, this is consistent with the
possibility of human flourishing without thinking: in other words, thinking
may be valuable for its own sake but not be something we need to do.
5. Thinking is valuable for its own sake because it is necessary for human flour-
ishing. In other words, thinking is something we need to do.21
Option 1 is implausibly weak: it gives logical rules the same normative force as the
rules of chess. Options 2, 3 and 4 are less weak, and I think they are live possibilities.
However, I am going to develop Option 5. It seems plausible to me that thinking
is as strongly related to human flourishing as this claim says; moreover, I don’t
think there is any special reason to prefer theoretical austerity from the outset. But
I should stress that what comes next is one way of developing the constitutivist
position, not the only way.
Let me briefly comment on the way that Option 5 explains the normativity of
logic. If we accept Option 5 together with the dispositional-constitutive position, we
have the following two claims:
20As several philosophers have argued, this is not the same as ‘intrinsic’ value: something can be
valuable for its own sake in virtue of its intrinsic properties, or in virtue of its relational properties
(Korsgaard 1983; Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2000).
21Compare Moore (2003b, 128) and Schechter & Enoch (2006, 707).
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1. Logical rules are constitutive of thinking.
2. Thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
In order to arrive at the conclusion that logic is normative, we need the following
principle: if X is constitutive of Y, and Y is necessary for human flourishing, then X
is normative.
By way of brief motivation for this principle, consider G.E.M. Anscombe’s
accounts of the authority of the law (1978) and the morality of promising (1969),
both of which use a strategy parallel to the one I propose for logic. In both cases,
there is something constituted by a rule: the existence of a legal order is constituted
by the rule ‘obey the law’; the institution of promising is constituted by the rule
‘keep your promises’. And in both cases, the thing in question is necessary for human
flourishing: the existence of a legal order ensures some degree of security from
arbitrary violence; the institution of promising underwrites human cooperation. As
Anscombe puts it, these things have the kind of necessity Aristotle defined as ‘that
without which some good will not be obtained’.22 This, Anscombe suggests, is why
the rules in question are normative.
The principle that if X is constitutive of Y, and Y is necessary for human
flourishing, then X is normative simply makes explicit Anscombe’s explanatory
strategy. If that strategy is a plausible one, then so is the principle.
6.4.2 Thinking and human flourishing
In this section I argue that thinking is necessary for human flourishing (Option
5 of the previous section). I don’t have a proof of this claim, but will offer four
considerations which support it. Following this, I address the absence of value
problem.
First, as I noted above, Dickie argues (2015, 127) that the need to represent
explains why we form beliefs in some situations but not others:
If you have plenty to think about, you are not hungry for food for
thought, and are less likely to take up the opportunity to think about
a thing that an attentional perceptual link provides. If you are hungry
for food for thought, you will seize upon the opportunity provided by an
attentional perceptual feed, sustaining the attentional link, and forming
and maintaining a body of 〈That is Φ〉 beliefs even if the object you are
22Aristotle, Metaphysics V 1015a20. The same definition underlies Wiggins’ account of needs,
discussed above.
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attending to is an unexciting specimen with which you would not bother
in a situation where the need was being fulfilled in other ways.
I suggested that these considerations only support the existence of a drive – not a
need in the proper sense. But now it is worth noting that the drive to think does
not seem pathological in the way that a drive to chop onions all day does. So there
is at least prima facie reason to take this to be a need in the proper sense.
Second, for most other human activities, it seems possible to imagine a scenario
in which someone has a flourishing life without the activity. For example, eating is
typical of human beings, but we can imagine someone who goes on a fast, perhaps
even to their death, for some worthwhile end. And while prior eating might be
a necessary condition for fasting, eating plays no role in justifying the fast. But
thinking is different. The only way I can imagine someone having a flourishing life
without thinking would be if they had intentionally renounced it – perhaps as a
religious act.23 And this just means that the person’s nonthinking is only justified if
it is itself the result of – that is, justified by – thinking. So some thinking remains
necessary.
It’s worth emphasizing, too, just how deeply a life without thinking would differ
from our own. As suggested in Option 3 in the previous section, thinking is necessary
for deciding how best to pursue your ends. So it’s not clear that someone who had
renounced thinking could exercise agency. And it seems doubtful that we should
count as flourishing a life that involved no exercise of agency.
Third, we might consider the capacities that are typical of human beings. One
capacity that does seem typical is the capacity for rational activity. As Philippa
Foot writes (2001, 56),
there is this great difference between human beings and even the most
intelligent of animals. Human beings not only have the power to reason
about all sorts of things in a speculative way, but also the power to see
grounds for acting in one way rather than another; and if told that they
should do one thing rather than another, they can ask why they should.
A more traditional way to put this point is to say that human beings are rational
animals, or thinking animals. Now, in the classical neo-Aristotelian framework, a
23A referee suggests that someone might renounce thinking as the result of a non-conceptual
experience, such as an epiphany or revelation. If this were possible, it would weaken the force of the
present consideration, perhaps motivating a retreat to a weaker claim (Option 1, 2, 3 or 4). But I
think the possibility is somewhat tenuous: it might be more fitting to say, in such a case, that the
person is not flourishing.
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member of a given life-form cannot flourish without doing the things that are typical
for members of that life-form (Foot 2001, ch. 2).24 So if thinking is typical for the
human life-form, then thinking is necessary for human flourishing.
Similar ideas are implicit in some constitutivist writing. Tyke Nunez (2018),
for example, argues that logic is normative because logical rules specify the proper
exercise of our capacities: ‘every exercise of the faculty ought to accord with its laws’
(2018, 1162). On its own, Nunez’ claim is not enough to secure normativity, as we
can ask why we ought to exercise our capacities properly rather than improperly.
Nunez’ claim needs to be supplemented with the claim that the capacity to think
is characteristic of human beings, such that the proper exercise of this capacity is
necessary for human flourishing.
Fourth, recall what I referred to as Korsgaard’s ‘deepest answer’ to the question
of why we should act: that acting is how we constitute ourselves as unified agents.
Along similar lines, I suggested that thinking is how we constitute ourselves as unified
subjects. On their own, I argued, these ideas fail to secure normativity. But now we
can see these ideas in a different, more Aristotelian light. We are living things of a
particular sort – human beings. As living things, we are organized in a teleological
way: we need to maintain our unity in the face of a tendency to disunity (Tenenbaum
2011; Moosavi 2019). As a general rule, then, a necessary condition for a living thing
to flourish is that it maintain its unity.
But different sorts of living things are unified in different ways. Every animal
is unified by maintaining the distinctness of its body from its surroundings. But
as human beings, we are unified in a further, particularly self-conscious way – as
agents and, more importantly for present purposes, as subjects. Given that thinking
is how human beings constitute ourselves as unified subjects, and that such unity is a
necessary condition for a living thing to flourish, it follows that thinking is necessary
for human flourishing.
Finally, let me tie this back to the absence of value problem. One way of looking
at that problem is that, even if there is a concept K to which some standard is
internal, it’s not clear why it matters to be a K rather than something else. In
other words, the constitutivist has to show that the concept they care about is
24We might worry about the consequences of this Aristotelian claim for human beings who are, in
various ways, unable to do what is ‘typical for the life-form’. In my view, the right response to this
worry is to place less emphasis on the human essence and more emphasis on the idea that flourishing
consists in the full exercise of the capacities which one actually has. (Compare Wiggins’ emphasis
on the degree of flourishing that is ‘actually attainable’.)
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distinguished in some normatively significant way. We’re now in a position to address
this problem. What distinguishes thinking from nonthinking is the role that thinking
plays in the life of human beings. It is simply part of being a human being that
thinking is necessary for your flourishing.
Of course, you might ask: why does it matter to be a human being, rather than a
human being*, where the latter is like a human being, but without a need to think?
Perhaps a human being* has a need to engage in some different representational
activity, thinking*, which is somewhat like thinking, but not constituted by logical
rules. Moreover, perhaps thinking* is better than thinking, so that we might be
better off trying to be human beings* rather than human beings.
We should go slowly here. First, it’s not clear what it would mean for thinking*
to be better than thinking. Better how? To make sense of this claim, we would need
some idea of a standard, applicable to both thinking and thinking*, which thinking*
comes closer to meeting than thinking. And it is at least difficult to see what that
standard would be.25 (Consider the parallel question of whether thinking is better
than perceiving.)
Second, it’s not clear how to understand the idea that we might be better off
trying to be human beings* rather than human beings. In particular, it’s hard to
distinguish this from the question whether it would be better if human beings were
replaced by human beings*.26 For it’s not clear in what sense the resultant beings
would be us.
The right response to the absence of value problem, then, is that there are limits
on our ability to live by alternative concepts: it is not the case that for any concept
K, we can invent a concept K* which is an intelligible alternative for beings like us.
There are some concepts – we might think of them as ‘bedrock concepts’ (Chalmers
2011b, s. 8) – for which we have no alternatives. I have suggested that the concept
of thinking and the concept of a human being are bedrock in this sense. We are
human beings, with a need to think: these facts are not up to us.
For these reasons, we should accept that thinking is necessary for human flour-
ishing. Supposing that logic is constitutive of thinking, it follows that logic is
normative.
25Indeed, it is unclear what thinking* is supposed to be. For thinking is not just a name for
representational activity which meets certain constraints: it is representational activity whose
contents are thoughts. So we can ask what kind of content thinking* is supposed to have, if not
thoughts.
26For discussion of this question, see Williams (2006) and Moore (2018, ch. 17).
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6.5 Vexing issues about logical normativity
That concludes the main part of my case for the proposed account of logical norma-
tivity. In this section, I argue that this account deals nicely with some vexing issues
that arise in the literature on logical normativity. This will help to clarify the kind
of normativity that logic has in my account and the role of this normativity in an
explanation of how logic relates to thinking.
The issues I have in mind are about various implausible consequences that follow
from certain formulations of the claim that logical rules are normative. For example,
consider the Simple Formulation:
Simple Formulation If p entails q, then if you believe p, you ought to believe q.27
This has a welter of implausible consequences: first, it seems to entail that if you
believe p, you ought to believe if p, then p, and then you ought to believe if p, then,
if p, then p and so on. This seems a waste of cognitive resources (Harman 1986,
12).28 Second, it seems to entail that if you believe p and if p, then q, then you ought
to believe q – even if q is false (Harman 1984; MacFarlane 2004).29 And surely we
ought not to believe things that are false. Third, given that p entails p, and there
is nothing in the Simple Formulation to exclude the case where q = p, it seems to
entail that if you believe p, you ought to believe p. This seems like an objectionable
kind of bootstrapping: believing something doesn’t on its own give you a reason to
believe it (Broome 1999).
Now, the claim that logical rules are normative need not be committed to the
Simple Formulation. But the underlying concern is that any formulation of the
claim that logical rules are normative will entail similar consequences, or else be
too weak to be interesting. Defenders of the normativity of logic have tended to
respond by developing ‘bridge principles’, weakenings of the Simple Formulation that
27A fully general formulation of this thesis would have to make provision for multiple-premise
entailments. However, this detail doesn’t matter for our purposes, as the problems arise even in
the single-premise case. Also, if we conceived of believing in terms of degrees of confidence, we
would need to reformulate the thesis to impose a constraint on the degrees of belief in p and q: for
discussion, see Field (2009) and Milne (2009).
28In fact, depending on what a belief is, the ‘cluttering’ beliefs might not count as additional
beliefs. (For example, they don’t narrow the set of possible worlds in which the subject’s beliefs
are true.) But for purposes of argument I will waive this point. Harman (1986, 14) responds to a
related point by specifying that the objection applies to explicit rather than implicit beliefs.
29Parallel arguments are often given against the claim that meaning is normative: see Hattiangadi
(2006) and Glüer & Wikforss (2009).
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avoid the implausible consequences. Here, I begin with some general comments on
how these issues appear in my account. Next, I respond to each of the implausible
consequences mentioned above. Finally, I compare my treatment of these issues with
recent accounts centred on bridge principles, showing that, in my account, while a
bridge principle holds, it is not fundamental in explaining the relation of logic to
thinking.
6.5.1 Three questions about logical rules
To begin the response, we need to distinguish three questions about logical rules
and their corresponding answers. The first question is: what are the logical rules
constitutive of thinking? For present purposes, I will take Conditional Proof and
Modus Ponens to be logical rules constitutive of thinking. I formulate them as
follows:
Conditional Proof If by assuming p you can deduce q, infer if p, then q.
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, infer q.
All rules define a standard of correctness, specifying some acts as correct in light of
the rule (Broome 2014, 24). It would be equivalent, then, to formulate the rules as
follows:
Conditional Proof If by assuming p you can deduce q, it is correct to infer if p,
then q.
Modus Ponens From p and if p, then q, it is correct to infer q.
As I mentioned earlier in the paper, the choice of how to present logical rules is a
notational one; it doesn’t yet answer any philosophical question about the normative
force of the rules.
The second question is: what relation must a subject have to the rule in order to
think? So far, I’ve said simply that a subject must have a disposition to conform to
the rule, a disposition which is manifested in a subject’s tendency to conform to the
rule. But now I need to say a bit more about what this amounts to. Claims about
dispositions play an explanatory role: when X has a disposition to do Y, and then X
does Y, we can explain why X did Y by appeal to its disposition. But where the
bearer of the disposition is a subject, we also have to say what it is first-personally
for the subject to have, and to exercise, the disposition.
6. The value of thinking and the normativity of logic 161
Borrowing from Peacocke (1987), I am going to say that when a subject has a
disposition to conform to some logical rule, the subject finds the transitions that the
rule specifies as correct ‘primitively compelling’.30 That is, they are compelling, and
the subject need not have any further idea of why they are compelling. To be clear,
this means that the subject is tempted by particular inferences which evidently fall
under the rule. It does not mean that the subject is tempted to accept a general
representation of the rule.31 The subject can act on the resulting compulsion by
making the transition, but there is no guarantee that they will do so: the question
may never arise, or the compulsion may be overridden by competing factors. These
factors might include inattention, tiredness, the complexity of the thoughts involved
(making it unobvious that the transition falls under the rule) or other reasons not to
make the transition.32 Unless the subject finds the transitions compelling, however,
they are not thinking.
The third question is: why ought we to think? And here my claim is that thinking
is necessary for human flourishing. By contrast, there are other rules such that we
must have a similar relation to them in order to do a certain activity, but there is
no general reason why we ought to do that activity. For example, we must have a
similar relation to the rules of chess in order to count as playing chess, but there is
no general reason why we ought to play chess.
Now, I think that full answers to these three questions would be an exhaustive
account of the sense in which Conditional Proof and Modus Ponens are normative.
But at no point in answering these questions are we committed to the Simple
Formulation. The Simple Formulation is neither an answer to the first question
(what the logical rules are), nor to the second question (how a subject must relate to
logical rules in order to think), nor to the third (why the subject ought to think).
Nor does it follow from the answers to these questions taken jointly.
6.5.2 The implausible consequences of the Simple Formulation
Let me now consider the implausible consequences that follow from the Simple
Formulation. The first was that if you believe p, you ought to believe if p, then p
and so on. The second was that if you believe p and if p, then q, then you ought to
30Harman discusses a related notion of ‘psychological immediacy’ in Appendix A of his (1986).
31Most people would find it hard to resist the following reasoning: Either I left my keys at home or
in the car. They’re not in the car. So they must be at home. But they need not find a representation
of Disjunction Elimination intuitive.
32There is a helpful discussion of the various possibilities here in Moore (2003b, 48-49).
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believe q – even if q is false. The third was that if you believe p, you ought to believe
p. Let me start with the first two cases, as the third raises some additional issues.
Here is what I want to say about the inferences in the first two cases. First,
both inferences are correct in light of logical rules which we are supposing to be
constitutive of thinking: the first in light of Conditional Proof, the second in light of
Modus Ponens.
Second, this means that anyone who thinks has a disposition to conform to these
rules. As I suggested above, this means that anyone who thinks finds the transitions
that the rules specify as correct primitively compelling. But it does not follow that
anyone who thinks must draw these inferences: the question may never arise, or the
compulsion may be overridden by competing factors. In the case of the move from
p to if p, then p, it seems plausible that the question will never arise. In the case
of the move from p and if p, then q to q, where q is false, the fact that q is false
is a competing factor that can, and should, override the compulsion to draw the
inference.33
Third, however, if the subject does not have the disposition to conform to these
rules – i.e. if the question does arise, and there are no competing considerations,
but the subject does not find the transitions compelling – then the subject is not
thinking.
Consider a parallel case. Suppose that you believe x is an F G (for example,
‘This is a tall tree’). This entails – not logically, but bracket this for now – x is a G
(‘This is a tree’). By analogy with the Simple Formulation, it might be proposed
that if you believe x is an F G, you ought to believe x is a G. The same problems
will arise: first, that this is a waste of cognitive resources, and second, what if x is a
G is false?
Here is what I would say instead. First, the inference from x is an F G to x is a
G is correct in light of the rule for thoughts of this structure.34 Second, anyone who
33An alternative solution to this problem is to weaken our characterization of the dispositions
required for grasping logical rules. Rather than dispositions to infer a conclusion on the basis of
judging the premises, Murzi & Steinberger (2013) propose dispositions to consider a conclusion on
the basis of entertaining or supposing the premises. I am sympathetic to this solution, but accepting
it would require discussion of the role of entertaining and suppositional reasoning in thinking, which
I have no room to do here.
34For discussion of such ‘structurally valid’ inferences, see Evans (1976) and Balcerak Jackson
(2007). To give a full account of these inferences we would need to distinguish bad cases like ‘x is a
rubber duck, so x is a duck’. I’m going to assume that there is some way of distinguishing these cases,
as it seems plausible that in good cases the inference in question is closely tied to understanding
(Balcerak Jackson 2009).
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understands x is an F G must have a disposition to conform to this rule; they must
find the transition to x is a G primitively compelling. However, this does not mean
they must draw this inference: the question may never arise, or the compulsion may
be overridden. But, third, if they do not have this disposition at all, then they simply
do not understand x is an F G. The fact that x is a G is false is a good reason to
override the disposition, but it is not a good reason for denying the existence of the
disposition altogether. (The parallel is only partial because the rule in question is
not a logical one: you can fail to understand the relevant structure in x is an F G
while still thinking. In general, this is the difference between the normativity of logic
and the normativity, if there is any, of non-logical elements of content.)
Finally, the third implausible consequence of the Simple Formulation was that if
you believe p, you ought to believe p. This raises somewhat different issues from the
previous two cases because it doesn’t depend on the rules for any logical connective.
Rather, it depends only on Reflexivity, which is a structural rule – that is, an
inference rule that is not about any logical connective.
Reflexivity From p, infer p.
This rule guarantees that p entails p, and then the Simple Formulation tells us that
if you believe p, you ought to believe p.
In the discussion so far, I’ve implicitly taken ‘logical rules’ to refer only to
operational rules – rules for logical connectives – and haven’t said anything about
the role of structural rules, or how thinkers must relate to such rules. Structural
rules may raise different issues. While it seems plausible that we have dispositions to
infer in accordance with Conditional Proof and Modus Ponens, it’s less clear what
it would mean to have a disposition to infer in accordance with, say, Transitivity.
On the other hand, it’s hard to draw a clear distinction between operational and
structural rules, as operational rules can be seen as reflecting structural rules (Došen
1989), and operational rules can be seen as containing information about structural
rules (Dicher 2016). These facts favour a uniform treatment of operational and
structural rules.
Without taking a conclusive position on how other structural rules should be
treated, it does seem plausible to me that any thinker has to have a disposition to
conform to Reflexivity. If you judge p but do not find it primitively compelling to
judge p, then there is reason to doubt that you are judging at all. The unintelligibility
of judging p and refusing to judge p is even stronger than the unintelligibility of
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judging x is an F G and refusing to judge x is a G. So I think we should take
Reflexivity to be constitutive of thinking, and this means that we need a response to
the bootstrapping problem raised above.
At this point my response is fairly similar to my response to the first two problems.
First, the inference from p to p is correct in light of Reflexivity. Second, anyone
who understands p must find this transition (really a degenerate case of ‘transition’)
primitively compelling. Third, if someone does not find this transition primitively
compelling, they are not thinking. None of this means that if you believe something,
you ought to believe it.
6.5.3 Bridge principles
In this section I compare my approach to logical normativity with recent approaches
centred on developing ‘bridge principles’.
A general strategy common to recent approaches to logical normativity is to
argue that the normativity of logic consists in the holding of a ‘bridge principle’,
which is a weakened version of the Simple Formulation above, of the following form:35
Bridge Principle If p entails q, [normative statement about attitudes to p and q].
Bridge principles are developed so as to avoid the implausible consequences of the
Simple Formulation. For example, a principle which avoids all three problems might
be:
If p entails q, you ought not to believe p while disbelieving q, unless q is false.
As this principle does not enjoin you to believe anything, it does not enjoin cluttering
your mind with useless consequences, nor believing the things you happen to already
believe. Nor does the rule prohibit disbelieving a consequence of your beliefs if the
consequence is false.
I’d like to make three remarks by way of comparing my account to the bridge
principle strategy. This comparison will shed light on my own account, provide
additional motivation for a particular class of bridge principles, and also raise a
question about the larger explanatory role of bridge principles. First, I will show that
35This literature begins with MacFarlane (2004); for more discussion see Field (2009), Broome
(2013) and Steinberger (2019a). A fully general bridge principle would, of course, allow for multiple
premises. It is also possible that more than one bridge principle is required, in order to capture
different varieties of logical normativity (Steinberger 2019c), but I will ignore this detail here.
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it is possible to generate a bridge principle from my account. Second, however, the
bridge principle is open-ended, rather than attempting to specify when we should,
or should not, draw a valid inference, and I will offer some principled reasons to
think this is the right approach. Third, I will contrast the explanatory role of bridge
principles on my account from the role they have in many discussions: it is often
suggested that bridge principles bridge a gap between logic and thinking, but on my
account this is not so.
First, then, it is possible to state a bridge principle in my account. To do this, we
have to make a modification to the form above. The antecedent of the form above is
‘If p entails q’, but in my account the relation that thinkers must be responsive to is
not entailment in general, but entailment in light of particular logical rules. Let us
say that p ‘directly entails’ q if and only if the transition from p to q is correct in
light of a single application of a logical rule.36 (For example, p directly entails if p,
then p, but does not directly entail if p, then if p, then p.37) The antecedent of my
bridge principle must invoke direct entailment rather than entailment.
What about the consequent of the bridge principle? Initially, it seems like all we
have is:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p you must find the transition to q
primitively compelling.
If we wanted to build in more detail, we could say:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p, and if the question arises whether q,
you have a reason to believe q, unless other factors override this.
But we have to be careful about ‘reason’ here. This ‘reason’ is just an articulation of
the primitive compulsion a subject feels in virtue of having a disposition to conform
to a logical rule. It is not a justifying reason (an ‘other things being equal it would be
good if. . . ’ reason), because a subject could have a similar reason in virtue of being
disposed to conform to the rule for ‘tonk’ (Prior 1960). Rather, it is an explanatory
reason – a motivational state which could explain the subject’s action (Parfit 1997;
Alvarez 2017). And this means that we do not yet have a genuine bridge principle:
a bridge principle has a normative statement as its consequent, but a claim about
36We can define entailment as the transitive closure of direct entailment. p entails q if and only if
for some set {p1, p2,. . . pn}, p directly entails p1, p1 directly entails p2 ... and pn directly entails q.
37Compare Field’s (2009) notion of ‘obvious’ entailment and the diachronic norms discussed by
Hlobil (2015).
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explanatory reasons is not a normative statement. Similar remarks apply to ‘must’
in the previous formulation of the principle.
However, in my account thinking does have genuine normative status, and a
failure to find the right transitions primitively compelling means a failure to think.
In other words, while the principle above simply describes what it is to have a
disposition to conform to logical rules, the value of thinking means that we have a
reason – indeed, a need – to have such a disposition. This, I think, allows us to say
that if p directly entails q, someone who believes p does have a justifying (as well as
explanatory) reason to believe q. If they refuse to believe q, this raises doubts about
whether they are thinking. So we have:
If p directly entails q, then if you believe p, and if the question arises whether q,
you have a reason to believe q, unless other factors override this.
This (fairly weak) bridge principle is true in my account.
To be clear, this bridge principle is not particularly novel. It is a reasons-based,
rather than ought-based principle, like that of Sainsbury (2002). This puts it in
tension with the ‘Strictness Test’ that MacFarlane (2004) draws from Broome (1999):
essentially that pro tanto reasons are too weak to properly capture logical normativity.
The intuitive worry is that reasons-based bridge principles make it too easy for other
considerations to override logical reasons. In my view, some of the force of this
objection comes from conflating explanatory and justifying reasons. The explanatory
reasons generated by logical dispositions may, indeed, be hard to override: if you
believe p, and p directly entails q, you can’t choose not to believe q merely because
you are offered some money. But the justifying reasons generated by logic are pro
tanto, as there may be good reason, all things considered, to try to bring it about
that you disbelieve q, even if it follows from some p which you accept.
This leads to the second remark I want to make. The bridge principle in my
account is open-ended, containing a reference to overriding considerations, rather
than attempting to specify when we should, and when we should not, draw a valid
inference. This is a feature it shares with other reasons-based bridge principles
(MacFarlane 2004). This contrasts with some other investigations of the normativity
of logic, which aim at finding a plausible bridge principle which avoids implausible
consequences while still providing some reasonably strong normativity. The way these
accounts avoid implausible consequences is by building a bridge principle explicitly
to avoid them – for example, building in an exception for cases where the conclusion
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of the entailment is false. The resulting bridge principle satisfies the Strictness Test,
specifying when we should, and should not, draw a valid inference. My account
generates some novel reasons of principle to think this is the wrong strategy.
To show this, I want to develop an analogy. Consider the normativity of promising.
I think – as did Anscombe (1969) – that an account of the normativity of promising
should be composed of two parts. First, there is the rule of promising – the rule you
have to tend to follow in order to count as promising. Plausibly, this rule is simply
‘keep your promises, unless released from doing so by the promisee’. Second, however,
there is an account of why promising is something we should go in for. Here there
are a range of options: virtue theories, contract theories, consequentialist theories
and so on (Habib 2018).
Now, what about a promise to commit murder? Such a promise should not be
kept: so should we say that the rule of promising is really ‘keep your promises, unless
released from doing so by the promisee, or unless the promise is to commit murder’?
In my view, we should not. Having a tendency to follow the rule of promising does
not require that you follow the rule in every case; it is consistent with this tendency
that you sometimes override it when there are good reasons to do so. If we built
all the exceptions there are into the rule of promising, what we would end up with
would not be an account of the normativity proprietary to promising; it would be an
account of general morality contained as exceptions to promise-keeping.
Similarly, I do not think we should incorporate the rule against believing false-
hoods, or other good epistemic rules, into an account of the normativity of logic. The
result would no longer be an account of the normativity proprietary to logic; it would
be an account of good epistemic conduct. Of course, an account of the normativity of
logic will be part of an account of good epistemic conduct – this much is reflected in
the open-endedness of my bridge principle – but that does not mean that we should
be able to read off the latter from the former, any more than we should be able to
read off the wrongness of murder from our account of the normativity of promising.
If this is right, then there are reasons of principle for rejecting the Strictness Test as
a constraint on bridge principles.
Finally, I’d like to end by spelling out a deep difference between my account and
a view of logic and thinking that motivates much work on bridge principles: namely,
that these principles bridge a gap between logic and thinking. The idea that there is
such a gap derives from Gilbert Harman (1986, 6). Steinberger explains the idea as
follows (2019a, 307; citation omitted):
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The traditional conception whereby logic occupies a normative role in our
cognitive economy rests upon the mistake of conflating (or at least running
too closely together) principles of deductive logic with what Harman calls
‘a theory of reasoning’. Yet the two enterprises—formulating a deductive
logic and formulating a normative theory of reasoning—are fundamentally
different according to Harman. A theory of reasoning is a theory of how
ordinary agents should go about managing their beliefs. ... In short,
Harman’s explanation of our intuitions to the effect that logic must have
a normative role to play in reasoning is that we conflate deductive logic
and theories of reasoning. Little wonder, then, that we take there to be
an intimate relation between logic and norms of belief: the relation is
simply that of identity! However, once we are disabused of this confusion,
Harman maintains, we are left with ‘a gap’. The question is whether that
gap separating logic and norms of reasoning can be bridged.
Bridge principles are then conceived as a way to bridge the gap. This is reflected in
the form of the principles: the antecedent is a claim about thoughts or sentences,
saying nothing about thinking, while the consequent is a claim about thinking. Given
that the claim about thinking is a normative one, the suggestion is that what bridges
the gap between logic and thinking is the normativity of logic.38 If normativity is
what bridges the gap between logic and thinking, and the correct bridge principle
specifies that normativity, then the correct bridge principle is not just true, but also
fundamental in an explanation of how logic relates to thinking.
The account I’ve developed in this paper has a very different shape. On my
account, a bridge principle is true, but it is derivative, rather than fundamental, in
an explanation of how logic relates to thinking. Of course, this point isn’t meant as
an objection to Harman, or to the bridge principles literature: that would require
defending the constitutive position, which I haven’t done here. But it is still worth
spelling out the difference in approach, because it helps us to clarify the theoretical
ambitions of an account of logical normativity.
On my own account, the correct bridge principle does not bridge a gap between
logic and thinking. If there is such a gap, then what bridges it is that logic is
constitutive of thinking – i.e. that thinkers have to tend to conform to logical rules
in order to think. But given the way I defined ‘logic’ as a set of inference-rules
operating on thoughts, it might be better to say that, on my own account, there is
38This suggestion is not essential to the study of bridge principles: it would be possible to frame
them as attempting to specify the way in which logic is normative, but not attempting to make any
claims about what is explanatorily fundamental. However, as is clear from MacFarlane (2004) and
Steinberger (2019a), the gap idea does motivate much of this research.
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no gap at all between logic and thinking. As a result, it would be possible to give
an explanation of how logic relates to thinking, and of why logic is normative for
thinking, without any reference to bridge principles.
This possibility should force us to clarify what we are after in studying bridge
principles. We might simply be interested in finding some truth about the normative
force of logic. In that case, seeking a satisfactory bridge principle may be a good
strategy. But – as suggested by talk of a ‘gap’ between logic and thinking – we
might also be interested in giving a fundamental explanation of how logic relates to
thinking. In that case, we should not take for granted that bridge principles are the
place to start.
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